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Promoting rule compliance is of vital importance for societal leaders such as managers, 
policy makers, and politicians. People’s willingness to comply with rules and guidelines tends to 
be positively associated with an organization’s financial success, in part because rules tend to 
promote collective as opposed to individual interests (e.g., coming on time, behaving ethically, 
prudent use of resources, paying taxes; Akintoye & Tashie, 2013; Parks, Joireman, & Van Lange, 
2013). Although the importance of rule compliance can hardly be overstated, rule compliance is 
not always easy to achieve. Enron, for example, went bankrupt as a consequence of unethical 
behavior and poor oversight from regulatory agencies (Raul, 2002). Similarly, governments’ 
success in promoting compliance with tax rules varies widely between countries. Tax evasion is 
estimated to cost Greece up to 25% of its GDP, Germany up to 13.5% of its GDP, and the 
United States of America up to 8.6% of its GDP (Schneider, 2008; Tax Justice Network, 2011).  
 Although leaders can promote rule compliance through rewarding rule-abiding behavior 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2011), they typically punish rule-breaking behavior with fines, penalties, and 
prison sentences (Kirchler, Kogler, & Muehlbacher, 2014). For example, judges sentence citizens 
to jail, managers fire employees for not sticking to rules, and government officials fine businesses 
for evading taxes. But what makes some leaders more, and other leaders less, effective at 
promoting rule compliance with such punishments? In this dissertation, I focus on the 
determinants and consequences of leaders’ punishment goals. I investigate how and why leaders 
rely on certain punishment goals, and how and why leaders’ reliance on such punishment goals 
affects punishment effectiveness.    
I argue that—with increasing power over others—leaders rely more on punishment goals 
that are actually suboptimal in promoting rule compliance. I propose that power fosters a 
distrustful mindset towards people, which increases reliance on deterrence—but not just deserts 
as a punishment goal. Using deterrence—as opposed to just deserts—as a justification for 
punishments, in turn, decreases people’s willingness to comply with rules because they feel 
distrusted by the leader. Although power may thus increase leaders’ reliance on punishments to 




  What do leaders aim to achieve with punishment? Scholars have typically classified 
punishment goals into goals that aim to deter future rule-breaking behavior (Bentham, 1789/1988; 
Hobbes, 1651/1988; Kirchler et al., 2014; Nagin, 1998) or goals that aim to give people their just 
deserts (i.e., give offenders their deserved punishment, thereby achieving justice; Darley, 2009; 
Kant, 1780/1961).  
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Although both goals may co-occur, they have different aims. A deterrence goal aims to 
deter future rule breaking from potential rule breakers and, as such, is prospective rather than 
retroactive. When having such a goal, leaders should be primarily concerned with deterring future 
rule breaking instead of achieving retributive justice through punishing (past) rule breakers 
proportionate to their crime. This approach is most often associated with legal philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham (1789/1988) who argued that “general prevention ought to be the chief end of 
punishment, as its real justification” (p. 396). In contrast, a just-deserts goal aims to punish past 
rule breakers proportionately (i.e., achieve balance between crime and punishment), regardless of 
the punishment’s ability to deter future rule breaking. A just-deserts goal is thus retroactive rather 
than prospective. Having this goal, leaders should be primarily concerned with achieving 
retributive justice through punishing rule breakers proportionate to their crime instead of 
preventing future rule breaking. This approach is generally associated with moral philosopher 
Immanuel Kant (1780/1961) who argued that “punishment can never be administered merely as 
a means to promoting another good” and that “punishment should be pronounced over all 
criminals proportionate to their internal wickedness” (p. 397).  
There are two general reasons why I am interested in understanding the determinants and 
consequences of leaders’ punishment goals. First, it provides an explanation for why leaders use 
punishments. What do leaders want to achieve when they impose (potentially life-changing) 
punishments on others? Second, it provides an explanation for leaders’ (in)effectiveness in 
promoting rule compliance with punishments. Are the goals that leaders use to justify their 
punishments beneficial or detrimental for people’s willingness to comply with rules? In this 
dissertation, I thus investigate punishment goals from both the top-down perspective of the 
leader (the determinants) and the bottom-up perspective of the people (the consequences). In the 
following paragraphs, I will first address the role of power as a determinant of punishment goals. 
I will then address the consequences of punishment goals for people’s willingness to comply with 
rules. Last, I will integrate the proposed determinants and consequences into an overarching 
framework with one underlying psychological explanation.  
 
Determinants of punishment goals 
Previous research on the psychology of punishment suggests that punishments are 
typically guided by a just-deserts goal rather than a deterrence goal (Darley, 2009). That is, 
punishments tend to be aimed at giving rule breakers what they deserve instead of preventing 
future rule-breaking behavior from these rule breakers (Aharoni & Fridlund, 2011; Carlsmith, 
2006; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Keller, Oswald, Stucki, & Gollwitzer, 2010). In a 
recent experiment, for instance, participants still desired a rule breaker to be punished even when 
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the rule breaker (or other potential rule breakers) could never be deterred from breaking rules 
(Crocket, Ozdemir, & Fehr, 2014). When assigning punishments, these participants were also 
shown to be sensitive to factors that are relevant for just-deserts theory (e.g., extenuating 
circumstances) while being insensitive to factors that are relevant for the deterrence of rule 
breaking (e.g., publicity of punishment; Carlsmith et al., 2002). Just-deserts punishments are in 
part preferred over deterrence punishments because giving rule breakers their just deserts 
through punishment is (emotionally) satisfying (de Quervain et al., 2006; Strobel et al., 2011; 
Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008) and driven by emotions such as anger (Nelissen & 
Zeelenberg, 2009; Seip, Van Dijk, & Rotteveel, 2014). This has led some scholars to conclude 
that: “the just-deserts goal is the psychological foundation of citizens’ desire to punish 
transgressions” (Darley, 2009, p. 1).  
 However, this conclusion seems premature in light of the limited amount of research that 
has been conducted on the psychological determinants of deterrence. The majority of research 
on punishment goals has focused on the determinants of just-deserts driven punishments, such 
as anger (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2011; Seip et al., 2014), concerns about group members’ status 
(Okimoto & Wenzel, 2011), and victims’ perceived desires (Gromet, Okimoto, Wenzel, & 
Darley, 2012), but has left the psychological determinants of deterrence relatively unaddressed. 
This is surprising since governmental authorities and organizational managers are well 
documented to use punishments to prevent-and-deter citizens and employees from breaking 
rules (Butterfield, Trevino, Wade, & Ball, 2005). A major concern among European tax agencies, 
for example, is to deter citizens from evading taxes with harsh fines and penalties (Kirchler et al., 
2014). Moreover, philosophers and legal scholars have long stressed the importance of deterring 
people from rule breaking with punishments (Bentham, 1789/1988; Hobbes, 1651/1988). But 
what, then, determines reliance on deterrence as opposed to just deserts as a punishment goal?  
 
Power 
 Power can be broadly defined as asymmetric control over valuable resources (Anderson 
& Brion 2014; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). As a result, power entails the ability to reward or punish 
others by granting or withholding valuable resources (Keltner, Anderson, & Gruenfeld, 2003). To 
help organizations achieve rule compliance, leaders are often given such power. Government 
officials can set the height of fines that citizens have to pay when they evade taxes, university 
professors can control whether and when lower-ranked academics are given tenure, and 
managers can control employees’ salaries or decide about bonuses. Having power can have 
pervasive psychological effects on people’s perceptions, emotions, and behaviors (Blader & 
Chen, 2012; Mooijman, Van Dijk, Ellemers, & Van Dijk, 2015). For instance, studies have shown 
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that control over resources can benefit power holders—they tend to be less dependent on others 
(Fiske, 1993; Lee & Tiedens, 2001) and therefore enjoy greater freedom to act according to their 
personal desires (Galinksy, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Lammers, Stoker, Jordan, Pollman, & 
Stapel, 2011). It is easier for power holders to disregard social norms (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003) and focus on accomplishing their own goals (Guinote, 2007a; Maner & Mead, 
2010), instead of having to devote attention to what others think and feel (Goodwin, Gubin, 
Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000). Power therefore tends to boost people’s self-esteem (Wojciszke & 
Struzynska–Kujalowicz, 2007) and leads them to express more positive—approach related—
emotions (e.g., amusement and happiness) and less negative—inhibition related—emotions (e.g., 
embarrassment and shame; Keltner et al., 2003). As Rucker, Galinsky, and Duboi (2012, p. 353) 
noted: “the cumulative evidence suggests that power is an omnipresent force whose tentacles 
reach out and grasp nearly every situation to guide and ultimately shape human behavior”. 
Recent research suggests that having power can impact how severely people believe 
others should be punished for rule-breaking acts (Van Prooijen, Coffeng, & Vermeer, 2014; 
Wiltermuth & Flynn, 2013). Van Prooijen et al. (2014) demonstrated that power holders punish 
rule breakers more harshly because power tends to increase people’s tendency to perceive rule 
breaking acts as diagnostic of the rule breaker’s personality. Moreover, Wiltermuth and Flynn 
(2013) demonstrated that power holders punish rule breakers more harshly than non-power 
holders because power increases the moral clarity with which people perceive morally right acts 
from morally wrong ones (i.e., power holders view rule-breaking acts as more immoral than non-
power holders). Although these previous studies on power and punishments are informative, 
they do not address the goals that power holders strive for when imposing punishments on 
others. Indeed, what do such power holders aim to achieve with their punishments? The first aim 
of this dissertation is to examine how and why power affects leaders’ punishment goals. Since 
punishment goals are a vital source of punishment behavior, understanding the effects of power 
on punishment goals can provide a fundamental understanding of leaders’ subsequent 
punishment behavior (e.g., the type of punishment they tend to use). More specifically, I propose 
that—through fostering a distrustful mindset towards others—power increases reliance on 
deterrence, but not on just deserts, as a punishment goal. Power is thus predicted to be an 
important determinant of leaders’ punishment goals through affecting their distrust towards 
others. The research—consisting of eight experimental studies and a field study—testing this 






Power and distrust  
 Considering the theorized importance of distrust in explaining why power increases 
reliance on deterrence—but not just deserts—as a punishment goal, I also examined why having 
power increases distrust in others. Distrust entails expecting others to break rules that promote 
cooperation (such as a declaration of business expenses; Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 
2006). Understanding the power-distrust link is important because it gives further insight into the 
psychological mechanism that underlies leaders’ reliance on deterrence as a punishment goal. 
Powerful leaders tend to be motivated to maintain their power (because of its many benefits; see 
Fehr, Herz, & Wilkening, 2013) and distrusting others prepares them to counteract behaviors 
aimed at undermining their power (e.g., through expecting others to break rules; Kramer, 1999). 
For instance, managers who trust their employees to comply with organizational rules are more 
likely to fail to take the appropriate actions required to prevent their employees from breaking 
rules, thereby potentially undermining their own power position. Distrusting their employees to 
comply with organizational rules, however, increases the likelihood that a manager engages in 
acts that prevent employees from breaking rules (e.g., introducing more monitoring; Lount & 
Pettit, 2012). I propose that the power-distrust link is in part explained by leaders’ motivation to 
maintain their power over others. Decreasing the motivation to maintain power may thus 
attenuate the extent to which power fosters distrust. Because power is hypothesized to increase 
reliance on deterrence as a punishment goal through increasing distrust, these predictions suggest 
that powerful leaders’ reliance on deterrence as a punishment goal can in part be explained by 
their motivation to maintain power over others. The research—consisting of three experimental 
studies—addressing this prediction is reported in Chapter 3. 
 
Consequences of punishment goals 
 In addition to examining power as a determinant of punishment goals, the aim of this 
dissertation is to examine the consequences of punishment goals. When leaders justify their 
punishment behavior as an attempt to deter people or provide people their just deserts, does this 
affect people’s willingness to comply with rules? Inspired by the literature on (perceived) 
interpersonal justice, I examine whether punishment goals may have direct consequences for 
people’s willingness to comply with rules. Previous research has demonstrated that rule 
compliance is in part determined by how people feel treated by their leader (i.e., interpersonal 
justice; Tyler & Lind, 1992). For instance, people’s willingness to comply with rules decreases 
when a leader is perceived to act unjustly through pursuing his or her own interest instead of 
others’ interests (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002). This is in part because of the “social 
contract” between people and their leaders; people are willing to comply with leaders’ rules and 
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grant them power as long as leaders ensure that justice is done (i.e., people who cooperate are 
proportionately rewarded and people who break rules are proportionately punished; see Plato 380 
BC/1992). These effects of perceived interpersonal treatment are often independent from the 
outcome that people (expect to) receive from leaders (Cropanzano, Gillian, & Gilliland, 2007). In 
other words, it can be the subjective treatment itself, regardless of the objective monetary 
outcome that one expects to receive, that plays a role in people’s willingness to comply with 
rules.  
 In this dissertation, I examine whether leaders’ use of punishment goals as a punishment 
justification affects the subsequent effectiveness of this punishment. I propose that justifying the 
use of punishments as an attempt to deter, compared to an attempt to achieve justice, decreases 
the extent to which a punishment is effective at promoting rule compliance. I further propose 
that this is explained by people feeling more distrusted by a leader that justifies punishments as 
an attempt to deter compared to achieve justice. Indeed, distrust may not only underlie reliance 
on deterrence as a punishment goal, it may also directly influence people’s willingness to comply 
with rules because being distrusted by one’s leader may seem unjust and unwarranted. Examining 
these consequences of punishment-goal justifications allows an understanding of how leaders’ 
reliance on punishment goals (as described briefly above, and in more detail in Chapter 2) affects 
the subsequent effectiveness of the punishment. This provides an integrative understanding of 
the consequences of leaders’ punishment goals. Is a leader’s inclination to rely on certain 
punishment goals beneficial or detrimental for his or her ability to promote rule compliance 
through the use of such punishments? The research—consisting of four experiments—
addressing the consequences of punishment goals for punishment effectiveness is reported in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Integrating determinants and consequences of punishment goals 
 Central to the above-mentioned predictions about the determinants and consequences of 
punishment goals is the role of distrust. Distrust entails an expectation of malicious intent from 
others (integrity-based distrust; Kramer, 1999). Distrust thus means expecting others to break 
rules that promote cooperation (such as rules regarding tax payments or declarations of business 
expenses; Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006). As described briefly above, distrust is 
predicted to both underlie leaders’ reliance on deterrence as a punishment goal, and decrease the 
effectiveness of punishments that are justified as an attempt to deter people from rule breaking. 
Distrust, in other words, is predicted to mediate the effect of power on punishment goals (the 
determinant) and to mediate the effect of using deterrence as punishment justification on rule 
compliance (the consequence). More specifically, I predict leaders’ distrust towards people to mediate 
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the positive relationship between power and use of deterrence as a punishment goal, and I 
predict people feeling distrusted by the leader to mediate the negative relationship between leaders’ use 
of deterrence as punishment justification and rule compliance. Leaders’ distrust towards people 
may, in other words, be determined by their power, and consequently inferred from their 
punishment-goal justifications by people, thereby undermining people’s willingness to comply 
with rules. Distrust may thus explain why leaders rely on deterrence as a punishment goal and 
why this reliance on deterrence may decrease punishment effectiveness.  
 
Summary 
In sum, in the current dissertation I examine, (a) how and why the power that leaders 
have affects their distrust in others, (b) how this distrust affects leaders’ reliance on punishment 
goals, (c) how leaders’ use of punishment goals as a justification affects the extent to which 
people feel distrusted by their leader, and (d) how feeling distrusted by their leader affects 
people’s willingness to comply with this leader’s rules. Together, addressing these four questions 
facilitates both a top-down understanding of how and why leaders are inclined to use 
punishments and a bottom-up understanding of how and why people are willing to comply with 
rules set by leaders that rely on deterrence or just deserts goal for punishments. In the remainder 
of this dissertation, I will outline these questions in more detail and provide empirical support for 
the current set of predictions. I conclude this dissertation by discussing the theoretical and 
practical implications of my analysis, and the limitations of my research, in Chapter 5. Because 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 were written as independent articles that can be read separately, readers may 
notice some overlap between the chapters. Please also note that throughout the dissertation, the 
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Leaders of all sorts frequently install sanctions to induce compliance with rules (Parks et 
al., 2013). Managers publicly reprimand employees for bad behavior and policy-makers 
implement policies with a mandatory minimum for punishments. Yet, punishment is not always 
effective and can even be counterproductive (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Van Dijk, Mulder, & 
De Kwaadsteniet, 2014). If punishment can be problematic, what do leaders then aim to achieve 
with their punishments? In the current paper, we argue that leaders’ power affects what they aim 
to achieve with punishments. Specifically, we propose that power increases the tendency to 
punish to deter rule breaking instead of give rule breakers their just deserts, and that this power-
deterrence link can be explained by power fostering a distrustful mindset.  
Addressing this question is important because the managers and policy-makers who 
design and implement punishments have, by definition, a form of power—that is, they possess 
and can allocate critical resources. Yet, little is known about how power affects how and why 
they punish. Answering this fundamental question about power and punishments can provide 
important insights into the punitive practices of leaders such as managers and policy-makers, and 
in what ways their punishments are effective in inducing rule-abiding behavior (e.g., Arvey & 
Ivancevich, 1980; Ball, Trevino, & Sims, 1994). Gaining more insight into how and why power 
affects punitive practices may therefore help organizations and governmental institutions design 
more effective sanction policies.  
 
Power and Punishment Motives 
Power can be defined as asymmetric control over critical resources (Magee & Galinsky, 
2008); that is, power entails the capacity to control the outcomes of others. Power provides the 
benefit of controlling one’s own and others’ monetary (e.g., salary), social (e.g., inclusion) or 
physical (e.g., housing) resources. Importantly, having power goes hand in hand with the ability 
to implement punishments such as salary cuts, fines, or prison-sentences.  
The motives that guide such punishments are typically classified into deterrence motives 
or just desert motives (Carlsmith et al., 2002). The deterrence motive of punishment reflects the 
desire to deter people from engaging in uncooperative, rule-breaking behavior (see Bentham, 
1789/1988 and Hobbes, 1651/1988). For example, managers can punish employees publicly to 
set an example and deter future rule breaking by other employees. In contrast, the just deserts 
motive is mainly concerned with giving offenders their deserved punishment (i.e., their “just 
deserts”; Darley, 2009). Punishments based on this motive are generally proportionate to the 
severity of the offence but insensitive to the likelihood of deterring uncooperative, rule-breaking 
behavior (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Kant, 1780/1952; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). Thus, the deterrence 
and just deserts motives reflect different punishment goals. The deterrence motive aims to deter 
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future rule-breaking behavior from all individuals through the installment and implementation of 
punishments. Instead, the just deserts motive aims to achieve retributive justice by retroactively 
and proportionally punishing individual rule breakers.  
Research has suggested that people generally prefer punishments that restore retributive 
justice by giving offenders their just deserts (Aharoni & Fridlund, 2011; Carlsmith, 2006; 
Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley, 2009). We argue, however, that power increases reliance on 
deterrence, but not just deserts, as a punishment motive. We propose that power increases 
distrust, which in turn increases the reliance on deterrence as a punishment motive and increases 
the use of punishments that are suitable as a deterrent—for instance, punishments that are public 
or have a mandatory minimum.  
 
Power and Distrust 
Asymmetric control over resources benefits power holders. For example, managers can 
award themselves salaries and bonuses that are bigger than those typically given to employees 
(Kipnis, Castel, Gergen, & Mauch, 1976). This is possible because power holders are less 
dependent on others (Fiske, 1993; Lee & Tiedens, 2001) and therefore enjoy greater freedom to 
act according to their personal desires (Galinksy, et al., 2003; Lammers et al., 2011). Indeed, it is 
easier for power holders to disregard social norms (Keltner et al., 2003) and focus on 
accomplishing their own goals (Guinote, 2007a; Maner & Mead, 2010) instead of having to 
devote attention to what others think and feel (Goodwin et al., 2000). Power, in other words, is 
beneficial for those who hold it. Power holders are therefore motivated to protect their beneficial 
position (Fehr et al., 2013; Maner, Gailliot, Butz, & Peruche, 2007) and prevent others from 
obtaining access to their power (Case & Maner, 2014; Lammers & Stapel, 2011; Mead & Maner, 
2012).  
One way in which power holders can lose resource control is to be too trusting of others. 
Trust entails an expectation of benign behavior from others—that is, behavior that furthers the 
interests of the trustee (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006). 
Trust further entails an expectation of the other party’s benign intent. Trust can therefore be 
distinguished from being assured that others take your interests into account. In contrast to trust, 
assurance is not based on an expectation of benign intent, but on the idea that others further 
your interest because this is in their self-interest (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Thus, trusting 
others means expecting others to take your interests into account, even when this is not in the 
other’s self-interest. We similarly operationalize trust as an expectation of cooperative intent, 
which we define as expecting others to further your interest in interest-conflicting situations (cf. 
Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Mulder et al., 2006). For instance, in the classic trust game, trusting 
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others means giving away control over one’s money based on the expectation that others will 
cooperate and give control over this money back at the end of the game. When one’s trust is met, 
one keeps control over the money. However, when one’s trust is abused, one loses control over 
the money to the other (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). Trusting others to cooperate can then 
be considered a form of potential resource sharing (i.e., power sharing) that opens up a power 
holder for loss of resource control (Kramer, 1999; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Zand, 
1997). Indeed, expecting benign intentions from others has been shown to be an important 
antecedent of opening oneself up to these others’ potentially exploitative behaviors (Lount & 
Petitt, 2012). Managers that trust their employees to stick to organizational rules may fail to take 
the appropriate actions required to prevent employees’ rule-breaking acts that undermine this 
manager’s power position. Because power holders such as managers are motivated to stay in 
power, we predict that power fosters an individual’s expectation that others cannot be trusted to 
cooperate (i.e., choose other-interest over self-interest).   
This prediction rests on the notion that power facilitates goal-directed behavior (Guinote, 
2007b) and that an important goal of people in power positions is to maintain their privileged 
position within the power hierarchy (Williams, 2014; Willis & Guinote, 2011). Research has 
demonstrated that people exhibit a strong tendency to retain obtained power (Fehr et al., 2013)—
a tendency that strongly increases with individuals’ increasing degree of loss aversion. This 
suggests that power is especially desirable once you obtain it and that power holders are strongly 
motivated to retain this desirable power (i.e., power-endowment effect). Since trusting people’s 
inclination to cooperate increases vulnerability to potentially losing resources and thus power to 
others, we predict that power holders are likely to distrust others to cooperate. These predictions 
depart from previous research on how power can make people less averse to losing resources 
(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Inesi, 2010). In contrast to this previous research, the current 
theorizing revolves around power holders potentially losing resources to others. We suggest that 
a loss of resources may be threatening to power holders when others are able to gain such 
resources and hereby undermine a power holder’s resource control. As such, we hypothesize that 
power fosters distrust as a resource-protection strategy.  
 
Distrust and Punishment Motives 
 We have hypothesized so far that power holders become more distrustful due to their 
power. We further propose that this increased distrust in turn increases the reliance on 
deterrence, rather than just deserts, as a punishment motive. We base this prediction on the 
notion that uncooperative, rule-breaking behavior is expected when distrust is high (Mayer et al., 
1995; Mulder et al., 2006). Distrust may therefore increase the belief that people need to be 
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deterred with punishments from breaking rules that promote cooperation. In contrast, 
punishments that aim to give offenders their just deserts are more concerned with restoring 
retributive justice through proportionate punishments. Punitive responses that give offenders 
their just deserts have been robustly linked to factors that have little to do with decreasing the 
future likelihood of rule breaking (e.g., moral outrage and concern for social cohesion, see 
Carlsmith et al., 2002; Tyler & Boeckman, 1997). We therefore predict that distrust increases the 
reliance on deterrence as a punishment motive whereas it does not affect the reliance on the just 
deserts motive. This conjecture corresponds with the view of seventeenth-century philosopher 
Thomas Hobbes (1651/1996), who in his book Leviathan argued that—because people generally 
care little about others—punishments should deter people from breaking rules that promote 
cooperation. In sum, we propose that power increases reliance on such Hobbesian philosophy; 
that is, an individual will be more inclined to distrust others and therefore rely more on 
deterrence as a punishment motive.  
 
Punishment Preferences 
How might such an increased reliance on deterrence as a punishment motive affect 
punishment preferences? We address two ways in which punitive practices are likely to be 
affected by the increased reliance on deterrence rather than just deserts—that is, public 
punishments and punishments with a mandatory minimum. 
Power holders can use public punishment to deter rule-breaking behavior. Microsoft, for 
example, prominently displayed its lawsuits against piracy on its website, probably in an attempt 
to deter piracy through reminding everyone of the enforced rule and ensuing punishment (Xiao 
& Houser, 2011). Publicly communicating the names of rule-breakers may serve as a similar 
deterrent; government-officials sometimes implement policies that publicly communicate the 
names of offenders as a way to show the consequences of rule breaking and hereby deter future 
rule breaking from others. For instance, a Texas judge recently convicted a drunk driver to 
publicly wear a sign stating that he killed someone while driving drunk (Texas Judge, 2012). 
Similarly, both India and parts of Australia recently started publicly naming and shaming 
offenders in an attempt to deter crime (see Langlois, 2012). Setting a mandatory punishment 
minimum provides another way in which rule breaking can be deterred (Gabor & Crutcher, 
2002). Setting a guaranteed minimum for a punishment may deter rule-breaking behavior through 
increasing the certainty of punishment severity. In other words, by increasing the extent to which 
potential offenders can be sure of receiving a fixed punishment upon breaking a rule.  
From the perspective of deterrence theory, private punishments serve less purpose than 
public punishments, since private punishments have less potential to deter rule breaking 
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(Carlsmith et al., 2002; Nagin, 1998). Similarly, raising a mandatory minimum for punishment 
guarantees that offenders are less likely to think they can “get away” with breaking rules (Nagin, 
1998). Just-deserts theory makes less clear predictions about these types of punishments—giving 
offenders their just deserts revolves around proportionate punishments instead of revenge, which 
is the desire to make the offender suffer (often disproportionately; see Gerber & Jackson, 2012 
for empirical evidence of the distinction between just deserts and revenge). Instead of wanting 
the offender to suffer disproportionally, the just-deserts motive aims to achieve proportionality 
between the rule-breaking act and punishment (i.e., balance). Crucially—for just-deserts theory—
private punishments are often sufficient because there is little need for the punishment to 
publicly deter others and private punishments can give offenders their deserved punishment 
without making them suffer disproportionally (Carlsmith et al., 2002). Moreover, for just-deserts 
theory, mandatory minimum punishments are often unnecessary. Just-deserts theory predicts that 
rule-breaking acts have to be punished on the basis of the characteristics of the act, such as 
extenuating circumstances—no mandatory minimum is required as some offences might go 
unpunished. Thus, in just-deserts theory there is generally less purpose for public punishments 
and mandatory minimum punishments than in deterrence theory. Deterrence theory proposes 
that one should frequently use public punishments and mandatory minimum punishments, as 
they can be efficient in preventing future rule breaking.  
The majority of states in the USA implement some form of mandatory minimum for 
punishments, even when the public considers such policies harsh and unjust (see “Mandatory 
Minimum”, 2007). Furthermore, punishments that are implemented publicly are frequently 
considered to be ineffective or to violate offenders’ privacy (Jabour, 2013). Nevertheless, power 
holders frequently install and implement such punishments against the wishes and preferences of 
their employees or the general public. Our theorizing provides an explanation for this 
phenomenon: Power increases distrust in others and therefore increases the reliance on 
deterrence as a punishment motive. This increased reliance on deterrence, in turn, facilitates the 
use of public punishments and punishments with a mandatory minimum.  
 
Research overview 
 We tested the hypothesized effect of power on deterrence through distrust across nine 
studies. The predictions and the specific studies that test every prediction are depicted in Figure 
2.1. Because every proposed relationship is new and lacks empirical validation from previous 
research, we decided to first test every prediction separately (i.e., power increasing distrust, 
distrust increasing deterrence, and power increasing deterrence) in a correlational and causal 
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manner before testing the full mediation model. This gave us the advantage to increase 
generalizability and replicability, and to establish the causality of the effects.  
First, we describe the six studies that test the hypothesized links between power and 
distrust, distrust and deterrence, and power and deterrence, respectively. Next, we describe three 
studies that test the mediating role of distrust. Across all these studies, we used different 
instantiations of power—from measuring a general sense of power (Studies 2.1a and 2.4a), to 
power primes (Studies 2.3b and 2.4b) and structural manipulations of power (Studies 2.1b, 2.3a 
and 2.4c). We also measured (Studies 2.1a, 2.1b, 2.2a, 2.4a, and 2.4b) and manipulated distrust 
(Studies 2.2b and 2.4c), and measured punishment motives across a number of different 
situations— from the problem of tax fraud (Studies 2.4a and 2.4b) and academic plagiarism 
(Study 2.3b) to cooperation in social dilemmas (Studies 2.1b, 2.2b, and 2.4c) and less specific 
situations (Studies 2.1a, 2.2a, and 2.3a). We also included cross-cultural samples from the USA 
(Studies 2.1a, 2.2a, 2.4a, and 2.4b), the Netherlands (Studies 2.1b, 2.2b, 2.3b, and 2.4c) and a 
sample of Western European countries included in the European Value Survey (Study 2.3a). 
To demonstrate that the effect of power on deterrence is mediated by distrust specifically, 
we also assessed the role of victim identification and the importance of group interest. Previous 
research has demonstrated that power can increase a focus on the welfare of the entire group 
relative to the individual (Magee & Smith, 2013) and decrease identification with victims 
(Galinsky et al., 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2008). To rule out that the effect of power on deterrence 
is explained by one of these variables instead of distrust, we assessed them in Study 2.4c. 
Moreover, in order to address the extent to which self-reported punishment motives translate 
into actual punitive practices (see Carlsmith, 2008), we measured the extent to which power 
holders use public punishments (Study 2.3b) and mandatory minimum sentences (Study 2.4a) as a 
way to deter rule breaking.   
In our studies, we excluded participants who misreported their power position or failed 
to follow instructions with regard to writing an autobiographical story about power. Consistent 
with the recommendations of Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2011), we made sure that every 
condition had at least 20 participants, although most studies reported have considerably more 
participants per condition (i.e., more than 40; cf. Simmons, Nelson and Simonsohn, 2013). All 
items in the studies could be answered on seven-point scales (1 = disagree completely; 7 agree 
completely), unless stated otherwise and all participants provided informed consent and were 






      
Figure 2.1. Schematic depiction of all predictions. The study numbers indicate which studies test 
which prediction. The surrounding line with accompanying studies represents tests of the full 
model.   
 
Studies 2.1a and 2.1b: Power and Distrust 
 We tested the hypothesized power-distrust relationship in two studies. Specifically, we 
tested in Study 2.1a whether chronically experiencing power (i.e., trait power) is associated with a 
general distrust towards others, and we tested in Study 2.1b whether occupying a structural 
position of power causes people to become more distrustful.  
Study 2.1a Method  
Participants, design, and procedure. A total of 165 participants (75 males, Mage = 
32.03 years, SDage  = 10.88) were recruited from the Mechanical Turk website (see for a discussion 
of this platform as a research tool, Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) and were paid $0.50 
for their participation.  
Generalized sense of power. Participants completed the generalized sense of power 
scale taken from Anderson and Galinsky (2006, see also Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2011) The 
scale assesses the extent to which people experience power in their everyday lives. Specifically, 
the scale is comprised of four items measuring high power (e.g., “In my relationships with others, 
I think I have a great deal of power”; “If I want to, I get to make the decisions”) and four items 
measuring low power (e.g., “Even if I voice them, my opinions have little sway”; “My ideas and 
opinions are often ignored”). The low-power items were reverse coded and averaged with the 
high-power items to form the generalized sense of power scale (cf. Anderson et al., 2011; M = 
4.78, SD = 0.85; Cronbach’s α = .74). To disentangle the high- versus low-power subscales and 
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indicate if the experience of power or powerlessness drives the scale’s effect, we also computed 
separate high- and low-power scales with the items measuring high and low power, respectively. 
A factor analysis (PCA) confirmed that the high- versus low-power items loaded unto two 
different components (Eigenvalue = 2.99 and 2.34, respectively) without cross-loadings and with 
a total of 66.55% variance explained for. Both the low-power subscale (α = .87) and high-power 
subscale (α = .76) had sufficient reliability and did not correlate significantly (r = .05, p = .49).  
General distrust. Participants then completed a seven-item scale measuring their general 
trust towards others (M = 4.95, SD = 0.98; α = .81). We adapted and extended items from the 
general trust scale (Yamagishi, 1986). Items included, “In general, I believe that people will break 
the rules whenever they can get away with it”, “When it really comes down to it, most people 
only think about what is good for themselves but forget what is good for others”, and “Most 
people can be trusted to cooperate with others” (reverse-coded).  
 
Results and discussion 
A regression analysis in which trust was regressed on power showed that, as predicted, 
the generalized sense of power scale was negatively associated with trusting others (β = -.17, 
t(165) = 2.21, p = .028). We repeated this regression analysis with the four-item scale that 
measured high power and the four-item scale that measured low power, respectively. Results 
demonstrated that the high-power subscale was negatively associated with trust (β = -.28, t(165) 
= 3.71, p < .001), whereas the low-power subscale was unrelated to trust (β = .021, t(165) = .79, p 
= .79). This provides preliminary support for our hypothesis that high power decreases trust. To 
examine whether power causes people to become more distrustful, we conducted Study 2.1b.   
 
Study 2.1b Method  
Participants, design, and procedure. Ninety-eight Dutch university students (68 
females, Mage = 22.53 years, SDage = 3.30) participated in exchange for €1 and were assigned to 
one of two conditions (power position vs. neutral position).  
 Role-based power manipulation. All participants were told that they would play in a 
“business simulation” in which they could earn extra money by working together with other 
participants. Depending upon condition, participants were then informed that they were assigned 
to a powerful manager position or they received no information about their power position (cf. 
Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012). As managers, participants were led to believe that 
they had control over how money would be allocated to the other participants. The other 
participants (described as “workers”) allegedly were unaware of this resource control of the 
participant.   
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Interpersonal trust. The business simulation was in reality a social dilemma game. The 
social dilemma comprised of a collective resource of 30 chips, with each chip worth $0.10. Every 
individual group member could take between 0 and 10 chips out of this collective resource. 
Consistent with previous social dilemma games, money that was left in the collective resource 
was multiplied by two and divided equally amongst the group members. This way, taking money 
out of the collective resource only benefitted the individual group members (Van Lange et al., 
2013). Previous research has demonstrated that there exists a strong rule (e.g., norm) to 
cooperate in such dilemma situations (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). 
Participants assigned to the managerial position had full control over the money in the common 
resource. This manipulation is consistent with the definition of power as control over valuable 
resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Nothing was mentioned about a power position to 
participants in the control condition.   
All participants then indicated to what extent they trusted the other group members to 
cooperate on a three-item scale. Items included “I think group members cannot be trusted to 
cooperate”, “Group members will weigh their self-interest more than the interests of others”, 
and “Group members cannot be trusted to maximize the group’s outcomes” (α = .64).  
Power manipulation check. Participants indicated whether they occupied a managerial 
position (yes, no) and how powerful they felt on one item (i.e., “I feel powerful). Six participants 
wrongly reported their power position and were therefore left out of the analyses. Including or 
excluding these six participants from the analyses did not change the results of these analyses. 
Confirming the validity of the power manipulation for those who correctly reported their power 
position, participants in the high-power condition (M = 4.07, SD = 1.88) felt more powerful than 
participants in the control condition (M = 3.06, SD = 1.76; t[90] = 2.64, p = .010, d = 0.56). 
 
Results and discussion 
Participants in the high-power condition placed less trust in other participants’ inclination 
to cooperate (M = 4.94, SD = 1.14) than participants in the control condition (M = 5.55, SD = 
0.87; t[90] = 2.77, p = .007, d = 0.58). Thus, taken together, Studies 2.1a and 2.1b provide 
converging evidence for the hypothesis that power increases distrust.  
 
Studies 2.2a and 2.2b: Distrust and Deterrence 
In the following two studies, we tested the second hypothesized relationship. More 
specifically, in Study 2.2a we measured participants’ chronic distrustfulness towards others and 
their desired punishment motives. We expected that participants who are chronically distrustful 
rely more on deterrence, but not just deserts, as a punishment motive. In Study 2.2b, we 
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experimentally manipulated distrust and subsequently measured participants’ punishment 
motives. We expected the experimental manipulation of distrust to cause participants to rely 
more on deterrence, but not just deserts, as a punishment motive.  
 
Study 2.2a Method  
Participants, design, and procedure. A total of 125 participants (75 males, Mage = 
32.03 years, SDage  = 10.88) were recruited from the Mechanical Turk website and were paid $0.50 
for their participation.  
General trust.  Participants completed the same general distrust scale as in Study 2.1a  
 (M = 4.95, SD = 1.01; α = .83).   
 Punishment motives. Participants indicated their preference for deterrence (M = 4.82, 
SD = 1.27; α = .82) on a four-item scale (e.g., “In general, punishments should be aimed at 
deterring crime”; ”Punishments should be aimed at preventing crime”). Participants also 
indicated their preference for just deserts (M = 4.59, SD = 1.33; α = .85) on a four-item scale 
(e.g., “In general, punishments should give offenders their just deserts”; Punishments should 
make offenders pay for their wrongdoings”). These items measuring deterrence and just deserts 
were adapted from past work examining punishment motives (De Keijser, Van der Leeden, & 
Jackson, 2002). The deterrence and just deserts motives were moderately correlated (r = .42, p < 
.001) and a factor analysis resulted in a two-factor solution with deterrence (Eigenvalue = 3.83) 
and just deserts (Eigenvalue = 1.65) items loading on two different factors with one cross loading 
and a total of 68.39% variance accounted for. 
 
Results and discussion 
Two separate linear regression analyses regressing deterrence and just deserts on distrust 
showed that general distrust was positively associated with deterrence (β = .34, t(124) = 4.00, p < 
.001) but not with just deserts (β = .11, t(123) = 1.17, p = .24). This provides initial support for 
the hypothesis that distrust increases reliance on deterrence as a punishment motive. To examine 
whether distrust causes reliance on deterrence, Study 2.2b was conducted.    
 
Study 2.2b Method  
Participants, design, and procedure. Eighty-five Dutch university students (71 
females, Mage = 22.40 years, SDage  = 5.01) participated in exchange for €1 and were assigned to 
one of two conditions (distrust vs. trust).  
Trust manipulation. All participants were told that they would participate in a social 
dilemma (cf. Study 2.1b but nothing was mentioned about a business simulation and no power 
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position was manipulated). Importantly, it was explained to participants in the distrust condition 
that “previous social dilemma experiments demonstrated that participants generally cannot be 
trusted to act cooperatively”, whereas participants in the trust condition were told that “previous 
social dilemma experiments demonstrated that participants generally can be trusted to act 
cooperatively”.  
Punishment motives. It was then explained that fines are sometimes introduced in 
social dilemma situations. Such fines decrease the amount of money that participants who act 
uncooperatively can earn in the social dilemma game. Participants had to indicate whether they 
thought that in the current social dilemma such fines should deter, or give others their just 
deserts. More specifically, participants indicated their preference for deterrence (α = .83) and just 
deserts (α = .87) on two six-item scales. Sample items for deterrence included, “Fines are needed 
to prevent group members from acting uncooperatively”, “Fines should deter uncooperative 
behavior”, and “Fines should act as a deterrent to group members”. Sample items for just deserts 
included, “Fines are needed to give group members who act uncooperatively their deserved 
punishment”, “Fines should make uncooperative group members pay for their behavior”, and 
“Fines should give uncooperative group members their just deserts”. The deterrence and just 
deserts motives were moderately correlated (r = .45, p < .001) and a factor analysis resulted in a 
two-factor solution with deterrence (Eigenvalue = 5.19) and just deserts (Eigenvalue = 2.47) 
items loading on two different factors with one cross loading and a total of 63.89% variance 
accounted for. 
Trust manipulation check. Lastly, participants indicated to what extent they distrusted 
their group members in the social dilemma (i.e., “group members cannot be trusted to act 
cooperatively”). Confirming the validity of the trust manipulation, participants distrusted group 
members’ inclination to cooperate more in the distrust (M = 5.05, SD = 1.39) compared to the 
trust condition (M = 4.37, SD = 1.68; t[83] = 2.02, p = .047, d = .44).  
 
Results and discussion 
Distrustful participants were more likely to indicate that fines should deter uncooperative 
behavior (M = 5.35, SD = 0.69) compared to trusting participants (M = 4.67, SD = 1.35; t[83] = 
2.96, p = .005, d = 0.65). However, the experimental manipulation of distrust did not affect the 
extent to which participants relied on just deserts as a punishment motive (Mdistrust = 4.35, SDdistrust 
= 1.23; Mtrust= 4.38, SDtrust = 1.32; t[83] = .11, p = .91, d = 0.02). In sum, Studies 2.2a and 2.2b 
provide evidence that people increasingly rely on deterrence, but not just deserts, as a 




Studies 2.3a and 2.3b: Power and Deterrence 
In the third series of studies, we examined the hypothesized power-deterrence 
relationship. In Study 2.3a, we used data from the European Value Survey to test whether 
occupying a real-life power position was associated with relying on deterrence as a motive for 
punishment. We then investigated in Study 2.3b whether experimentally manipulating power 
through a priming procedure impacts reliance on deterrence, and we tested how reliance on 
deterrence affects the use of public punishments.  
 
Study 2.3a Method  
Participants, design, and procedure. A total of 6,147 participants (3,274 females, Mage 
= 42.49 years, SDage  = 18.36) who participated in the European Value Survey from 1981 were 
analyzed (EVS, 2011). We selected this value survey because it was the only value survey we were 
able to trace that measured people’s power positions and punishment motives. This dataset 
consists of survey-data that was collected through face-to-face interviews in over ten European 
countries such as the UK and France, totaling more than 12,000 interviews. Importantly, this 
dataset gave us the advantage of testing the hypothesis that power is associated with more 
reliance on deterrence as a punishment motive in a representative, large-scale European sample.  
Managerial position. Power was determined by categorizing participants into those who 
occupied a power role and those who did not. Specifically, we coded those who occupied a 
managerial position as 1 and those who did not occupy a managerial position (i.e., skilled-
workers, clerks, and unskilled workers) as 0. We reasoned that occupying a managerial position 
entails controlling and managing subordinates—that is, having power. In total, 14.5 % of 
participants occupied a managerial position. 
Punishment motives. Punishment motives were assessed with the question “When a 
person is sentenced by a court of law, what should be the main aim of imprisonment? 
Participants could choose between four options: a) to re-educate the prisoner, b) to make those 
who have done wrong pay for it, c) to protect other citizens, and d) to act as a deterrent to 
others. We analyzed these response options in two ways. First, we created a variable in which we 
coded the just deserts option (i.e., option b) as 0 and the deterrence option (i.e., option d) as 1 
and left the other two options (a and c) out of the analyses. However, aiming to protect citizens 
through imprisonment can be argued to be similar to deterring rule breakers, since both these 
motives are focused on preventing further rule breaking (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley, 
Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000). We therefore created another variable in which the just deserts 
option (i.e., option b) was again coded as 0 but this time we combined the deterrence option (i.e., 
option d) with the protect-citizens option (i.e., option c) and coded this as 1.  
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Results and discussion 
Results are presented in Table 2.1. In agreement with our predictions, participants’ 
punishment motives were affected by whether they occupied a managerial position or not. More 
specifically, for both contrasts (just deserts versus deterrence and just deserts versus 
deterrence/protecting citizens) managers were more likely to indicate that imprisonment should 
act as a deterrent compared to non-managers (χ2 = [1, n = 4196] = 31.42, p < .001, d = 0.17; χ2 = 
[1, n = 6147] = 72.06, p < .001, d = 0.22, respectively). This provides preliminary support for the 
hypothesis that power is associated with more reliance on deterrence. To further demonstrate 
that it is power1 that increases reliance on deterrence, we manipulated power in Study 2.3b. 
Moreover, Study 2.3b also tested whether power increases the use of public punishments as a 
means to deter rule breaking. This would demonstrate how reliance on deterrence could directly 
affect power holders’ punitive practices. 
 
Table 2.1. Managers and non-managers’ preferred imprisonment motive for Study 2.3a. 
                                           Managerial Position 
Contrast 1: Yes No   
Just Deserts 342 (66%) 2280 (77%)   







Just Deserts 343 (38.5%) 2828 (53.8%)   




                                                         
1The European value survey also contained a question relating to how much “control participants had 
over their lives” (ranging from 1 “none at all” to 10 “a great deal”). Importantly, managers felt like they 
had more control over their lives (M = 6.75, SD = 2.06) than non-managers (M = 6.43, SD = 2.28; 
t(11696) = 6.15, p < .001, d = 0.12). Moreover, this control-over-life item was positively associated with 
relying on deterrence as a punishment motive (B = .05, t(9181) = 3.80, p < .001). This provides additional 
evidence for our usage of managerial position as a proxy of power and further corroborates the link 





Study 2.3b Method  
Participants, design, and procedure. Forty-eight participants (32 females, Mage = 20.10 
years, SDage  = 1.68) at a Dutch University participated in exchange for €1 and were randomly 
assigned to one of the two power conditions (high vs. low power).  
Power manipulation. Depending on condition, participants recalled a powerful or 
powerless event in their lives (cf. Galinsky et al., 2003). Specifically, participants in the high [low] 
power condition were asked to, “Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over 
another individual or individuals [someone else had power over you]. By power, we mean a 
situation in which you [someone else] controlled the ability of another person or persons to get 
something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those individuals [controlled your ability 
to get something you wanted or was in the situation to evaluate you]. Please describe this 
situation in which you had [no] power—what happened, how you felt, etc”. 
Punishment motives and public punishments. Participants then read a small excerpt 
about plagiarism. This excerpt was allegedly part of an unrelated experiment. The excerpt was 
introduced as a survey deployed by the university. It explained that the university had recently 
adopted a system that automatically tracks down plagiarism in student assignments. It also 
explained that the university desired the input from students to align their sanction policies with 
the opinions of students. In reality, the university adopted a system to track down plagiarism, but 
never deployed such a survey. This was explained to participants during the debriefing at the end 
of the experiment.  
After reading the excerpt, participants indicated on a five-item scale to what extent the 
specific punishments that offenders (i.e., students that commit plagiarism) receive should be 
publicly made known to other students. Sample items included, “The punishment should be 
made known to other students” and “Punishments for plagiarism should be kept private” 
(reverse-coded; α = .85). Participants also indicated on a five-item scale the extent to which the 
names of offenders should be publicly made known to others students. Sample items included, 
“The names of offenders should be made known to other students” and “The names of 
offenders should be kept private” (reverse-coded; α = .87). The public-punishment and public-
naming scales were moderately correlated (r = .30, p = .040) and a factor analysis resulted in a 
three-factor solution with public naming (Eigenvalue = 4.55) and public punishment (Eigenvalue 
= 2.51) items loading on two different factors with four items also loading on a third factor 
(Eigenvalue = 1.05), and a total of 78.49% variance explained for. 
Participants then indicated their preference for deterrence as a punishment motive on 
two items (i.e., “Overall, punishments for plagiarism should be aimed at deterring all students 
from committing plagiarism” and “Overall, punishments for plagiarism should prevent all 
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students from committing plagiarism”; Spearman-Brown ρ = .66). They also indicated their 
preference for just deserts as a punishment motive on two items (i.e., “Overall, punishments for 
plagiarism should be aimed at giving offenders a punishment he/she deserves” and “Overall, 
punishments for plagiarism should give offenders a proportionate punishment”; ρ = .97). The 
deterrence and just-deserts motives were correlated (r = .31, p = .030) and a factor analysis 
resulted in a two-factor solution with deterrence (Eigenvalue = 2.32) and just deserts (Eigenvalue 
= 1.12) items loading on two different factors without cross-loadings and a total of 86.02% 
variance accounted for. Note that for the reliability of two-item scales, the Spearman-Brown 
statistic is preferred over both the Pearson correlation and Cronbach’s alpha (Eisinga, Te 
Grotenhuis, & Penzer, 2013). 
Power manipulation check. Lastly, participants indicated on a fourteen-item scale to 
what extent they felt powerful (e.g., “I feel powerful”; “I feel like I can control others”, α = .94). 
Importantly, participants felt more powerful in the high-power condition (M = 5.29, SD = 0.59) 
compared to the low-power condition (M = 2.70, SD = 0.71; t[46] = 13.57, p < .001, d = 4.00), 
hereby confirming the validity of the power manipulation.  
 
Results and discussion 
Participants in the high-power condition were more favorable towards implementing 
public punishments (M = 3.60, SD = 1.52) than participants in the low-power condition (M = 
2.61, SD = 1.59; t[46] = 2.20, p = .033, d = 0.65). They were also more favorable towards publicly 
naming the offenders (M = 2.41, SD = 1.42) than participants in the low-power condition (M = 
1.50, SD = 0.69; t[46] = 2.77, p = .007, d = 0.81). Importantly, with regard to the underlying 
motive for such punishments, participants in the high-power condition considered the deterrence 
of plagiarism more important (M = 2.97, SD = 1.64) than participants in the low-power 
condition (M = 1.98, SD = 1.09; t[46] = 2.45, p = .018, d = 0.72). No effect of power, however, 
was found on the just-deserts motive for punishment. Just deserts was considered of equal 
importance by participants in the high-power (M = 2.90, SD = 1.93) as those in the low-power 
condition (M = 2.73, SD = 1.55; t[46] = .34, p = .73, d = 0.10).  
Lastly, two bootstrap analyses with 5,000 resamples indicated that powerful participants’ 
reliance on deterrence as a punishment motive mediated their increased favorability towards 
using public punishments (95% CI = [0.022, 0.55]) and public naming (95% CI = [0.029, 0.47]) 
as a punitive policy measure. More specifically, the significant effect of power on public 
punishment (β = .31, p = .033) and public naming (β = .39, p = .007) decreased to non-
significance (β = .19, p = .19) and marginal significance (β = .23, p = .08) after deterrence (which 
was predicted by condition [β = .34, p = .018] and in itself significantly predicted public 
502982-L-bw-Mooijman
 31 
punishment [β = .42, p = .003] and public naming [β = .53, p < .001]) was added to the model. 
Although just deserts predicted public punishment (β = .49, p < .001) and public naming (β = 
.49, p < .001), it did not mediate the effect of power on public punishments (95% CI = [-0.17, 
0.31]) and public naming (95% CI = [-0.10, 0.27]). In other words, power increased participants’ 
favorability towards public punishments as a way to deter plagiarism.  
These results support the hypothesis that power increases reliance on deterrence. Merely 
inviting participants to think of a situation in which they experienced power, as opposed to 
powerlessness, was sufficient to elicit the hypothesized effects. Interestingly, results further 
demonstrated that reliance on deterrence directly affected power holders’ punitive practices by 
increasing power holders’ favorability towards public punishments. 
 
Studies 2.4a, 2.4b, and 2.4c: Testing the Mediation Model 
Studies 2.4a, 2.4b, and 2.4c were conducted to test the full theoretical model. Study 2.4a 
tested the mediation model while measuring people’s generalized sense of power, whereas Study 
2.4b experimentally manipulated power with a priming procedure. Study 2.4c investigated the 
power-deterrence link when trust is directly manipulated, while ruling out that power-deterrence 
link can be explained by power increasing a focus on the group or decreasing identification with 
those who are potentially victimized by punishment. In addition, Study 2.4a tested the idea that 
deterrence increases the endorsement of mandatory minimum punishments.  
 
Study 2.4a Method 
Participants, design, and procedure. A total of 146 participants (88 males, Mage = 33.01 
years, SDage  = 11.79) were recruited from the Mechanical Turk website and were paid $0.50 for 
their participation.   
Generalized sense of power. To measure participants’ generalized sense of power, they 
first completed six items of the Anderson and Galinsky’s Generalized Sense of Power scale used 
previously in Study 2a (2006; M = 3.40, SD = 1.21; α = .60). Consistent with Study 2a, we also 
computed a low-power and high-power subscale. A factor analysis (PCA) confirmed a two-factor 
solution with high- (Eigenvalue = 3.33) and low-power (Eigenvalue = 1.32) items loading on two 
different factors with no cross loadings and a total of 77.49% variance accounted for. Both the 
low-power subscale (α = .74) and high-power subscale (α = .89) had sufficient reliability and 
correlated moderately (r = -.34).  
General distrust. Next, participants completed the eight-item scale used previously in 
Study 2a (M = 4.79, SD = 1.09; α = .87).  
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Punishment motives. Participants then read a small excerpt about the enforcement of 
tax laws in the USA. The excerpt explained that taxes are used to benefit society as a whole but 
that individual taxpayers might sometimes be tempted to evade taxes. Participants indicated their 
preference for deterrence (M = 4.53, SD = 1.40; α = .87) as a motive for the punishment of tax 
frauds on a four-item scale. They also indicated their preference for just deserts (M = 5.54, SD = 
1.03; α = .71) as a motive for the punishment of tax frauds on a three-item scale. Sample items 
included, “punishments should give offenders their just deserts”, “punishments should make tax 
frauds pay for their behavior”, “punishments should deter tax fraud”, and “punishments should 
prevent tax payers from committing tax fraud”. The deterrence and just deserts scales were 
marginally correlated (r = .15, p = .060) but loaded unto two different components (Eigenvalue = 
3.03 for deterrence and 1.85 for just deserts) without cross-loadings and a total of 69.65% 
variance accounted for. Lastly, participants indicated to what extent there should be set a 
mandatory minimum for sentences and fines that tax frauds receive (M = 4.60, SD = 1.72). 
 
Results and discussion 
A set of linear regression analyses regressing all variables on the generalized sense of 
power showed that power was positively associated with generalized distrust (β = .33, t[144] = 
4.21, p < .001), relying on deterrence as a motive for punishments (β = .37, t[144] = 4.51, p < 
.001), and a preference for mandatory minimum punishment (β = .16, t[144] = 1.98, p = .050). 
Similarly, analyses regressing all variables on generalized distrust showed that distrust was 
positively associated with relying on deterrence as a punishment motive (β = .35, t[144] = 4.51, p 
< .001) and being favorable towards mandatory minimum punishment (β = .33, t[144] = 4.17, p 
< .001). However, analyses regressing just desert on power and distrust showed that both power 
and distrust were not reliably associated with just deserts (β = -.10, t[144] = -1.26, p = .21; β = 
.14, t[144] = 1.73, p = .09, respectively). Interestingly, we replicated these effects with the high-
power subscale. This subscale was associated with generalized distrust (β = .26, t[144] = 3.21, p = 
.002), relying on deterrence as a motive for punishments (β = .29, t[144] = 3.69, p < .001) and 
mandatory minimum punishments (β = .16, t[144] = 1.99, p = .048) but not with just deserts (β = 
-.09, t[144] = 1.07, p = .29). The low-power subscale, however, showed no association with 
distrust (β = .12, t[144] = 1.50, p = .14), deterrence (β = .13, t[144] = 1.55, p = .12),  just deserts 
(β = .02, t[144] = -.28, p = .78) or mandatory minimum punishments (β = .02, t[144] = .28, p = 
.78). Lastly, deterrence but not just deserts was associated with mandatory minimum 
punishments (β = .15, t[144] = 1.82, p = .070; β = .05, t[144] = .65, p = .52, respectively). 
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Mediation analyses. To test whether distrust mediated the effect of power on the 
deterrence motive and preferences for mandatory minimum punishment, we conducted a set of 
regression analyses using coefficients from 5,000 resamples bootstrap samples. For the 
endorsement of deterrence, results showed that the confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
distrust did not contain zero (95% CI = [0.03, 0.26]). More specifically, adding distrust as a 
mediator slightly decreased the effect of power on deterrence (from β = .37, t[144] = 4.78, p < 
.001 to β = .29, t[144] = 3.56, p < .001). Similarly, a 5,000 resamples bootstrap analysis showed 
that for the endorsement of a mandatory punishment minimum, the confidence interval for the 
indirect effect of distrust did not contain zero (95% CI = [0.03, 0.26]). More specifically, adding 
distrust as a mediator decreased the effect of power on mandatory minimum punishment (from β 
= .16, t[144] = 1.98, p = .050 to β = .06, t[144] = .73, p = .47). Thus, the results indicate that 
distrust mediated the effect of a generalized sense of power on the endorsement of deterrence 
and mandatory minimum punishments.   
Next, we explored to what extent power predicted the implementation of punishments 
with a mandatory minimum through the mediating effect of distrust predicting deterrence (i.e., 
power         distrust          deterrence          mandatory punishment minimum). By doing so, we 
could further validate our reasoning by showing that experiencing power was positively 
associated with the implementation of punishments with a mandatory minimum through the 
relationship between distrust and deterrence. We tested this multiple-step model using a macro 
from Hayes, Preacher and Myers (2011). The overall mediation (95% CI = [0.09, 0.39]), separate 
effect of distrust (95% CI = [0.023, 0.20]) and the combined effect of distrust through deterrence 
(95% CI = [0.01, 0.09]) were significant using 5,000 resamples and a 95% bias-corrected 
confidence interval. The combined effect of distrust through deterrence could be replicated with 
the high-power subscale (95% CI = [0.01, 0.15]) but not the low-power subscale (95% CI =  [-
0.02, 0.01]). Thus, people who feel relatively powerful are favorable towards implementing 
mandatory punishment minimums as a way to deter those they do not trust. In Study 2.4b, we 
manipulated power to provide support for the causal link between power, distrust and 
deterrence.  
 
Study 2.4b Method 
Participants, design, and procedure. Seventy-three participants from the USA (45 
males, Mage = 32.18 years, SDage  = 12.09) were recruited from the Mechanical Turk website and 
participated for $0.50.  
Power manipulation. Participants were informed that they would be completing a study 
on their attitudes toward tax fraud and were randomly assigned to one of the two power 
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conditions (high vs. low power). Participants had to write an autobiographical story about 
themselves experiencing high or low power (cf. Study 2.3b). Five participants completed the 
study but were not included in the analyses because they either wrote about events unrelated to 
power or they failed to write more than one word. Importantly, one coder, blind to conditions 
and hypotheses, rated each story that revolved around power using a seven-point scale measuring 
how much power the participant reported having. Participants described themselves as more 
powerful in the high-power stories (M = 5.41, SD = 0.99) than low-power stories (M = 2.50, SD 
= 1.02; t[66] = 11.94, p < .001, d = 2.94), hereby confirming the validity of the power 
manipulation. 
Distrust. Next, participants read an excerpt about tax fraud in the United States (cf. 
Study 2.4a). Participants’ distrust towards taxpayers’ tendency to pay their taxes was measured 
with four items (α = .80). Sample items included, “I believe that taxpayers will evade taxes 
whenever they can get away with it” and “When it really comes down to it, most taxpayers will be 
tempted to commit tax fraud”. 
Punishment motives. Subsequently, participants indicated their preference for 
deterrence on one item (e.g., “A punishment should primarily be aimed at deterring taxpayers”) 
as a motive for punishment. They also indicated their preference for just deserts on one item  
(e.g., “A punishment should primarily give tax payers their just deserts”) as a motive for 
punishment.  
 
Results and discussion 
Participants in the high-power condition were more distrustful towards taxpayers (M = 
4.84, SD = 0.98) than participants in the low-power condition (M = 4.07, SD = 1.56; t[66] = 
2.40, p = .019, d = 0.59). Importantly, with regard to the underlying motive for punishments, 
participants in the high-power condition considered the deterrence of tax fraud more important 
(M = 4.74, SD = 1.11) than participants in the low-power condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.65; t[66] 
= 2.16, p = .035, d = 0.53). The just-deserts motive for punishment, however, was considered 
less important by participants in the high-power condition (M = 5.24, SD = 1.54) as compared to 
participants in the low-power condition (M = 6.32, SD = 1.01; t[66] = 3.45, p = .001, d = 0.85).  
Mediation analysis. To test whether distrust mediated the effect of power on the 
deterrence motive, we conducted a set of regression analyses using coefficients from 5,000 
resamples bootstrap samples. Results showed that the 95% confidence interval for the indirect 
effect of distrust did not contain zero [0.02, 0.35, see Figure 2.2]. Distrust did not mediate the 
effect of power on just deserts [-0.13, 0.03]. In Study 2.4c, we aimed to replicate these findings 
while experimentally manipulating distrust. We also aimed to rule out that the effect of power on 
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deterrence is caused by lower levels of victim identification or an increased focus on the welfare 




Figure 2.2. Mediation analysis for Study 2.4b. High power is coded as 1, low power as -1. Beta 
weights are unstandardized, *p < .05.   
 
Study 2.4c Method 
Participants, design, and procedure. Ninety-four participants from a Dutch university 
(60 females, Mage = 22.19 years, SDage  = 2.75) participated for €1 and were assigned to a 2 (power: 
high vs. control) x 2 (trust: distrust vs. control) between-participants design.  
Trust manipulation. All participants were told that they would participate in a social 
dilemma (cf. Study 2.2b). Importantly, it was explained to participants in the distrust condition 
that “previous social dilemma experiments demonstrated that participants generally cannot be 
trusted to act cooperatively”, whereas participants in the control condition did not receive this 
information.   
Role-based power manipulation. Depending upon condition, participants were 
informed that they were assigned to a powerful manager position or they received no information 
about their power position (cf. Study 2.1b). As managers, the participants were led to believe that 
they had control over how money would be allocated to other group members. That is, 
participants assigned to the managerial position had full control over the money in the common 
resource. Participants were told that the other group members were unaware of the participant’s 
power.  
Punishment motives. Participants were led to believe that they were in this game 
together with three other participants (cf. Studies 2.1b and 2.2b). Again, there was a collective 
resource of 30 chips, with each chip worth €0.10 and every individual group member could take 
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between 0 and 10 chips out of this collective resource. Chips that were not taken by individual 
group members were multiplied by two and at the end of the game evenly distributed among the 
group members.  
The actual social dilemma was then played. Player A took 7 out of 10, player B took 1 out 
of 10 and Player C took 10 out of 10 coins out of the collective resource. In other words, it was 
clear that Player A and C acted uncooperatively. Participants had to indicate whether they 
thought that Player A and C should be punished to deter selfish behavior, or give them their just 
deserts. More specifically, participants indicated their preference for deterrence on a four-item 
scale (α = .90) and just deserts on a three-item scale (α = .92). Sample items for deterrence 
included, “They should be punished to prevent uncooperative behavior” and “Uncooperative 
group members should be fined to deter them”. Sample items for just deserts included, “They 
should be punished to give them their just deserts” and “Uncooperative group members should 
pay for what they have done”. The deterrence and just-deserts motives were significantly 
correlated (r = .51, p < .001) and a factor analysis resulted in a two-factor solution with 
deterrence (Eigenvalue = 4.29) and just deserts (Eigenvalue = 1.41) items loading on two 
different factors without cross loadings and a total of 81.42% variance accounted for. 
Possible alternative explanations. To rule out some alternative explanations for the 
power-deterrence relationship, we also measured the extent to which participants focused on the 
welfare of the entire group versus the individual and the extent to which they identified with 
group members who would be potentially punished. Both constructs could potentially explain the 
power-deterrence link through power increasing people’s focus on the welfare of the group (cf. 
Magee & Smith, 2013), or power decreasing identification with the victim (cf. Van Kleef et al., 
2008). More specifically, we measured both group orientation (α = .78; e.g., “At this moment, I 
consider the group interest more important than the interest of the individual group member”; 
“Group-interest should guide decisions to a stronger extent than self-interest”) and victim 
identification (α = .95; e.g., “I feel sorry for group members who will be punished”; “I identify 
with uncooperative group members”) with four items.  
Trust manipulation check. Before group members made their decision, participants 
also indicated to what extent the group members in the social dilemma could be trusted to act 
cooperatively on a three-item scale (α = .89; e.g., “Group members can generally be trusted to act 
cooperatively”; “I trust group members to value the collective interest over their own”; “Group 
members will leave most chips in the common pool”). We conducted an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with power and trust and their interaction as independent variables, and trust as 
dependent variable. This analysis yielded a (marginally significant) main effect of power (F[1, 90] 
= 3.19, p = .077, η2p = .03) and a (marginally significant) main effect of trust F[1, 90] = 3.00, p = 
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.087, η2p = .03). Although no significant interaction effect emerged (F[1, 90] = 0.95, p = .33, η2p = 
.01) the means do demonstrate that in the control condition power holders (M = 4.01, SD = 
1.62) distrusted marginal significantly more than non-power holders (M = 3.22, SD = 1.78; t[45] 
= 1.92, p = .060, d = 0.57) whereas power holders distrusted as much (M = 4.25, SD = 1.38) as 
non-power holders in the distrust condition (M = 4.03, SD = 1.49; t[45] = 0.53, p = .59, d = 
0.15).  
Power manipulation check. At the end of the experiment, participants indicated to 
what extent they had a position of power on a three-item scale (α = .91; “I hold a position of 
power”, “I feel like I can control others’ outcomes”, and “I feel powerful”). Confirming the 
validity of the power manipulation, participants felt more powerful in the high-power conditions 
(M = 5.12, SD = 1.05) compared to the control conditions (M = 3.71, SD = 1.92; F[1, 90] = 
17.79, p < .001, η2p = .17). We found no main effect for trust (F[1, 90] = 0.12, p = .73, η2p = .00) 
and no interaction effect between power and trust (F[1, 90] = 1.11, p = .29). 
 
Results and discussion 
 We conducted two separate analyses of variances (ANOVA) with power and trust, and 
their interaction as independent variables, and deterrence and just deserts as dependent variables, 
respectively (see Figure 2.3). We observed a main effect of power for deterrence (F[1, 90] = 4.68, 
p = .033, η2p = .05) but not for just deserts (F[1, 90] = .46, p = .49, η2p = .01) No main effect of 
distrust was observed for deterrence (F[1, 90] = .31 p = .58, η2p = .00) or just deserts (F[1, 90] = 
.12, p = .73, η2p = .00) Importantly, an interaction effect between power and distrust emerged for 
deterrence (F[1, 90] = 3.69, p = .058, η2p = .04) but not for just deserts (F[1, 90] = 2.70 p = .11, 
η2p = .03). More specifically, power only increased reliance on deterrence when nothing was 
mentioned about the trustworthiness of group members (t[45] = 2.92, p = .005, d = 0.87). 
However, when participants were distrustful, no effect of power on deterrence emerged (t[45] = 
.17, p = .87, d = 0.05). 
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Figure 2.3. Reliance on deterrence as a function of power and trust for Study 2.4c. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
 Possible alternative explanations. Correlations between punishment motives, group 
focus, and victim identification are reported in Table 2.2. Both deterrence and just deserts 
correlated positively with victim identification but negatively with being focused on the welfare 
of the group. We conducted two separate analyses of variances (ANOVA) with power and trust, 
and their interaction as independent variables, and group focus and victim identification as 
dependent variables, respectively. We found no main effect of power or distrust, or interaction 
effect between power and distrust for victim identification (F[1, 90] = .08, p = .78, η2p = .00; F[1, 
90] = .00, p = .96, η2p = .00 and F[1, 90] = .03, p = .87, η2p = .00, respectively) or group focus 
(F[1, 90] = 1.16, p = .28, η2p = .01; F[1, 90] = .02, p = .89, η2p = .00 and F[1, 90] = .38, p = .54, 
η2p = .00, respectively). In other words, power did not affect victim identification or group focus 
in the distrust or control condition. The effect of power on deterrence could therefore not be 
explained by either one of these variables.  
These results strongly suggest that distrust is the default for participants with power. 
Indeed, when trust was low, the relationship between power and deterrence was attenuated; 
participants in the control condition relied on deterrence to the same extent as participants who 
occupied a position of power. Distrust, in other words, made participants in the control 
condition prefer deterrence—just like power holders. Importantly, victim identification and 



















2.4b, and 2.4c provide converging support for the hypothesis that distrust plays a unique and 
pivotal role in explaining why power holders rely on deterrence as a punishment motive.  
 



















Just Deserts   .51*** -   
Victim Identif.   .21*  .31** -  
Group Focus  -.14 -.26* -.30* - 
 
Note. N = 94, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
General Discussion 
Leaders frequently punish to induce compliance with rules (Parks, Joireman, & Van 
Lange, 2013). Yet, punishment is not always effective and can even be counterproductive 
(Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Van Dijk et al., 2014). If punishment can be problematic, what do 
leaders then aim to achieve with their punishments?  
Nine studies demonstrated that power increased reliance on deterrence as a punishment 
motive. Specifically, results indicated that power led to an increased reliance on deterrence, but 
not just deserts, as a punishment motive and, as a consequence, made participants more 
favorable towards the implementation of punishments that are public or have a mandatory 
minimum. In addition and importantly, results revealed why this occurred. Power undermined 
individuals’ trust in others, such that the expectation that others are more likely to break the rules 
accounted for the observed relationship between power and deterrence. Together, these studies 
provide converging support for the hypothesis that power affects the reliance on deterrence 
through a decreased trust in others.     
 
Theoretical Implications  
The present research makes several important contributions to the literature on power 
and punishment. First, it provides an understanding why and how those in power punish. It 
demonstrates that power can lead people to punish to deter. So far, research has demonstrated 
that power affects the severity of punishments (Van Prooijen, Coffeng, & Vermeer, 2014; 
Wiltermuth & Flynn, 2013) or has provided suggestions as to why those in power punish others 
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(Butterfield, Treviño, & Ball, 1996; Butterfield et al., 2005). However, little research to date has 
provided empirical evidence as to what powerful individuals seek to achieve with such 
punishments. The current research demonstrates that power increases reliance on deterrence, but 
not just deserts, as a punishment motive. That is, power does not necessarily decrease a concern 
with retributive justice, but it increases a concern for deterring rule breaking. These findings are 
consistent with our reasoning that distrust—elicited by power—increases punishment behavior 
aimed at deterring rule breaking instead of achieving retributive justice. Note that the current 
results do not show that power holders consider deterrence more important than just deserts. 
Instead, the current results demonstrate that due to their power, powerful individuals consider 
deterrence more important than individuals without power. The advantage of gaining knowledge 
about the effects of power on punishment motives is that it gives insight into what powerful 
individuals actually try to achieve with punishments. The current findings imply, for example, 
that the height of fines and the length of sentences can depend on whether those in power 
believe that punishments have the potential to deter rule-breaking behavior. Moreover, few 
studies have yet documented the psychological underpinnings of deterrence. Research on 
retributive justice has mainly focused on the use of justice as a punishment motive (Darley, 
2009). Our work shows that taking the social hierarchy of an organization or society into account 
when investigating people’s punishment motives may provide important additional insights.  
 Secondly, the current research broadens our understanding of the psychological effects of 
power and the determinants of interpersonal distrust by demonstrating that power can 
undermine the trust that individuals have in others, even before others’ actual trustworthiness can 
be inferred from their behavior or other (social) cues. This suggests that powerful individuals in 
an organization or society (e.g., managers, and policy-makers) tend to approach others (e.g., 
employees, citizens) in a more distrustful manner. This might seem at odds with research that has 
documented how the psychological state of status that is often associated with a hierarchical 
position can increase interpersonal trust (Lount & Pettit, 2012) and acts of justice (Blader & 
Chen, 2012). Importantly, although power and status often go together, they are conceptually 
distinct (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Power refers to asymmetric control over resources, whereas 
status is the respect and admiration that one has in the eyes of others. Although we did not 
experimentally distinguish power from status, our findings suggest that power may affect 
interpersonal trust differently than status.  
 More specifically, power might impact trust through affecting people’s resource-control 
goals. Research suggests that power holders prefer to strive for goals that maintain and protect 
their resource control (Fehr et al., 2013; Willis & Guinote, 2011) and that powerful individuals 
are better able to achieve such control goals than powerless individuals (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; 
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Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky & Van Dijk, 2008). The current research suggests that distrust might 
be a consequence of such a heightened resource-control goal, since trust invites potential 
exploitation and, thus, loss of power. The notion that the motivation to retain power undermines 
trust in others is further consistent with research showing that power holders’ focus on their own 
resources makes them cynical about others’ generous acts (Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky., 2012). 
Our theorizing revolves around trust as an expectation of others’ cooperative intent. People’s 
(potential) uncooperative behaviors are relevant to power holders because through such acts, 
power holders can lose resources and thus power. Thus, it seems unlikely that this relationship 
between power and distrust originates from power making people simply more action-oriented 
(Galinsky et al., 2003), unless such action is in the service of gaining, maintaining or protecting 
resources (Keltner et al., 2003). This also implies that power may not undermine trust in others 
when this trust assessment is irrelevant for the power holder’s resource-control (i.e., when the 
other cannot gain resources through an untrustworthy act; cf. Inesi et al., 2012).   
Our theorizing has implications for the emerging literature on people’s motivation to 
acquire and maintain power or status. Individuals vary in the degree to which they are motivated 
for prestige (status attainment and maintenance) or power (power attainment and maintenance; 
see Anderson, Willer, Kilduff, & Brown, 2012). The current theorizing and obtained results 
suggest that distrust and power motivation may be intrinsically linked—being motivated to attain 
power may foster distrust about others’ underlying intentions. When striving for a high ranked 
power position that is available to only one (or a few) individual(s) it may be functional to assume 
that others are (also) power hungry, instead of losing your coveted position to those you assumed 
not to desire it. Being distrustful about others’ intentions may in turn also foster power 
motivation as a way to be less dependent on those you expect to be exploitative. Although 
speculative, these propositions provide a new perspective on the psychology of power motivation 
and offer suggestions as to why some individuals prefer to strive for respect and admiration, but 
not power (Anderson et al., 2012; Joseph, Sellers, Newman, & Mehta, 2006). That is, striving for 
power may be accompanied by viewing others as distrustful, corrupt, and exploitative—a state of 
mind that might be aversive to many. Striving for status, however, may foster a more trusting 
mindset, since status is dependent on the respect and admirations of others and distrusting these 
others is a form of disrespect (Tyler & Blader, 2003).   
 
Practical Implications  
 Within an organization or society, those individuals who design and implement 
punishments have, by definition, a form of power. Managers, for example, regularly punish to 
induce rule compliance (Kerr, 1975; Magee, Kilduff, & Heath, 2011). Similarly, policy-makers are 
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frequently responsible for designing systems that aim to influence the behavior of people through 
providing punitive incentives (e.g., fines). The current research indicates that merely due to their 
power position, such managers and policy-makers may focus more on punishments that deter 
undesired behavior.  
 This provides an intriguing speculative psychological explanation for why countries with 
the most unequal distribution of incomes (i.e., resources) also imprison the most people (see 
Wilkinson & Pickett, 2007, 2009). For instance, the USA’s relatively unequal distribution of 
incomes compared to other Western countries has been linked to USA’s higher imprisonment 
rates (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2007, 2009). The USA’s imprisonment rates (576 people per 100,000) 
are four and a half time higher than that of the UK (142 people per 100,00) and fourteen times 
higher than those of Japan (40 people per 100,000)—all of which are rich, industrialized and 
educated countries (United Nations, 2000). The same pattern can be found for USA states—
more unequal states imprison more people than less unequal states (Wilkinson & Picket, 2007). 
Interestingly, the relationship between inequality and imprisonment rates does not seem to be 
explained by unequal countries and states being less educated or people more poor (Wilkinson & 
Pickett, 2007, 2009). What, then, explains the effect of inequality on imprisonment rates? Some 
have suggested that citizens demand more severe punishments in unequal societies (Downes & 
Hansen, 2006). Although this is likely to be partially true, the current research provides an 
alternative explanation. That is, with increasing power differentials, powerful policy-makers and 
judges become more concerned with the deterrence of crime. Since relatively unequal societies by 
definition have greater power differentials, higher imprisonment rates can reflect power holders’ 
increased concern with the deterrence of crime. Inequality might therefore also affect 
imprisonment rates through its psychological effect on powerful individuals who design and 
implement punishments. For instance, in the USA, increases in the use of mandatory minimum 
sentences as a deterrent cause rule breakers to receive longer sentences for minor crimes, hereby 
increasing imprisonment rates (Chemerinsky, 2004).   
Relatedly, the increased reliance on deterrence instead of just deserts can also lead 
punishments and punitive policies to misalign with what employees or citizens consider fair and 
just (Darley, 2009). This may elicit negative attitudes towards the punishers (e.g., judges, 
managers; Ball, Treviño, & Sims, 1994) and undermine the effectiveness of their policies through 
reducing people’s compliance with the very rules those punishments try to uphold (Magee et al., 
2011; Tannenbaum, Valasek, Knowles, & Ditto, 2013; Tyler, 2006). Indeed, the tendency of 
power-holders to punish an employee publicly or to implement a mandatory minimum for 
punishments has in the past been perceived as unjust and counterproductive (Jabour, 2013; 
Robinson, 2005). Similarly, the current findings also suggest that punishments that aim to deter 
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are driven by distrust. This may have the consequence that such punishments signal distrust to 
those who are (potentially) subjected to them. Managers and policy-makers may, in other words, 
communicate through their punitive policies that rule-breaking behavior is expected and 
widespread. Ironically, this might have the exact opposite effect of those intended. Punishments 
that increase distrust have been shown to increase rule-breaking behavior (Mulder et al., 2006). 
Those in power can therefore create a self-fulfilling prophecy with their punishments. They may 
feel that people will break the rules when not deterred by punishments, but people increasingly 
break the rules because punishments signal distrust, leading those in power to further enforce 
punishments to deter more rule breaking. This cycle of increasing distrust and punishment could 
undermine people’s compliance with the rules that punishments try to uphold and hereby 
severely undermine cooperation within an organization or society.  
Taken together, this suggests that power holders’ reliance on deterrence as a punishment 
motive can have detrimental consequences. Managers and policy-makers should therefore be 
aware of the effect that power has on their punitive decisions.   
 
Possible limitations and directions for future research 
 Whereas the current research provides convergent support for our hypotheses across 
different samples and measures, there are some issues to be noted. For instance, participants 
were not confronted with severe moral transgressions that evoke strong emotional reactions (e.g., 
rape or murder). It is possible that giving offenders their just deserts becomes more important in 
situations that involve severe moral transgressions because the need to restore retributive justice 
might be higher upon observing a blatant injustice. Power holders might therefore rely more on 
just deserts as a punishment motive when confronted with a severe moral transgression. Since 
judges deal with such issues on a regular basis, understanding the effects of power on their 
punitive decision-making may prove interesting future research. Relatedly, in the current studies 
scenarios revolved around unknown others with whom participants had little to no interaction. 
In organizational settings, managers often have to decide on how to punish an employee who 
they know very well. It could be that familiarity with the rule breaker moderates the extent to 
which power holders punish to deter. We believe investigating the boundary conditions will 
prove an interesting avenue for future research. 
There may also be additional structural reasons for power holders’ increased concern with 
deterring rule breaking. Since rule compliance can (although imperfectly) be measured but 
retributive justice often cannot due to its subjective nature, power holders are generally held 
accountable for how well they can prevent rule breaking instead of provide fair and just 
punishments. Combined with the psychological effects of power on deterrence, this may further 
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facilitate reliance on deterrence as a motive for punishment. Moreover, when managers and 
policy-makers are made responsible and accountable for deterring rule breaking through 
punishments, they may experience a greater sense of power. This power may further increase 
their belief that deterrence is needed. For example, a manager might be made responsible for 
preventing employees’ unethical behavior. This can instill a sense of power into the manager that 
propels further reliance on deterrence as a punishment motive. Power holders are generally also 
less susceptible to being punished than their less powerful counterparts. This difference between 
the powerful and powerless may also affect reliance on deterrence and just deserts, and thus 
affect punishment preferences. Indeed, since power holders are less likely to be punished, a 
punishment that is proportionate may become less important to power holders. This might 
further facilitate the use of punishments that deter instead of punishments that provide offenders 
their just deserts. It should be noted, however, that the current research clearly shows the 
mediating role of distrust—an effect that cannot be easily explained by power holders’ decreased 
susceptibility to punishment. A decreased susceptibility to being punished is more likely to 
decrease, instead of increase, distrust towards others since punishment is a threat (Keltner et al., 
2003) and feeling threatened can increase distrust towards others (Kramer & Schaffer, 2014). Our 
results suggest that losing resources may be threatening to power holders when others are able to 
gain their (lost) resources. Future research could experimentally manipulate whether power 
holder’ trust could lead to resource loss to others (or not), to further verify our theorizing. 
In sum, we believe that some of the above factors can further facilitate power holders’ 
reliance on deterrence opposed to just deserts. Considering the problems that can be associated 
with using deterrence as a punishment motive, we believe that investigating these issues further 
to be an important direction for future research.  
 
Conclusion 
We presented nine studies that examined how power changes why people punish. Across 
a range of different instantiations of power, measurements of distrust, and rule-breaking acts, we 
consistently observed that power undermines trust and that this distrust increases the reliance on 
deterrence as a punishment motive, and facilitates the use of punishments to achieve this (i.e., 
public punishments; punishments with a mandatory minimum). In doing so, the current work 
broadens our knowledge about power, punishment motives, and trust. It also provides practical 
implications for managers and policy-makers about how their power can bias their punitive 
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Trust is often described as a “binding force” in organizations—it connects people and 
binds them together in a pursuit of collective goals and achievements. For instance, when people 
trust others to be cooperative, they tend to focus less on fulfilling self-interested goals, and are 
more likely to comply with rules that promote cooperation (e.g., paying taxes, contributing to 
group effort; Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 2009; 
Yamagishi, 2011). Although stimulating trust is thus important for organizations—such as teams, 
corporations, and societies—previous research has demonstrated that the power differences that 
are often prevalent within such organizations can increase individual’s distrust towards each 
other. That is, having—versus not having—power over others has been shown to increase 
individuals’ distrust towards others, thereby motivating behavior aimed at preventing others from 
being uncooperative (e.g., punish them to prevent uncooperative behavior; see Chapter 2; 
Mooijman et al., 2015). Individuals’ power is thus a vital source of distrust within organizations.  
But what is the reason why power increases distrust towards others? In the current 
research, we argue that powerful individuals’ distrust can in part be explained by their motivation 
to maintain power.  
 
Power 
 Despite the existence of egalitarian forms of organization, the hierarchical organization 
remains one of the most prevalent (Anderson & Brown, 2012). Central to a hierarchically 
structured organization is the notion that some individuals have more power than others (e.g., 
managers having more power than non-managers). Power can be broadly defined as an 
individual’s asymmetric control over valuable resources (Anderson & Brion 2014; Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008). That is, power entails the ability to reward or punish others by granting or 
withholding valuable resources (Keltner et al., 2003). Having such power is often beneficial. For 
instance, power holders can award themselves higher salaries and bonuses (Kipnis et al., 1976), 
disregard others’ desires and feelings (Goodwin et al., 2000; Van Kleef et al., 2006), and focus on 
pursuing their own instead of others’ goals (Galinksy et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007a; Lammers et al., 
2011; Maner & Mead, 2010). Furthermore, power boosts people’s self-esteem (Wojciszke & 
Struzynska–Kujalowicz, 2007) and leads them to express more positive—approach related—
emotions (e.g., amusement and happiness) and less negative—inhibition related—emotions (e.g., 
embarrassment and shame; Anderson et al., 2003).  
Given the benefits commonly associated with having power, powerful individuals are 
motivated to maintain their power. Recent research has shown that after individuals obtain a 
position that enables them to make group decisions (i.e., power), the majority of them tend to 
choose to maintain their power position, even when delegating this position to others is in the 
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interest of the group (Fehr et al., 2013). The tendency to maintain a power position was also 
shown to become stronger when individuals’ degree of loss aversion increased, suggesting that 
power is especially desirable after one obtains it (i.e., a power-endowment effect; Fehr et al., 
2013). The notion that powerful individuals aim to maintain power is corroborated by research 
showing that—when powerful individuals perceive their power to be threatened—they are more 
likely to create divisions among less powerful individuals in such a way that it prevents them 
from forming alliances (Case & Maner, 2014). Moreover, powerful individuals pay more attention 
(and seek proximity) to individuals who they perceive as a threat to their power (Maner & 
Meader, 2010). Thus, when individuals gain power, they seem motivated to maintain their power.   
 
Distrust and the motivation to maintain power 
Distrust involves an expectation of malicious intent (Kramer, 1999). If you distrust others 
you thus expect them to pursue their own interests rather than yours (Balliet & Van Lange, 
2011). Such distrust may in part be a consequence of power holders’ motivation to maintain their 
power over others. The rationale for this follows from the notion that power holders can lose 
their power by trusting others too much—trusting others to take your interests into account can 
be considered a form of resource sharing (i.e., power sharing) that entails a risk for power holders 
to lose resource control (Kramer, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995; Zand, 1997). For instance, managers 
that trust their employees to comply with organizational rules may fail to take the appropriate 
actions required to prevent their employees from breaking rules, thereby potentially undermining 
their own power position. Distrusting employees to comply with organizational rules, however, 
increases the likelihood that a manager engages in acts that prevent employees from breaking 
rules (e.g., introducing more monitoring; Lount & Pettit, 2012). This may, in turn, help the 
manager to maintain power (since a manager’s position depends in part on how employees 
behave).  
More evidence corroborating the role of power motivation in explaining the power-
distrust relationship comes from research demonstrating that individuals distrust others more 
when they are less willing to risk losing their resources to these others (Das & Teng, 2004), and 
that this distrust often explains why individuals take actions to prevent resource loss (i.e., do not 
give others access to their resources; Lount & Pettit, 2012). Similarly, economists frequently 
define trust as involving the risk of losing resources to others (e.g., Berg et al., 1995). Since power 
holders have, by definition, more resources to lose to others than non-power holders, we 
propose that the motivation to maintain resource control (i.e., power) explains at least in part 
why power fosters a distrustful mindset (consistent with Thomas Hobbes’ notion that individuals 
should distrust each other to prevent exploitation; Hobbes, 1651/1988). If our reasoning is 
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correct then, (a) occupying a high (versus low) power position should increase distrust towards 
others through increasing the motivation to maintain this power position, (b) individuals with a 
high (versus low) motivation to maintain power should distrust others more when they occupy a 
position of power, and (c) occupying a stable power position should attenuate the power-distrust 
link (to the extent that a stable power position fulfills the motivation to maintain power; see 
Maner & Mead, 2010).  
 
Overview of current research 
 We tested these predictions in three experiments. Our first aim in Experiment 3.1 was to 
replicate our finding from Chapter 2 that power fosters distrust. Our second aim was to test 
whether power (high versus low) affects distrust through affecting the desire to maintain one’s 
(high- or low-power) position. In Experiment 3.2, we measured how important participants 
considered obtaining a position of power and tested its interactive effect with the power position 
that we assigned participants to (i.e., leader versus subordinate). As such, we could test whether 
the power-distrust link is especially strong for those with a high (versus low) motivation for 
power. Finally, in Experiment 3.3, we investigated how the stability of participants’ power 
position affected their trust. Consistent with previous research (Maner & Mead 2010), we 
reasoned that having a stable (versus unstable) power position fulfills the motivation to maintain 
power, thereby attenuating the power-distrust link (i.e., making individuals less distrustful 
towards others).  
Consistent with recommendations of Simmons et al., (2011), we ensured that each 
condition had around 30 participants (Experiment 3.1), or more (i.e., more than 45 in 
Experiments 3.2 and 3.3; cf. Simmons et al., 2013). Unless indicated otherwise, all measured 
variables were assessed on seven-point scales on which participants could indicate their level of 
agreement (1 = disagree completely, 7 = agree completely). All participants provided informed consent 
and were debriefed, compensated, and thanked for their participation. 
 
Experiment 3.1 
 In Experiment 3.1, we investigated the extent to which having high (versus low) power 
affects the trust that individuals have in others. We further investigated how this power-trust link 
is affected by individuals’ motivation to maintain power. Consistent with the conceptualization of 
power as control over critical resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), we manipulated the extent to 
which individuals controlled a large (high power) compared to small (low power) amount of 
money that they give to others (cf. reward power; see Anderson et al., 2003). We further 
measured both individuals’ motivation to keep control over these resources and their trust in 
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others. If the power-distrust link is explained by power holders’ motivation to maintain power, 
then having high (versus low) power should increase the motivation to maintain power and 
subsequently foster distrust in others.  
 
Method  
Participants and design. Ninety-seven Dutch university students (77 females; Mage = 
20.75 years, SDage = 2.28) participated in exchange for €2 and were randomly assigned to either 
the high-power or low-power condition.   
Procedure. Participants were informed that they were part of a five-person group 
consisting of four “workers” and one “leader”. Four group members would be able to earn up to 
an extra €20 by finding correct words in a scrambled-letter task, whereas the fifth group member 
would be assigned as the group leader. This group leader could control (part) of the €20 that the 
other group members could earn. Crucially, group members had to self-report to the group 
leader the number of correct words they found. The group leader would then be able to reward 
the group members on the basis of that information. The rule was that group members would be 
rewarded €0.10 for each correctly found word, but that group leaders could deviate from this rule 
at their own discretion.  
Power manipulation. To determine the leadership position, all participants filled out the 
Management Assessment Inventory scale (MAI; see Stouten, De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005). This 
is a bogus scale consisting of 26 items measuring leadership style (e.g., “a leader should be able to 
command respect”). Allegedly on the basis of participants’ scores on this scale, all participants 
learned that they were assigned to the group leader position (participants were informed that they 
scored comparatively “high” on this scale). Participants in the high-power condition were then 
informed that they controlled €17.50 that they could allocate, whereas participants in the low-
power condition were informed that they controlled €2.50 that they could allocate. That is, as 
group leaders, participants could fully determine how this money was allocated to the other 
group members (but they could not allocate any money to themselves and the money would only 
be relevant within the experiment; they would thus not be able to keep the remaining money for 
themselves or give it to others after the experiment). Participants were told that the money not 
controlled by them (€2.50 or €17.50, depending on condition) was controlled by the 
experimenter, who would use it to allocate it to the other group members. This manipulation is 
consistent with the conceptualization of power as control over valuable resources (see Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008). Thus, high power entailed more control over critical resources (i.e., money) than 
low power.  
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Motivation for maintaining power. Participants then indicated to what extent they 
were motivated to maintain their power on the following item, “I want to maintain the power I 
currently have”.   
Distrust. Participants further indicated the extent to which they distrusted the other 
group members to report the correct number of words. Note that group members could try to 
gain more money from the group leader through lying about the number of words they found 
(i.e., reporting a higher number of words). Thus through lying, group members could undermine 
the group leader’s reward power (i.e., the group leader could reward group members less 
accurately), and undermine the reward-rules of the experiment. Four items were framed 
positively (i.e., trust) and four items were phrased negatively (i.e., distrust). Trust items included 
the following, “group members can be trusted”, “group members will be honest when self-
reporting”, “group members are not inclined to lie”, and “I think group members are 
trustworthy”. Distrust items included the following, “group members cannot be trusted”, “group 
members will be dishonest when self-reporting”, “group members are inclined to lie”, and “I 
think group members are untrustworthy”. These four trust items were reverse coded and 
averaged with the four distrust items to form an eight-item distrust scale (α = .87).  
Power manipulation check. To verify the power manipulation, participants’ sense of 
power was measured on a five-item scale. Items included the following, “I feel powerful”, “I feel 
in control of others”, “Others depend on me”, “I think I have power over others”, and “I feel 
influential” (α = .87). Confirming the validity of the power manipulation, high-power leaders felt 
more powerful (M = 5.39, SD = 0.92) than low-power leaders (M = 3.58, SD = 1.17; t[95] = 
8.50, p < .001, d = 1.75). 
 
Results  
Confirming our predictions, high-power leaders were both more motivated to stay in 
power (M = 4.96, SD = 1.21) than low-power leaders (M = 4.44, SD = 1.52; t[95] = 1.88, p = 
.063, d = 0.39) and more likely to distrust workers (M = 4.36, SD = 1.12) than low-power leaders 
(M = 3.85, SD = 1.14; t[95] = 2.23, p = .028, d = 0.46). Motivation to maintain power was 
positively correlated with distrust (r  = .46, p < .001) and a bootstrapping analysis using 5,000 
resamples (Hayes & Preacher, 2011) demonstrated that the motivation to maintain power 
mediated the effect of power on distrust (95% CI = [0.01, 0.024]). Moreover, the significant 
effect of power on distrust (β = .22, t = 2.23, p = .028) was reduced to non-significance (β = .14, 
t = 1.53, p = .13) when power motivation (which in itself still positively predicted distrust, β = 





These results replicate our previous finding that power increases distrust in others (see 
Chapter 2). Results from Experiment 3.1 also extend these previous findings by demonstrating 
that this power-distrust link can be explained by power holders’ motivation to maintain their 
power over others. Although consistent with our conceptualization of power, the power 
manipulation used in Experiment 3.1 did not enable group leaders to punish group members for 
rule-breaking behavior. In Experiment 3.2, we addressed this shortcoming while providing 
additional support for the idea that the power-distrust relationship can be partly explained as a 
means to maintain power. 
 
Experiment 3.2 
 In Experiment 3.2, we first measured the extent to which individuals considered 
occupying a power position personally important. If the motivation to maintain power explains 
why power increases distrust, then powerful individuals who consider having a power position 
important (high-power motivation) should distrust others more than individuals who do not 
(low-power motivation; cf. Case & Maner, 2014; Maner & Mead, 2010). Furthermore, we used a 
power manipulation that entailed the possibility to punish others for untrustworthy behavior (cf. 
influence; Keltner et al., 2003). Although power and influence are conceptually distinct (i.e., 
others can decide to not comply with a power holder’s request; Anderson & Brion, 2014), power 
holders often have influence over others through the possibility to punish them for their rule-
breaking behavior. In Experiment 3.2 we therefore used a power manipulation that included the 
possibility for power holders to punish others.   
 
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 174 Dutch university students (111 females; Mage = 
20.72 years, SDage = 2.31) participated in exchange for €2 and were randomly assigned to the 
high-power or low-power condition. Prior to the power manipulation, we measured the extent to 
which participants considered obtaining such a power position important.    
Procedure. Participants were informed that they would observe a six-person group. 
These group members could take resources out of a common resource pool for their own benefit 
(cf. social dilemma game; Molenmaker et al., 2014; Van Lange et al., 2013). Participants learned 
that they could harvest from a common resource of 300 chips, each worth €0.10. Each individual 
group member could take between 0 and 60 chips from this resource and chips that were left 
were multiplied by two and divided equally among the group members. This way, taking chips 
from the common resource only benefitted individual group members, whereas leaving chips in 
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the common pool benefitted the entire group (Van Lange et al., 2013). This social dilemma game 
can be used to measure the extent to which group members trust others to cooperate and leave 
chips in the common resource pool, while also manipulating the power that group members have 
in the game (Mooijman et al., 2015; Mulder et al., 2006). Indeed, it was further explained to 
participants that they—or another participant—would be assigned to a role that entailed either 
full control or no control over the common resource, respectively. That is, it was explained to all 
participants that having power entailed having full control over the chips in the common 
resource pool but that it was either themselves (high-power condition) or a different participant 
that was given this resource control (low-power condition). Both participants in the high-power 
condition and the low-power condition would observe the choices made by the other group 
members in terms of numbers of chips harvested, but only participants in the high-power 
condition could ultimately reallocate the chips among the group members (and thus punish 
group members for uncooperative behavior). It was explained to all participants that they would 
play multiple social dilemma game rounds, in which power positions would be reassigned to 
participants before every new round. In reality, the experiment stopped after one social dilemma 
game round.  
Importance of power position. Participants indicated whether they considered it 
personally important to acquire such a power position (yes, no). Forty-five participants (30.6%) 
considered it personally important to acquire such a power position, whereas one hundred-and-
two participants did not (69.4%). Participants were then randomly assigned to either the high-
power or no-power condition.  
Distrust. Participants indicated the extent to which they distrusted the other group 
members to refrain from taking chips from the common resource pool. Consistent with 
Experiment 3.1, four items were framed positively (i.e., trust) and four items were phrased 
negatively (i.e., distrust). Trust items referred to the following, “group members can be trusted”, 
“group members will further the interest of the group”, “group members are willing to forego 
their self-interest”, and “group members are inclined to pursue group interests”. Distrust items 
included the following, “group members cannot be trusted”, “group members are not willing to 
forego their self-interest”, “group members consider self-interest more important than group 
interest”, and “group members will take as many chips from the resource pool as possible”. The 
four trust items were reverse coded and averaged with the four distrust items to form an eight-
item distrust scale (α = .93). 
Power manipulation check. To verify the power manipulation, participants’ sense of 
power was measured on a four-item scale. Items referred to the following, “I feel powerful”, “I 
feel in control of others”, “Others depend on me”, and “I think I have power over others” (α = 
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.82). Confirming the validity of the power manipulation, participants felt more powerful in the 
high-power condition (M = 4.96, SD = 0.79) compared to the control condition (M = 2.33, SD = 
0.79; F[1, 143] = 356.33, p < .001, η2p = .71). No significant main effect of power importance or 
interaction effect between power motivation and the power manipulation was found (F[1, 143] = 
0.58, p = .45, η2p = .00; F[1, 143] = 1.26, p = .26, η2p = .01).  
Motivation for maintaining position. Lastly, to verify that participants who considered 
it personally important (compared to not important) to acquire a group leader position would be 
more motivated to maintain this position throughout the experiment, we measured their 
motivation to maintain their position with the following item, “I like to maintain the current 
position throughout the experiment”.  
 
Results  
Motivation for maintaining position. A univariate analysis of variance with power 
position (high, low) and power importance (yes, no) as independent variables, and power 
motivation as dependent variable yielded a significant main effect of power position (F[1, 143] = 
120.95, p < .001, η2p = .46) and a significant two-way interaction between the power manipulation 
and power importance (F[1, 143] = 6.14, p = .014, η2p = .04), but no significant main effect of 
power importance (F[1, 143] = 0.17, p = .89, η2p = .00). Participants in the high-power position 
who considered it personally important to acquire power were more motivated to maintain their 
high power position (M = 5.85, SD = 1.49) than participants who did not consider acquiring 
power important (M = 4.96, SD = 1.58; t[71] = 2.17, p = .033, d = 0.52). Power importance did 
not matter for participants in the low-power position (M = 2.64, SD = 1.32; M = 2.78, SD = 
1.21, respectively; t[72] = 0.44, p = .66, d = 0.10). 
Distrust. A univariate analysis of variance with power position (high, low) and power 
importance (yes, no) as independent variables, and distrust as dependent variable demonstrated a 
significant main effect of power (F[1, 143] = 4.01, p = .047, η2p = .04) and a significant two-way 
interaction between power position and power importance (F[1, 143] = 5.47, p = .021, η2p = .04), 
but no significant main effect of power importance (F[1, 143] = 0.58, p = .49, η2p = .00). As 
shown in Figure 3.1, occupying a high-power position increased distrust for those high in power 
importance (t[43] = 2.49, p = .017, d = 0.76), but not for those low in power importance (t[100] 
= 0.31, p = .76, d = 0.01).  
Mediation analysis. A moderated mediation analysis with 5,000 resamples (see Hayes & 
Preacher, 2011) demonstrated that participants’ motivation to maintain their (high) power 
position mediated the interaction between the (high, low) power position that participants 
occupied and how important (yes, no) they considered obtaining this power position (95% CI = 
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[0.02, 0.41]). That is, the motivation to maintain power explained (in part) why (high versus low) 
power increased distrust for individuals who considered acquiring the power position important 
(95% CI  = [0.09, 0.10]) but not for participants who did not consider acquiring the high-power 
position important (95% CI = [-0.85, 0.09]).  
 
  
Figure 3.1. Distrust as a function of power and power importance for Experiment 3.2. Error bars 
indicate standard errors. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 3.2 replicates the finding from Experiment 3.1 that power increases distrust 
in others (see Chapter 2; Mooijman et al., 2015). Results from Experiment 3.2 also provide 
additional evidence for the role of the motivation to maintain power. Participants who 
considered acquiring a power position important (versus not important), and occupied this power 
position, became more motivated to maintain their power position, and in turn became more 
distrustful. These findings thus affirm that the effects of power on distrust are in part explained 
by individual’s motivation to maintain a high-power position. Although consistent with our 
predictions, the measurement of power motivation was relatively indirect and the distribution of 
participants was unevenly distributed over the two power-importance response options (yes, no). 
We addressed these issues in Experiment 3.3. If the power-distrust link is explained by power 
holders’ motivation to maintain power, then fulfilling this motivation should attenuate the extent 
to which power fosters distrust. In Experiment 3.3, we addressed this by directly manipulating 
power stability. Manipulations of power stability have been used extensively in previous research 
to fulfill (or exacerbate) behavior aimed at maintaining power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Case 
















individuals tend to be less afraid of losing their power when their power position is stable 




In Experiment 3.3, we manipulated the stability of participants’ power position. If the 
power-distrust relationship is in part explained by power holders’ motivation to maintain power, 
then fulfilling the motivation to maintain power should attenuate the power-distrust link. Indeed, 
being certain about maintaining one’s (high) power position should attenuate actions aimed at 
maintaining power—that is, decrease distrust towards others. Finding evidence for this 
conjecture would suggest that creating stable power positions could weaken the extent to which 
power increases distrust.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Sixty-two Dutch university students (37 females; Mage = 22.53 
years, SDage = 2.88) participated in exchange for €2 and were randomly assigned to either the 
stable or unstable power position condition.  
Procedure. As in Experiment 3.2, all participants were given control over the allocation 
of resources in the same social dilemma game (i.e., all participants occupied a high-power 
position). It was explained to them that they would play multiple social dilemma game rounds.  
Power stability. Consistent with previous research on power stability (Maner & Mead, 
2010), half of the participants were informed that their power position could randomly change 
throughout the experiment (i.e., was unstable), whereas the other half of the participants were 
informed that their power position could not change throughout the experiment (i.e., was stable). 
To verify this stability manipulation, perceived stability was measured on a three-item scale. That 
is, “my position seems unstable”, “I feel uncertain about my position”, and “my position might 
change throughout the experiment” (α = .64). Confirming the validity of our manipulation, 
participants felt that their position was more unstable in the unstable power condition (M = 5.71, 
SD = 0.81) compared to the stable power condition (M = 5.16, SD = 1.21; t[60] = 2.01, p = .040, 
d = 0.52). 
Distrust. Participants indicated the extent to which they distrusted the other group 
members to refrain from taking chips from the common resource pool on a three-item scale. 
Items included, “group members cannot be trusted”, “group members will not further the 





Results and discussion 
Consistent with our predictions, participants in the unstable power condition distrusted 
others more (M = 4.44, SD = 1.14) than participants in the stable power condition (M = 3.72, 
SD = 1.58; t[60] = 2.06, p = .044, d = 0.53).  
 
Discussion 
These results provide additional evidence for the hypothesis that the effect of power on 
distrust is explained by the motivation to maintain this power. Indeed, consistent with the idea 
that stable power positions decrease the likelihood that individuals engage in behavior aimed at 
maintaining power (Case & Maner, 2014), these results demonstrate that having a stable (versus 
unstable) power position attenuated the power-distrust link.  
 
General Discussion 
Although promoting trust is vital for powerful individuals such as managers, previous 
research has demonstrated that power fosters distrust in others (see Chapter 2). In the current 
research, we investigated the psychological process that underlies this power-distrust link. In 
three experiments, we demonstrated that, (a) having high (versus low) power increased distrust 
through increasing the motivation to maintain power, (b) individuals with a high (versus low) 
motivation to stay in power distrusted others more when they occupied a position of power, and 
(c) occupying a stable (versus unstable) power position attenuated the power-distrust link. 
Together, these studies provide converging support for the hypothesis that power increases 
distrust in part because of power holders’ motivation to maintain power.  
 
Implications 
 The present research makes several contributions to the literature on power and trust. 
First, it provides an understanding why power increases distrust. Previous research has 
demonstrated that having power can increase an individual’s distrust towards others (Mooijman 
et al., 2015) but has provided little evidence as to what explains this power-distrust link. The 
current research provides support for the notion that power holders distrust others (partially) to 
maintain their own power. This suggests that powerful individuals in an organization (e.g., 
managers) may approach others in a more distrustful manner to maintain power. This might 
seem at odds with research that has documented how the psychological state of status that is 
often associated with a hierarchical position can increase interpersonal trust (Lount & Pettit, 
2012). Importantly, although power and status often go together, they are conceptually distinct 
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(Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Power refers to asymmetric control over resources, whereas status 
refers to the respect and admiration that one has in the eyes of others. Experiment 3.1 
manipulated power between conditions while keeping status differences between these 
conditions to a minimum (i.e., all participants were leaders). The present research therefore 
suggests that power affects interpersonal trust differently than status. This observation is 
consistent with recent research suggesting that power often has different, and even opposing, 
psychological effects than status (Blader & Chen, 2012).  
 Second, the current research broadens our understanding of distrust by demonstrating 
why power increases distrust. Although trust and hierarchy have been much studied topics 
(Kramer, 1999), few studies have investigated how power holders (dis)trust others. The present 
research suggests why an organizational hierarchy may create distrust through its power holders. 
As such, we are—to our knowledge—the first to demonstrate why power fosters distrust. These 
results have implications for attempts to promote interpersonal trust in organizations and 
societies. For instance, attempts to promote organizational trust may fail when those who aim to 
promote them (e.g., managers) tend to distrust others (e.g., employees) in the organization. 
Indeed, given the influence of power holders in setting exemplary behavior (Mayer, Kuenzi, 
Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009) and the negative effects associated with interpersonal 
distrust (e.g., decreased liking, increased tendency for unethical behavior; see Chapter 3; Mulder 
et al., 2006), power holders’ distrust is potentially problematic (e.g., communicates and spreads 
distrust throughout an organization or society). The current research suggests that attenuating 
power holders’ fear of losing their power may help alleviate some of the negative effects of 
power on distrust.   
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Whereas the current research provides converging support for our hypotheses, there are 
several possible limitations to address. For instance, we measured (trust) expectations about 
others’ behavior instead of measuring actual trust-related behaviors (e.g., sharing money with 
others; see Berg et al., 1995). Although the two are highly correlated (Lount & Pettit, 2012), 
future research could use the trust game to investigate the effects of power on trust-related 
behaviors. In the current experiments, power holders were also relatively independent from 
others (cf. the definition of power; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). However, power holders are in real 
life often also dependent on their subordinates (e.g., politicians relying on citizens’ votes) or 
higher-ranked officials (e.g., an assistant professor relying on a full professor) for maintaining 
their power.  
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Future research could investigate how these two types of dependence affect the power-
distrust link. Being dependent on someone else for maintaining one’s power may for instance 
foster trust towards this person, especially for those individuals who are highly motivated to 
maintain power (consistent with research on system-justification showing that being dependent 
on others increases the motivation to view these others more positively; Van der Toorn et al., 
2015). Indeed, on the basis of the current research, it may be fruitful to investigate ways of 
making power holders more dependent on others. Moreover, future research could also 
investigate how to effectively eliminate the power-distrust link. For instance, future research 
could focus on how power holders’ identification with a relevant organization affects their 
distrust (cf. Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). 
 
Conclusion 
We presented three experiments that examined the power-distrust in more detail. Using 
different manipulations of power and measurements of power motivation, we consistently 
observed that distrust increased as a function of the motivation to maintain power. The 
motivation to maintain power thus explained in part why power holders distrust others. In doing 
so, the current work broadens our knowledge about power and trust. It also suggests practical 
implications for managers, leaders, and policy-makers about why their power can make them 
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Authorities frequently use sanctions to promote rule compliance. Judges sentence citizens 
to jail, managers fire employees for not sticking to ethical rules, and universities expel students 
for misconduct. Because such sanctions can greatly affect people’s lives, authorities often provide 
a justification for their sanctioning behavior. For instance, judges sentence people to prison with 
the explicit justification that this is meant to deter future criminal behavior (e.g., see “Colorado 
Woman”, 2015) or that this is meant to give this person their just deserts (e.g., deserved 
punishment, see “Osama Bin Laden Dead”, 2011). Although providing sanction justifications 
may seem appealing to authorities, we propose that these justifications can in fact influence how 
effective a sanction will be in promoting future rule compliance. We propose that authorities’ 
sanctions are less effective at promoting rule compliance when they are justified as attempts to 
deter people from breaking rules as compared to giving people their just deserts. Moreover, we 
argue that these effects can be attributed to people feeling more distrusted when sanctions are 
justified as attempts to deter them from breaking rules as compared to giving them their just 
deserts.   
Previous research has mainly focused on the extent to which sanction goals guide 
sanctioning decisions (Carlsmith, 2006, 2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley et al., 2000; Gerber & 
Jackson, 2012), but has left the effects of sanction-goal justifications on rule compliance 
unaddressed. Examining how and why sanction justifications shape people’s willingness to 
comply with rules can provide valuable insights into how authorities should—and should not—
use sanctions. Societal and organizational authorities (e.g., policy-makers, leaders, and managers) 
tend to justify their use of sanctions by stressing the necessity to deter rule-breaking behavior 
(Kirchler et al., 2014; Mooijman et al., 2015). Understanding how such justifications affect rule 
compliance may therefore be helpful in, (a) explaining the (in)effectiveness of real-life sanctions, 




Authorities can stress different goals as justification for their use of sanctions. Scholars 
have typically classified sanction goals into goals that aim to deter future rule-breaking behavior 
(Bentham, 1789/1988; Hobbes, 1651/1988; Kirchler et al., 2014; Nagin, 1998) versus goals that 
aim to give people their just deserts (i.e., give offenders their deserved punishment; Darley, 2009; 
Kant, 1780/1961). Although both goal types may co-occur, they have different aims. The 
deterrence goal aims to deter future rule breaking from potential rule breakers and, as such, is 
prospective rather than retroactive. When having this goal, authorities should be primarily 
concerned with deterring future rule breaking instead of achieving retributive justice through 
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punishing (past) rule breakers proportionate to their crime. In contrast, the just-deserts goal aims 
to punish past rule breakers proportionately (i.e., achieve balance between crime and 
punishment), regardless of the sanction’s ability to deter future rule breaking. As such, the just-
deserts goal is retroactive rather than prospective. When guided by this goal, authorities should 
be primarily concerned with achieving retributive justice through punishing rule breakers 
proportionate to their crime instead of preventing future rule breaking. 
While both sanction goals can affect the type and severity of the sanction used (Carlsmith 
et al., 2002) and thereby influence rule compliance (Ball et al., 1994), we argue that authorities’ 
use of a sanction goal as a justification creates an additional source of influence. That is, 
independently of the type and severity of a sanction, people’s willingness to comply with rules 
may be affected by whether an authority justifies the existence of a sanction as an attempt to 
deter them or give them their just deserts. We propose that authorities’ sanctions are less 
effective at promoting people’s willingness to comply with rules when they are justified as an 
attempt to deter people from breaking rules, whereas sanctions will be more effective when they 
are justified as an attempt to give people their just deserts. Moreover, we argue that these effects 
can be attributed to people feeling more distrusted when sanctions are justified as attempts to 
deter them from breaking rules as compared to giving them their just deserts.   
 
When sanction justifications may signal distrust 
Authorities’ aim to deter people from rule breaking or give them their just deserts can 
result in sanctions that are equivalent in terms of sanction type and severity. However, these 
sanction goals are not equivalent with regard to their underlying considerations. A central aspect 
of a deterrence, but not a just-deserts, goal is that sanctions should be aimed at those who are 
deemed likely to break rules (hence the need to deter them; Nagin, 1998). In other words, 
authorities that aim to deter rule breaking expect people to break rules in the future (i.e., they 
distrust them; Mooijman et al., 2015). Whereas authorities that aim to give people their just 
deserts are indifferent with regard to people’s likelihood of breaking rules (i.e., trustworthiness is 
irrelevant; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Kant, 1780/1961; Mooijman et al., 2015).  
People can often infer such intentions and considerations from authorities’ decisions. 
Managers’ attempts to incentivize weight-loss with financial sanctions have been shown, for 
instance, to unintentionally signal negative attitudes towards the overweight (Tannenbaum et al., 
2013). Authorities who justify a sanction as an attempt to deter people from rule breaking may 
therefore be more likely to signal their distrust than authorities who justify a sanction as an 
attempt to give people their just deserts. Authorities using deterrence justifications may signal 
that sanctions are needed because people are likely to break rules in the absence of sanctions. The 
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sanction is then used as a means to deter people’s future rule-breaking behavior. In contrast, just-
deserts justifications signal that an authority’s sanction is aimed at those who have broken rules in 
the past instead of those who are expected to break rules in the future. The communicated 
“breadth” of a just-deserts justified sanction is thus smaller (i.e., targets only rule breakers) than 
the communicated breadth of a sanction that is justified as an attempt to deter (i.e., targets all 
potential rule breakers).  We argue that just-deserts justifications therefore may signal less distrust 
than deterrence justifications. 
Some evidence corroborating this reasoning comes from research showing that 
authorities’ distrust predicts deterrence—but not just-deserts—justified sanctions (see Chapter 2; 
Mooijman et al., 2015) and from research showing that people are highly motivated to infer 
authorities’ intentions from their sanction decisions (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003). People 
may thus infer from an authority’s deterrence—but not just-deserts—justification that they are 
expected to have the malicious intention to undermine the interests of the authority (consistent 
with definitions of distrust, Kramer, 1999; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; Zand, 1997. In sum, 
we hypothesize that justifying a sanction as an attempt to deter people from breaking rules, 
compared to giving people their just deserts, makes people feel more distrusted (Hypothesis 1).  
 
Why feeling distrusted may undermine rule compliance 
  How might people’s rule compliance be affected by their feelings of being distrusted by 
an authority? Rule compliance is not solely determined by the severity of a sanction or the 
probability that one receives a sanction (Balliet et al., 2011). Instead, rule compliance is also 
determined by how people feel treated by the authority (i.e., interpersonal justice; Tyler & Lind, 
1992). For instance, people’s satisfaction with authorities’ decisions decreases when authorities 
communicate disrespect through, (a) pursuing their own interest instead of the interest of the 
people (De Cremer, 2002) and (b) using non-transparent and biased procedures (Tyler, 2012). In 
contrast, authorities that are perceived to pursue the collective interest (Mulder & Nelissen, 
2010), show respect for others (Blader & Tyler, 2003), and use transparent and unbiased 
procedures foster decision acceptance (Tyler, 2012). Importantly, these effects of perceived 
interpersonal treatment often go beyond the outcome that people (expect to) receive from 
authorities (Cropanzano et al., 2007). We argue that how people feel treated by the authority that 
installs and justifies a sanction is also of vital importance for people’s willingness to behave 
according to the authority’s rules.   
More specifically, we propose that feeling distrusted by an authority undermines people’s 
willingness to comply with the authority’s rules. Some evidence for this conjecture follows from 
the notion that people are motivated to see themselves as trustworthy (Brown, 2012; Sedikides, 
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Meek, Alicke, & Taylor, 2014; Steele, 1988), and want and expect others to trust them (Ellemers, 
2012; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Feeling distrusted by an authority is therefore likely to foster the 
feeling that the authority does not view oneself favorably (e.g., without respect). This perception 
alone may be sufficient to feel poorly treated, thus undermining one’s willingness to abide to this 
authority’s rules. Indeed, perceived interpersonal treatment does not have to revolve around 
tangible outcomes that one receives, but can also entail subjective assessments of how others 
view oneself (e.g., respect; Ellemers, Doosje, & Spears, 2004). A perceived lack of trust in one’s 
willingness to comply with relevant guidelines and rules may seem unwarranted when no prior 
breach of rules was displayed, and may thus seem disrespectful and unjust. We propose, then, 
that feeling distrusted by an authority undermines people’s willingness to comply with this 
authority’s rules.  
Although sanctions increase the costs of rule breaking regardless of an authority’s 
justification, we argue that the potential effectiveness of a sanction is decreased by the distrust 
that people experience when authorities provide a deterrence justification. We hypothesize that 
authorities’ sanctions are less effective at promoting rule compliance when they justify such 
sanctions as deterring people from rule breaking compared to giving people their just deserts 
(Hypothesis 2a). We further hypothesize distrust to mediate the negative relationship between 
deterrence justifications and rule compliance (Hypothesis 2b).  
 
Overview of Current Research 
 We tested our hypotheses in four experiments in which we, (a) manipulated which 
justifications authorities provided for their sanctioning behavior, (b) measured the distrust that 
participants felt, and (c) tested how this affected rule compliance. More specifically, in these 
experiments we tested how providing participants with a deterrence or just-deserts sanction 
justification affected their willingness to comply with university rules (Experiment 4.1), their 
willingness to comply with their manager’s rules (Experiments 4.2 and 4.3), and the extent to 
which they lied to their team leader to further their own self-interest (Experiment 4.4). We tested 
our hypotheses in both Dutch (Experiments 4.1 and 4.4) and American samples (Experiments 
4.2 and 4.3). We also examined how providing both deterrence and just-deserts sanction 
justifications simultaneously, affected participants’ willingness to comply with rules (Experiment 
4.3). We expected that providing a deterrence justification negatively affects sanction 
effectiveness, even when it is provided simultaneously with a just-deserts justification. In 
Experiment 4.2, we examined how providing a sanction justification aimed at deterring others—
instead of the participant—affected distrust and rule compliance. We expected that the negative 
effects of providing a deterrence justification would be eliminated when the sanction was justified 
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as deterring others—as opposed to the participant—from breaking rules. Last, in all experiments, 
we measured the extent to which participants perceived the sanction as aimed at themselves. This 
enabled us to verify our assumption that, compared to just-deserts, deterrence justifications signal 
that potential—instead of past—rule breakers are targeted by the sanction.  
To provide support for the proposed mediating role of distrust and exclude alternative 
explanations, we assessed participants’ group identification, their attitudes towards the authority, 
their perceived legitimacy of the authority, and their distrust towards others. Previous research 
has demonstrated that rule compliance can be affected by the extent to which people identify 
with their group (Ellemers, Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Tyler & Blader, 2000), the attitudes that they 
hold towards authorities (Tyler & Blader, 2003), and the extent to which they trust others to 
comply with rules (Mulder et al., 2006). We assessed these control variables in Experiments 4.1–
4.3. All reported mediation analyses were conducted using a bootstrap analysis with 5,000 
resamples (Hayes, Preacher, & Meyers, 2011). Consistent with the recommendations of 
Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2013), we made sure that every condition had more than fifty 
participants. Unless indicated otherwise, all measured variables were assessed using seven-point 
scales, on which participants could indicated their level of agreement (1 = disagree completely, 7 = 
agree completely). All participants provided informed consent and were debriefed, compensated, and 
thanked for their participation.  
 
Experiment 4.1 
Experiment 4.1 investigated how a university’s sanction justification affects students’ 
feelings of distrust and their willingness to comply with the university’s rules and policies. To test 
this, we manipulated whether a real-life sanctioning system was justified to students as an attempt 
to deter plagiarism or give students their just deserts. We compared these two sanction-
justification conditions to a condition in which no information was given about a sanction. To 
rule out that decreased group identification instead of distrust mediated the hypothesized effect, 
we also measured students’ identification with their university.  
 
Method  
Participants, design, and procedure. Eighty-seven Dutch university students (68 
females; Mage = 23.11 years, SDage = 6.54) participated in exchange for €2 and were randomly 
assigned to one of three punishment conditions (deterrence vs. just deserts vs. no sanction). Two 
participants indicated being recently caught for plagiarism. Their data were excluded from the 




Sanction justification. All participants were informed that the study assessed students’ 
attitudes toward university policy. More specifically, it was explained how university students 
might sometimes be tempted to directly copy information from professional articles for their 
own work. In the deterrence condition and just-deserts condition, it was explained that the policy 
of their university was to immediately exclude students who committed such plagiarism from 
their respective courses in order to deter students from committing plagiarism, or give students 
their just deserts for committing plagiarism, respectively. As such, the severity of the sanction was 
held constant across the sanction conditions. In the no sanction condition, no information was 
given about a sanction.   
 Distrust. Participants indicated to what extent the policy made them feel distrusted on a 
four-item scale (adapted from Mooijman et al., 2015). Items included, “I feel distrusted by the 
university”, “I think the university assumes that I want to break the rules”, “I believe the 
university distrusts me”, and “I think I am trusted by the university” (reverse-coded; α = .87).  
 Rule compliance. Participants’ willingness to comply with university rules was assessed 
on a three-item scale. Items included, “I feel inclined to stick to university rules”, “I feel obliged 
to behave according to university rules”, and “I feel inclined to break university rules” (reverse-
coded; α = .89). 
Group identification. Group identification was measured on a six-item scale (adapted 
from Tyler & Blader, 2001). Sample items included, “I am proud to be a student of this 
university”, “I share norms and values with the university”, and “when I talk about where I study 
I usually say we rather than they”; α = .87).  
Manipulation check. As a manipulation check, we measured the extent to which 
participants perceived the sanction as aimed at them with the following item, “I feel like this 
sanction is meant for me”. Confirming that the deterrence justification signals that the sanction is 
aimed at potential instead of past rule breakers, participants in the deterrence condition were 
more likely to perceive the sanction as aimed at themselves (M = 4.86, SD = 1.46) than 
participants in the just-deserts condition (M = 3.72, SD = 0.59; t[56] = 3.89, p < .001, d = 1.04). 
 
Results  
Distrust. The sanction-justification manipulation affected the extent to which students 
felt distrusted by the university (F[1, 82] = 3.81, p = .026, η2p = .09). Perceived distrust was 
higher in the deterrence condition (M = 3.54, SD = 1.33) compared to the just-deserts condition 
(M = 2.57, SD = 1.35; t[55] = 2.72, p = .009, d = 0.73) and higher, but not significantly, 
compared to the no-sanction condition (M = 3.02, SD = 1.28; t[55] = 1.50, p = .14, d = 0.40). 
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The no-sanction and just-deserts condition did not differ from each other (t[54] = 1.27, p = .21, d 
= 0.35).  
Rule compliance. The sanction-justification manipulation also influenced students’ 
willingness to comply with university rules (F[1, 82] = 3.73, p = .028, η2p = .08). Rule compliance 
was lower in the deterrence condition (M = 5.76, SD = 1.16) than in the just-deserts condition 
(M = 6.40, SD = 1.12; t[55] = 2.14, p = .037, d = 0.58) and equally low as in the no-sanction 
condition (M = 5.58, SD = 1.28; t[55] = 0.54, p = .59, d = 0.14). Rule compliance was higher in 
the just-deserts condition compared to the no-sanction condition (t[54] = 2.56, p = .013, d = 
0.69).  
Group identification. The sanction-justification manipulation did not affect students’ 
identification with the university (M = 5.11, SD = 1.11; F[1, 82] = 0.75, p = .48, η2p = .02).  
Mediation analyses. Using a bootstrap analysis procedure with 5,000 resamples (Hayes 
& Preacher, 2011), we tested whether group identification or distrust mediated the effect of the 
sanction-justification manipulation on rule compliance. Although group identification was 
positively correlated with rule compliance (Pearson’s r = .23, p = .035), bootstrap analyses 
showed that it did not mediate the effect of the sanction-justification manipulation on rule 
compliance (95% CI = [-0.44, 0.04]). Instead, feeling distrusted was negatively correlated with 
rule compliance (r = -.39, p < .001), and bootstrap analyses demonstrated that this distrust 
mediated the effect of the sanction-justification manipulation on the decrease in rule compliance 
(95% CI = [-0.67, -0.06])—even after adding group identification as additional mediator (95% CI 
= [-0.74, -0.05]) or after adding group identification as a covariate (95% CI = [-0.77, -0.05]). 
Moreover, the significant effect of sanction justifications on rule-compliance (β = -.28, t = -2.14, 
p = .037) was reduced to non-significance (β = -.17, t = -1.25, p = .22) when distrust (which in 




Consistent with Hypothesis 1, results demonstrate that students felt more distrusted 
when their university’s sanction policy was justified as an attempt to deter students from rule 
breaking compared to giving those who broke the rule their just deserts. Consistent with both 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b, results further demonstrate that this distrust undermined the extent to 
which students were willing to comply with university rules (i.e., distrust mediated the effect of 
the deterrence justification on rule compliance). In fact, providing a deterrence justification for a 
sanction was as (in)effective in promoting a willingness to comply with university rules as 
providing no information about the possibility of receiving a sanction for breaking rules. 
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Sanctions that were justified as giving students their just deserts were more effective at 
promoting students’ willingness to comply with rules. Moreover, identification with the university 
could not explain these results.  
 
Experiment 4.2 
Experiment 4.2 investigated how sanctions that are explicitly justified as an attempt to 
deter oneself (compared to others) from rule breaking affects distrust and rule compliance. If 
deterrence justifications foster distrust through signaling that one is considered a potential rule 
breaker then deterrence justifications aimed at oneself should increase distrust, whereas deterrence 
justifications aimed at others should attenuate distrust. To test this, we manipulated whether the 
sanction was justified as deterring a group of people of which the participant was—or was not—
a part of. We compared these two conditions to a condition in which the sanction was justified as 
giving participants’ just deserts and a condition in which no information was given about the 
sanction. We predicted that a sanction signals more distrust (and thus is less effective in 
promoting a willingness to comply with rules) when it is justified as deterring oneself—compared 
to others—from rule breaking, and compared to a sanction that is justified as an attempt to give 
rule breakers their just deserts. We tested our predictions in an employee-supervisor context 
while measuring attitudes towards the supervisor. This enabled us to rule out that negative 
attitudes towards the authority instead of distrust mediated the hypothesized effect. 
 
Method  
Participants, design, and procedure. A total of 245 American participants (147 males; 
Mage = 32.78 years, SDage = 10.86) were recruited from the Mechanical Turk website and were 
randomly assigned to one of four sanction conditions (deterrence-self vs. deterrence-other vs. 
just deserts vs. no sanction). Participants received $1 for their participation. 
 Sanction justifications. All participants were asked to imagine themselves as a sales 
employee of a company called Big City Electronics (BCE). The scenario explained that BCE 
employs both sales and administrative employees and that recently office-supplies (e.g., binders, 
staplers) were stolen from BCE’s stock. The scenario continued by explaining that the supervisor 
reacted by introducing a sanction. This sanction was described as a “substantial pay-cut” for 
anyone caught stealing. Importantly, the supervisor justified this sanction as either meant to deter 
sales employees from theft (deterrence-self condition), deterring administrative employees from theft 
(deterrence-other condition), or giving rule-breaking employees their just deserts (just-deserts 
condition). In the no-sanction condition, no information was given about a sanction. 
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 Distrust. Feeling distrusted was measured on a six-item scale. Consistent with 
Experiment 4.1, we measured the extent to which the participants felt distrusted by the authority 
(i.e., supervisor). Items included, “I feel distrusted by the supervisor”, “I think the supervisor 
assumes I want to break the rules”, “The supervisor does not trust me”, “I think the supervisor 
believes I want to steal office supplies”, “I believe the supervisor considers me a potential rule 
breaker”, and “I feel like the supervisor assumes I have bad intentions” (α = .96).  
 Rule compliance. Participants’ willingness to comply with the rules was measured on a 
five-item scale (adapted from Tyler & Blader, 2005). Items included, “I feel inclined to slack off 
towards the end of the day”, “I feel inclined to come late if the supervisor doesn’t find out”, “I 
feel inclined to undermine the supervisor’s rules”, “I feel inclined to not do my best at work”, 
and “I feel inclined to find ways to undermine the supervisor” (α = .95).  
Attitudes towards supervisor. We measured participants’ attitudes towards the 
supervisor on a four-item scale. Items included, “I like this supervisor”, “I have a positive feeling 
about this supervisor”, “I tend to view this supervisor positively”, and “I dislike this supervisor” 
(reverse-coded; α = .93) 
Manipulation check. Participants indicated on one item to what extent they felt 
personally targeted by the sanction (i.e., “I feel like this sanction is targeted at me”). The 
sanction-justification manipulation affected the extent to which participants felt personally 
targeted by the sanction (F[1, 241] = 11.44, p < .001, η2p = .13). Confirming the validity of our 
manipulation, participants in the deterrence-self condition felt more personally targeted by the 
sanction (M = 4.08, SD = 2.29) than in the deterrence-other condition (M = 2.78, SD = 1.83; 
t[124] = 3.53, p = .001, d = 0.63) and just-deserts condition (M = 2.63, SD = 1.98; t[120] = 3.74, 
p < .001, d = 0.69). The just-deserts condition and deterrence-other conditions did not differ 
(t[120] = 0.43, p = .66, d = 0.08). 
 
Results  
Distrust. The sanction-justification manipulation affected the extent to which 
participants felt distrusted by the supervisor (F[1, 241] = 18.21, p < .001, η2p = .19). Perceived 
distrust was higher in the deterrence-self (M = 4.61, SD = 1.80) compared to the deterrence-
other condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.69; t[124] = 5.55, p < .001, d = 0.99), just-deserts condition 
(M = 2.76, SD = 1.89; t[120] = 5.52, p < .001, d = 1.01), and no-sanction condition (M = 2.58, 
SD = 1.55; t[121] = 6.66, p < .001, d = 1.21). The deterrence-other condition did not differ from 
the just-deserts condition or no-sanction condition (t[120] = 0.36, p = .72, d = 0.06; t[121] = 1.01, 
p = .32, d = 0.18, respectively). Lastly, the just-deserts condition and no-sanction condition did 
not differ from each other (t[117] = 0.56, p = 0.58, d = 0.10).  
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Rule compliance. The sanction-justification manipulation influenced participants’ 
willingness to comply with rules (F[1, 241] = 4.43, p = .005, η2p = .05). Willingness to comply 
with rules was lower in the deterrence-self (M = 5.06, SD = 1.89) compared to the deterrence-
other condition (M = 5.73, SD = 1.65; t[124] = 2.10, p = .038, d = 0.38), just-deserts condition 
(M = 5.84, SD = 1.46; t[120] = 2.56, p = .012, d = 0.47), and equally low as in the no-sanction 
condition (M = 4.95, SD = 1.70; t[121] = 0.34, p = .73, d = 0.06). Moreover, rule compliance was 
higher in the deterrence-other condition and just-deserts condition compared to the no-sanction 
condition (t[121] = 2.56, p = .012, d = 0.47; t[117] = 3.08, p = .003, d = 0.57, respectively). The 
deterrence-other condition and just-deserts condition did not differ significantly (t[120] = 0.43, p 
= .67, d = 0.08).  
Attitudes towards supervisor. The sanction-justification manipulation influenced 
participants’ attitudes towards the supervisor (F[1, 241] = 10.71, p < .001, η2p = .12). Participants 
in the deterrence-self condition liked the supervisor less (M = 3.79, SD = 1.46) than participants 
in the deterrence-other condition (M = 4.46, SD = 1.53; t[124] = 2.52, p = .013, d = 0.46) and 
just-deserts condition (M = 4.86, SD = 1.61; t[120] = 3.85, p < .001, d = 0.70) but equal 
compared to the no-sanction condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.60; t[121] = 1.39, p = .17, d = 0.25). 
Participants in the just-deserts condition and deterrence-other condition liked the supervisor 
more than participants in the no-sanction condition (t[117] = 4.95, p < .001, d = 0.92; t[121] = 
3.74, p < .001, d = 0.68, respectively). The deterrence-other condition and just-deserts condition 
did not differ significantly (t[120] = 1.40, p = .16, d = 0.25). 
Mediation analyses. Using a bootstrap analysis procedure with 5,000 resamples (Hayes 
& Preacher, 2011), we tested whether attitudes towards the supervisor or distrust mediated the 
effect of the sanction-justification manipulation on rule compliance. Positive attitudes towards 
the supervisor correlated positively with rule compliance (r  = .52, p < .001), but results from the 
bootstrap analyses showed that attitudes towards the supervisor did not mediate the effect of the 
sanction-justification manipulation on rule compliance (95% CI = [-0.01, 0.14]). However, 
distrust was negatively correlated with rule compliance (r = -.52, p < .001), and results from the 
bootstrap analyses showed that distrust mediated the overall effect of the sanction-justification 
manipulation on rule compliance (95% CI = [-0.34, -0.14]), even after controlling for attitudes 
towards the supervisor (95% CI = [-0.31, -0.12]) or after adding attitudes towards the supervisor 
as an additional mediator (95% CI = [-.26, -.09]). This indirect effect of distrust was also 
significant for the deterrence-self versus just-deserts contrast (95% CI = [-0.76, -0.29]) and the 
deterrence-self versus deterrence-other contrast (95% CI = [-.1.65, -0.69]). More specifically, for 
both contrasts perceived distrust decreased the significant effect of the sanction-justification 





Replicating Experiment 4.1, these results demonstrate that participants felt more 
distrusted by their supervisor when this supervisor justified a sanction as deterring participants 
from rule breaking compared to giving participants their just deserts (Hypothesis 1). Results 
further demonstrate that this distrust decreased the extent to which participants were willing to 
comply with rules (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). Crucially, the extent to which a deterrence 
justification fostered distrust and decreased sanction effectiveness was exacerbated when it was 
aimed at oneself, but attenuated when it was aimed at others. This corroborates our assumption 
that—compared to just-deserts justifications—deterrence justifications are more likely to foster 
distrust through signaling that one is considered a potential rule breaker. Moreover, no 
differences in distrust were observed when the sanction was justified as deterring others 
compared to giving participants their just deserts. This provides additional support for our 
reasoning that just-deserts justifications are less likely to elicit distrust and undermine sanction 
effectiveness, partially because such sanctions are not perceived to target the self.   
 
Experiment 4.3 
 The previous two experiments provide converging support for our hypotheses but used 
the deterrence or just-deserts sanction justifications as mutually exclusive—that is, a sanction was 
justified as either aimed at deterrence or just deserts. In reality, however, these motives can be, 
and often are, combined. Experiment 4.3 aims to address this issue by investigating the effect of 
providing simultaneously a deterrence and just-deserts justification. Because deterrence 
justifications signal that one is considered a potential rule breaker, we predicted that the presence 
of a deterrence justification still negatively affects rule compliance even when it is provided 
simultaneously with a just-deserts justification. To further rule out rival explanations, we also 
measured the extent to which participants distrusted other group members and the extent to 
which participants perceived the authority as legitimate (Mulder et al., 2006; Tyler, 1990). Lastly, 
consistent with the literature on organizational and legal rule compliance (O’Reilly & Chatman, 
1986; Tyler, 1990) we distinguished between mandatory and voluntary rule compliance, and rule 
breaking. This distinction is relevant since authorities not only want people to follow (mandatory) 
rules and prevent rule breaking, but they also aim to promote voluntary acceptance of rules (i.e., 







Participants, design, and procedure. A total of 249 American participants (146 males; 
Mage = 34.16 years, SDage = 10.45) were recruited from the Mechanical Turk website and randomly 
assigned to one of four sanction conditions (deterrence vs. just deserts vs. deterrence/just deserts 
vs. no sanction). Participants received $1.50 for their participation. 
 Sanction justifications. Participants were confronted with the same scenario as in 
Experiment 3.2. The sanction was explained as either deterring employees from theft (deterrence 
condition), giving employees their just deserts (just-deserts condition), or focused on both 
deterring employees and giving employees their just deserts (deterrence/just-deserts condition). 
In the combined sanction-justification condition, the order of the deterrence and just-deserts 
explanation was counterbalanced. In the no-sanction condition, no information was given about 
a sanction. 
 Distrust towards self. Perceived distrust towards oneself was measured with the same 
six-item scale as was used in Experiment 4.2 (α = .96).  
 Rule compliance. The rule compliance scales we included were used and validated in 
previous research (see Tyler & Blader, 2005).  
Mandatory rule compliance. Mandatory rule compliance was measured on a four-item  scale 
(adapted from Tyler & Blader, 2005). Items included, “I am inclined to use company rules to 
guide everything I do on the job”, “I am inclined to seek information about appropriate company 
policies before acting”, “I feel inclined to follow company policies and rules about how to do my 
job”, and “I feel inclined to comply with all organizational rules and policies” (α = .93). 
Voluntary rule compliance. Voluntary rule compliance was assessed on a five-item scale 
(adapted from Tyler & Blader, 2005). Items included, “I am inclined to follow organizational 
rules and policies when no one knows whether I did”, “I am inclined to implement the 
supervisor’s decisions even when he will not know whether I did”, “I am inclined to follow 
organizational rules and policies without questioning them”, “I am inclined to do what the 
supervisor expects of me, even when I don’t think its important”, and “I am inclined to happily 
accept all decisions made by the supervisor” (α = .92).  
Rule breaking. Rule breaking was measured on a five-item scale (adapted from Tyler & 
Blader, 2005). Items included, “I am inclined to find ways to undermine the supervisor”, “I am 
inclined to slack off towards the end of the day”, “I am inclined to come late to work”, “I am 
inclined to neglect to follow work rules or the instructions of the supervisor”, and “I am inclined 
to not do my best at work” (α = .94). 
Distrust towards others. Consistent with Mulder et al. (2006), distrust towards the other 
employees was measured on a four-item scale. Items included, “I feel like I cannot trust the other 
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employees”, “I think the other employees are tempted to break the rules”, “I feel like the other 
employees cannot be trusted”, and “I think the other employees are tempted to take office 
supplies home” (α = .94) 
Legitimacy. Legitimacy was measured on a three-item scale. Items included, “The 
supervisor is overextending his authority with this decision”, “The supervisor does not have the 
right to make these decisions”, and “I don’t think the supervisor has the authority to make such 
decisions” (α = .94). 
Manipulation check. Participants indicated on one item to what extent they felt 
personally targeted by the sanction (i.e., “I feel like this sanction is targeted at me”). The 
sanction-justification manipulation affected the extent to which participants felt personally 
targeted by the sanction (F[1, 245] = 18.59, p < .001, η2p = .19). Confirming the validity of our 
manipulation, participants in the deterrence condition felt more personally targeted by the 
sanction than in the just-deserts condition (t[123] = 7.04, p < .001, d = 1.27). Moreover, 
participants felt more feeling personally targeted in the combined-justification condition than in 
the just-deserts condition (t[122] = 4.04 p < .001, d = 1.27) but less compared to the deterrence 
condition (t[121] = 2.19 p = .030, d = 0.40). 
 
Results 
The means and standard deviations are reported in Table 4.1. Correlations are reported in 
Table 4.2.  
Distrust towards self. Overall, the sanction-justification manipulation affected feelings 
of distrust (F[1, 245] = 44.39, p < .001, η2p = .35). Participants felt more distrusted in the 
deterrence than in the combined sanction-justification condition (t[121] = 1.93, p = .056, d = 
0.35), just-deserts condition (t[123] = 10.59, p < .001, d = 1.91), and no-sanction condition (t[123] 
= 8.34, p < .001, d = 1.51). Moreover, distrust was higher in the combined-justification condition 
than in the just-deserts condition (t[122] = 7.49, p < .001, d = 1.36) and no-sanction condition 
(t[122] = 5.62, p < .001, d = 1.02). Lastly, participants in the just deserts condition felt (marginally 
significant) less distrusted than participants in the no sanction condition (t[124] = 1.95, p = .054, 
d = 0.35).  
Rule compliance.  
Mandatory rule compliance. The sanction-justification manipulation also influenced 
the willingness to comply with mandatory rules (F[1, 245] = 23.86, p < .001, η2p = .23). 
Mandatory rule compliance did not differ in the deterrence condition and combined sanction-
justification condition (t[121] = 0.04, p = .97, d = 0.01) but was lower in the deterrence condition 
and combined sanction-justification condition compared to just-deserts condition (t[123] = 4.27, 
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p < .001, d = 0.77; t[122] = 3.84, p < .001, d = 0.69). Overall, mandatory rule compliance was 
lowest in the no-sanction condition (ps < .001, ds > 0.70).  
Voluntary rule compliance. The sanction-justification manipulation affected the 
willingness to voluntary comply with rules (F[1, 245] = 13.61, p < .001, η2p = .14). Voluntary rule 
compliance was equal in the deterrence condition and combined-justification condition (t[121] = 
0.05, p = .96, d = 0.01) but was lower in the deterrence condition and combined sanction-
justification condition compared to the just-deserts condition (t[123] = 3.74, p < .001, d = 0.67; 
t[122] = 3.71, p < .001, d = 0.67). Overall, voluntary rule compliance was lowest in the no-
sanction condition (ps < .01, ds > 0.50). 
Rule breaking. The sanction-justification manipulation affected the willingness to break 
rules (F[1, 245] = 11.01, p < .001, η2p = .12). Rule breaking was (marginally) higher in the 
deterrence condition compared to the combined sanction-justification condition (t[121] = 1.81, p 
= .073, d = 0.44) and just-deserts condition (t[123] = 4.43, p < .001, d = 0.80) but equal to the 
no-sanction condition (t[123] = 0.99, p = .32, d = 0.18). Moreover, rule breaking was higher in 
the combined-justification condition compared to the just-deserts condition (t[122] = 2.45, p = 
.016, d = 0.44) but lower compared to no-sanction condition (t[122] = 2.93, p = .004, d = 0.53, 
respectively). Rule breaking was lower in the just-deserts condition compared to the no-sanction 
condition (t[124] = 5.92, p < .001, d = 1.06). 
Distrust towards others. The sanction-justification manipulation affected distrust 
towards others (F[1, 245] = 8.02, p < .001, η2p = .09). Distrust towards others was equal among 
the sanction conditions (ps > .45, ds < 0.12) but lower in the sanction conditions than in the no-
sanction condition (ps < .001, ds > 0.55).  
Legitimacy. The sanction-justification manipulation affected authority legitimacy (F[1, 
245] = 4.76, p = .003, η2p = .06). Legitimacy was higher in the just-deserts condition compared to 
the other conditions (ps < .01, ds > 0.49). The deterrence, combined justification, and no-
sanction condition did not differ (ps > .39, ds < 0.15). 
Mediation analyses. Using a bootstrap analysis procedure with 5,000 resamples (Hayes 
& Preacher, 2011), we tested whether legitimacy, distrust towards others, or perceived distrust 
towards self mediated the effect of the sanction-justification manipulation on rule compliance. 
Results from the bootstrap analyses demonstrated that distrust towards others and legitimacy did 
not mediate the overall effect (or the contrast effects between the significant conditions) of 
sanction justifications on rule compliance (all 95% CI’s fell between -0.20 and 0.09 without zero 
in the 95% CI interval). However, results from the bootstrap analyses demonstrated that 
perceived distrust towards the self mediated the overall effect of sanction-justification 
manipulation on the three forms of rule compliance (95% CImandatory compliance = [-0.09, -0.01]; 95% 
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CIvoluntary compliance= [-0.12, -0.01]; 95% CIrule breaking = [0.02, 0.17]), even after controlling for both 
participants’ distrust towards other employees and the perceived legitimacy of the supervisor. 
This was similar for the deterrence versus just-deserts contrast (95% CImandatory compliance = [0.40, 1.35]; 
95% CIvoluntary compliance = [0.53, 1.50]; 95% CIrule breaking = [-2.10, -1.01]) and combined-justification 
condition versus just-deserts contrast (95% CImandatory compliance = [-0.98, -0.014]; 95% CIvoluntary compliance = 
[-0.99, -0.18]; 95% CIrule breaking = [0.54, 1.37]). More specifically, for both contrasts, adding distrust 
to the model decreased the significant effect of the sanction-justification manipulation on the 
three forms of rule compliance (βs > .19, ps < .01) to non-significance (βs < .10, ps > .20).  
 
Discussion 
 Replicating and extending results from Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, results from Experiment 
4.3 demonstrate that participants felt more distrusted when, (a) sanctions were justified as an 
attempt to deter rule breaking compared to giving people their just deserts, and (b) sanctions 
were justified as both deterring people and providing them with their just deserts compared to 
only giving people their just deserts. Thus, the presence of a deterrence justification negatively 
affected rule compliance even when it was provided simultaneously with a just-deserts 
justification. This provides additional support for Hypothesis 1. Perceived distrust towards the 
self undermined the willingness to comply with both mandatory and voluntary rules, and it 
increased a willingness to break rules. This provides additional support for Hypotheses 2a and 
2b. Lastly, the observed effects of sanction justifications on rule compliance were not explained 
by participants’ perceptions of the authority’s legitimacy or participants’ distrust towards others 
(e.g., other employees). As such, results from Experiment 4.3 confirm the (negative) power of 
justifying a sanction as an attempt to deter rule breaking—even when coupled with a just-deserts 
justification, participants felt distrusted and sanction effectiveness was decreased. Lastly, these 
results indicate that the (negative) effect of deterrence-induced distrust is not specific to one 

















































































































































































   





















































































































































































































The previous three experiments demonstrated that deterrence justifications negatively 
affect self-reported rule compliance. Although highly informative, these experiments have not yet 
demonstrated the effects of sanction justifications on behavior. Experiment 4.4 was conducted to 
demonstrate the effect of sanction justifications on a behavioral measure of rule compliance. More 
specifically, we designed an experimental game in which participants could lie to an authority to 
evade a rule (i.e., by misreporting their earned revenue). To make sure that the established effects 
are not strictly due to the use of the words deterrence and just deserts, we justified sanctions as 
preventing participants from rule breaking (consistent with what deterrence aims to achieve, see 
Carlsmith et al., 2002) or giving participants their deserved punishment for breaking rules 
(consistent with what just deserts aims to achieve, see Carlsmith et al., 2002).  
 
Method  
Participants, design, and procedure. A total of 104 participants at Leiden University 
(91 females; Mage = 18.99 years, SDage = 1.44) were randomly assigned to one of three sanction 
conditions (deterrence vs. just deserts vs. no sanction). Participants received €2 for their 
participation. 
Rule compliance. Consistent with previous work on experimental tax games (Bilotkach, 
2006), participants were told that they were randomly assigned to be a “worker” in a work team 
consisting of eight members, while one other group member was randomly assigned to be the 
team leader. Workers could earn extra money by finding correct words amongst scrambled 
letters. The rule was that forty percent of the money would have to be paid to the group leader. 
The team leader had to evenly redistribute this money amongst all team members such that all 
group members could share in a part of the revenue (i.e., similar to taxes that have to be paid to a 
government).  
Although participants were told that the money they would earn was contingent on the 
number of words they found (and could thus vary across participants, depending on their 
productivity), all participants received €1.50—regardless of the amount of words correctly noted. 
Crucially, workers then had to self-report the amount of money had earned to the team leader. 
Participants were told that the team leader was able to verify if this self-reported amount was 
correct for only two workers (i.e., partial monitoring from an authority). As such, participants had 
the possibility to lie about the amount of money they earned, and in doing so both share in the 
collective revenue while keeping more of their own revenue. Thus, participants that report €1.50 




Sanction justifications. In the sanction conditions, the team leader decided to fine those 
who were caught lying by decreasing the money they earned with the task by €1. The type and 
severity of the sanction was thus held constant. This sanction was either justified as preventing 
team members from misreporting their revenue (deterrence condition) or as giving team 
members that misreport their revenue their deserved punishment (just-deserts condition). No 
information was given about a sanction in the no-sanction condition. 
 Distrust. Perceived distrust was measured with the following two items, “I feel distrusted 
by the team leader” and “I feel like the team leader does not trust me” (α = .95). Thus, consistent 
with the previous three experiments, we measured the extent to which the participants felt 
distrusted by the authority (i.e., team leader). 
Manipulation check. Feeling personally targeted by the sanction was measured with the 
following three items, “I feel like the sanction is targeted at me”, “I perceive the sanction as 
meant for me”, and “This sanction is meant for me” (α = .67). Confirming the validity of our 
manipulation, participants in the deterrence condition felt (marginally significant) more personally 
targeted by the sanction (M = 4.36, SD = 1.79) than participants in the just deserts condition (M 
= 3.85, SD = 1.26; t[68] = 1.77, p = .082, d = 0.43).  
 
Results 
Distrust. Overall, the sanction-justification manipulation affected feelings of distrust 
(F[1, 101] = 5.09, p = .008, η2p = .09). Participants felt more distrusted in the deterrence (M = 
4.43, SD = 1.79) than in the just-deserts condition (M = 3.53, SD = 1.43; t[68] = 2.78, p = .007, d 
= 0.67) and no-sanction condition (M = 3.60, SD = 1.45; t[67] = 2.72, p = .008, d = 0.62). Lastly, 
participants in the just-deserts condition felt equally distrusted as participants in the no-sanction 
condition (t[67] = .17, p = .87, d = 0.04). 
Rule compliance. On average (regardless of sanction-justification condition), 
participants lied to the team leader about the money they earned (M = 88.72, SD = 33.99; t[103] 
= 18.38, p < .001, d = 3.62). Participants’ lying depended on the sanction-justification 
manipulation (F[1, 101] = 3.47, p = .035, η2p = .06). As shown in Figure 4.1, participants were 
more likely to lie about the amount of money they earned in the deterrence condition compared 
to the just-deserts condition (t[68] = 2.51, p = .014, d = 0.61). Lying did not differ between the 
deterrence condition and no-sanction condition (t[67] = .22, p = .83, d = 0.05) but was less likely 





Figure 4.1. Rule compliance (indexed by lying about one’s revenue) as a function of sanction 
condition for Experiment 4.4. Error bars indicate standard errors.  
 
Mediation analyses. Feeling distrusted was negatively correlated with rule compliance (r 
= -.44, p = .005) and mediated the overall effect of sanction-justification condition on rule 
compliance (95% CI = [-16.61, -.1.64]). Moreover, adding distrust to the model decreased the 
significant effect of the sanction-justification manipulation on rule compliance (β = .30, p = .014) 
to non-significance (β = .17, p = .13). 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 4.4 provided a behavioral measure of rule compliance. Participants were 
more likely to lie to their team leader when the sanction was justified as aimed to deter lying 
compared to give those who misreport their revenue their just deserts (cf. Hypothesis 2a). 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2b and the previous three experiments, this effect was 
explained by participants feeling more distrusted when the sanction was justified as aiming to 
deter instead of giving participants their just deserts.   
 
General Discussion 
We presented four experiments that examined how sanction justifications affect sanction 
effectiveness. Across different manipulations, scenarios, and sanctions, we consistently observed 
































breaking rules as compared to giving them their just deserts. This distrust is further shown to 
decrease people’s willingness to comply with the rules of their university (Experiment 4.1), 
decrease their willingness to stick to the rules set by a manager (Experiments 4.2 and 4.3), and 
increase the extent to which people lie to their team leader to further their own self-interest 
(Experiment 4.4). These results strongly suggest that justifying a sanction as an attempt to deter 
people from breaking rules—compared to giving people their just deserts—makes people feel 
more distrusted (cf. Hypothesis 1) which decreases the effectiveness of a sanction (cf. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b).  
 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 The present set of studies makes several contributions to the literature on rule 
compliance. Previous research has mainly focused on the extent to which people use deterrence 
and just-deserts goals in guiding their sanction decisions (Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith et al., 2002; 
Darley et al., 2000; Greber & Jackson, 2012; Mooijman et al., 2015). The present research is to 
our knowledge the first to demonstrate the effects of using such goals as a justification on 
perceived distrust and rule compliance. The reported studies demonstrate that using sanction 
goals as a justification can lead an authority to signal the sanction’s underlying considerations to 
the public. Sanction goals are therefore not only “hidden” motivations that drive punitive-
sanction decisions (cf. Carlsmith et al., 2002; Mooijman et al., 2015); as justifications they are also 
highly relevant for influencing the effectiveness of sanctions. Interestingly, the present research 
demonstrates that sanction goals do not only influence rule compliance through affecting the 
severity and type of sanction. Rather, sanction goals can have a distinct and independent 
influence, regardless of sanction type and severity. The underlying considerations that an 
authority signals to others through sanction justifications are therefore highly relevant for the 
subsequent effectiveness of the sanction.  
The way authorities affect others’ tendency to comply with the rules is thus more subtle 
than some might think. Sanctions are not just means to increase the costs and decrease the 
benefits of rule breaking (cf. Nagin, 1998). Rather, sanctions are driven by philosophies and goals 
(Bentham, 1789/1988; Hobbes, 1651/1988; Kant, 1780/1961) that can directly affect the public. 
Previous research has demonstrated that powerful authorities are inclined to rely on deterrence as 
a sanction goal because they distrust others (Mooijman et al., 2015). The current research implies 
that the public is able to infer this distrust from sanctions justified as an attempt to deter rule 
breaking. This reinforces the notion that authorities should be careful with how they justify their 
sanctions. Indeed, the perceived distrust that was elicited by deterrence justifications played a 
unique role in undermining rule compliance. The average (negative) correlation across studies 
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between perceived authority distrust and rule compliance was .38, suggesting that feeling 
distrusted has a moderate influence on rule compliance (Cohen, 1988; Preacher & Kelley, 2011). 
Furthermore, this rule-undermining effect of feeling distrusted was independent from other 
important variables that have been shown to be relevant for cooperation and rule compliance, 
such as group identification (Ellemers et al., 2004; Tyler & Blader, 2000), attitudes towards 
authorities (Tyler & Blader, 2003), and distrust towards others (Mulder et al., 2006). The current 
research thus demonstrates that perceived authority distrust is of vital importance for an 
authority’s ability to promote compliance with cooperative rules.  
The current studies have direct practical relevance for authorities—judges, policy makers, 
and managers should be aware of the consequences that a deterrence justification can have for 
sanction effectiveness. To stimulate rule compliance it may be better to, (a) emphasize that 
sanctions are meant to give people their just deserts or (b) use deterrence justifications as a 
general motivation while emphasizing one’s trust in specific individuals (e.g., target others with 
the sanction). Such sanctions foster rule compliance without making people feel (too) distrusted. 
Although this advice seems straightforward, it may be harder to achieve than one may think. 
Recent research has demonstrated that power increases people’s reliance on deterrence as a goal 
for punishment (Mooijman et al., 2015). That is, power increases distrust towards others, which 
increases reliance on deterrence—but not just deserts—as a goal for punishment. Powerful 
authorities may thus ironically be the least inclined to emphasize the just-deserts aspects of a 
sanction, even though this may be the most effective course of action. However, the current 
research suggests that deterrence justifications can be effective when they are coupled with an 
affirmation of trust (e.g., are targeted at others).  
 
Limitations and Future Directions  
The current research supports our hypotheses across different samples and measures, but 
there are some issues to be noted. For instance, we did not focus on individuals who have already 
broken rules. It is possible that these individuals do feel personally targeted by the sanction and 
distrusted (although this distrust would be partially justified). Although potentially interesting, the 
majority of people tend to be rule abiding or at least perceive themselves as such (Brown, 2012; 
Sedikides et al., 2014). Justifying a sanction as a deterrent is therefore still likely to make them feel 
distrusted and thereby undermine sanction effectiveness. It is also possible that individuals who 
are more trusting of authorities are more, or less, likely to feel distrusted by the authority. In 
other words, chronic trait distrust may moderate the relationship between deterrence 
justifications and perceived distrust. Although we did not measure this in the current studies, we 
believe this to be an interesting avenue for further exploration.  
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Sanction goals are typically classified as deterrence or just-deserts goals (Carlsmith et al., 
2002). Previous research has mainly focused on the extent to which people use these two goals in 
guiding there sanction decisions (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Carlsmith, 2006, 2008; Darley et al., 2000; 
Greber & Jackson, 2012). The present research has been consistent with this approach since we 
examined how these two goals independently or interactively affect sanction effectiveness. 
However, future research could also examine how using less known and less used sanction goals 
as a justification (e.g., incapacitation or rehabilitation; Darley et al., 2000) affects people’s rule 
compliance. Lastly, because the focus in the current chapter was solely on how authorities justify 
their sanctioning behavior, future research could also investigate how people infer sanction goals 
from sanctions. Although this lies outside of the scope of the current reported studies, our 
theorizing and reported studies can provide a meaningful theoretical framework for formulating 
predictions about sanction-inferred goals. For instance, inferring that a sanction is meant to deter 
rule breaking can make people feel distrusted, and thus undermine rule compliance. Future 




Authorities frequently use sanctions to promote rule compliance and often provide a 
justification for their use of such sanctions. Although providing sanction justifications may seem 
appealing, the current chapter demonstrates that these justifications can in fact influence how 
effective a sanction will be in promoting future rule compliance. Four experiments demonstrate 
that sanctions are less effective at promoting rule compliance when they are justified as deterring 
people from rule breaking compared to giving people their just deserts. These effects could be 
attributed to people feeling more distrusted when sanctions were justified as deterring them from 
rule breaking instead of giving them their just deserts. This suggests that although authorities 
have been shown to rely on deterrence as a sanction justification (Mooijman et al., 2015), this 





































Leaders have a vital interest in successfully promoting rule compliance. Organizations 
such as corporations and countries perform better financially when people behave according to 
the rules, in part because rules tend to be promote collective interests rather than individual 
interests (e.g., paying taxes, Akintoye, & Tashie, 2013; Parks et al., 2013). Part of the reason for 
this is that—when people behave according to the rules—organizations can refrain from 
investing resources in preventing rule breaking, thereby freeing up resources for other 
worthwhile investments (Kramer & Cook, 2007). Considering the importance of rule compliance, 
the success of leaders in promoting rule compliance with punishments (e.g., fines, penalties, or 
prison sentences) is surprisingly mixed (Martinez, Moyano, McCaffrey, & Oliva, 2013; Tax Justice 
Network, 2011). What makes some leaders more, and other leaders less, effective at promoting 
rule compliance? In this dissertation, I focused on the determinants and consequences of leaders’ 
punishment goals. That is, I investigated how power affects punishment goals, and how 
punishment goals affect punishment effectiveness. This facilitates both a top-down 
understanding of leaders’ punishment goals (Chapters 2 and 3) and a bottom-up understanding 
of how people’s willingness to comply with rules is affected by leaders’ punishment goals 
(Chapter 4). This final chapter provides an overview of this research and its theoretical and 
practical implications.   
 
Summary of Findings  
The studies described in Chapter 2 were conducted to provide a better understanding of  
punishment-goal determinants. As shown in Chapter 2, results derived from eight experiments 
and a European Value Survey demonstrated that power increased reliance on deterrence—but 
not just deserts—as a punishment goal. This power-deterrence link was explained by power 
fostering a distrustful mind set, and was generalizable across different measurements and 
inductions of power (i.e., chronic trait power, autobiographical power manipulations, 
manipulations of structural positions of power, and real-life managerial positions). As further 
shown in Chapter 2, the reliance on deterrence as a punishment goal translated into a preference 
for punishments that can deter people from rule breaking (i.e., public punishments and 
mandatory minimum for punishments).  
Although these findings strongly suggest that leaders are inclined to punish to deter rule 
breaking, it did yet not demonstrate how relying on a deterrence or just deserts goal for 
punishment affects the effectiveness of the punishment. In other words, it remained unclear to 
what extent leaders’ reliance on deterrence as a punishment goal affected the extent to which they 
were (in)effective at promoting rule compliance with punishments. In Chapter 4, I addressed this 
shortcoming by investigating the relationships between punishment-goal justifications and rule 
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compliance. As described in Chapter 4, results derived from four experiments demonstrated that 
leaders decreased people’s willingness to comply with their rules when they justified their 
punishments as an attempt to deter people from rule breaking compared to an attempt to give 
people their just deserts. This (negative) deterrence-rule compliance relationship was explained by 
people feeling more distrusted by leaders that justified their punishments as an attempt to deter 
people compared to an attempt to give people their just deserts. Consistent with distrust being an 
important determinant of deterrence in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 thus demonstrated that—through 
leaders signaling their distrust—leaders undermined rule compliance when they relied on 
deterrence (rather than just deserts) as a punishment justification. Punishment effectiveness, in 
other words, was affected by the goals that leaders used to justify their punishments.  
Integrating Chapters 2 and 4, this strongly suggests that—because of their power—
leaders often rely on a punishment goal that is relatively ineffective at promoting rule compliance. 
Central to this observation was the role of distrust. Distrust explained why leaders relied on 
deterrence as a punishment goal (i.e., through distrusting others) and why reliance on deterrence 
as a punishment goal backfired (i.e., through people feeling distrusted by the leader). But what is 
the reason that power increased distrust towards others (and by doing so increased reliance on a 
relatively ineffective punishment goal)? In Chapter 3, I addressed these questions by investigating 
why power fosters distrust—and thus increases reliance on a relatively ineffective punishment 
goal—and how this distrust-link can be attenuated. Results from three experiments demonstrated 
that distrust can be explained by power holders’ motivation to maintain power. That is, when 
individuals gained power they were shown to be more motivated to distrust others to maintain 
their power over others. Moreover, individuals who were more strongly motivated to maintain 
power distrusted others more when they gained power, and occupying a stable (versus unstable) 
power position attenuated the power-distrust effect. This strongly suggests that the reliance of 
leaders on deterrence as a punishment goal, and its relative ineffectiveness in promoting rule 
compliance, is in part due to power holders’ motivation to maintain power over others.  
 
 Theoretical Implications and Contributions 
Determinants of punishment goals 
 One of the most prominent questions for leaders is how to promote rule compliance. As 
far back as the 17th and 18th century, philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1651/1988) and 
Jeremy Bentham (1789/1988) already argued that—because people are inclined to break rules—
leaders should use punishments to deter rule-breaking behavior. To this day, many corporations 
and government institutions follow this line of reasoning and use harsh fines and penalties to 
deter employees and citizens from breaking their rules (Kirchler et al., 2014). The results 
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presented in this dissertation demonstrate the psychological principles and assumptions that 
underlie this reasoning, and the consequences that follow from it. As shown in Chapter 2, relying 
on punishments as a means to deter others is a hallmark of powerful leaders such as top 
managers, policy makers and politicians. Indeed, reliance on deterrence, but not just deserts, as a 
punishment goal was determined by the power position that one occupied. Power thus increases 
leaders’ reliance on punishments aimed at the deterrence of rule breaking.   
These findings are in contrast with previous research that suggested the importance of 
just-deserts over deterrence as a goal for punishing (Darley, 2009). Concluding that the just-
deserts goal is more important than the deterrence goal is therefore premature. Rather, punishing 
to deter people from rule breaking seems to be elicited by different concerns than punishing 
others to give them their just deserts. Previous research on the just-deserts goal has focused 
mainly on the punishment of the individual offender (micro-level perspective) rather than the 
punishment of the individual in its broader context such as the effects on societal norms and 
values (macro-level perspective). Some may thus argue that the currently observed relationship 
between power and deterrence is explained in part by such societal-level considerations instead of 
specific offender-focused considerations (consistent with the notion that power holders think 
more broadly and abstractly; Magee & Smith, 2013). However, Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, and 
Scott (2004) demonstrated that perceptions of societal threat (in terms of low conviction rates of 
criminals) increased people’s desire for harsh punishments through increasing the desire to give 
criminals their just deserts, but not through increasing the desire to prevent future criminal 
behavior. Moreover, the studies described in Chapter 2 did not show that macro-level 
considerations—such as the collective welfare of the group—mediated the effect of power on 
deterrence. As such, macro-level considerations seem unfit to explain the observed findings of 
power on deterrence.  
 Instead, the current findings are perfectly consistent with Thomas Hobbes’ and Jeremy 
Bentham’s assumption that others cannot be trusted to comply with rules that promote 
cooperation. Indeed, they explicitly mention in their writings that punishments should deter rule 
breaking primarily because people care little about the rules (and would thus break rules when 
punishments are absent). Power thus seems to increase reliance on such “Hobbesian” and 
“Benthamian” philosophies; power holders tend to think that deterrence is needed because 
others cannot be trusted to comply with rules. As shown in Chapter 3, power holders’ distrust 
towards others is explained by power holders’ motivation to maintain power over others, and the 
reliance on deterrence through distrust can therefore be construed as part of the motivation to 
maintain power. The effect of power on deterrence is, at least in the current dissertation, thus not 
determined by macro-level considerations but by power holders’ desire to maintain their own 
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power. This provides a novel perspective on the psychology of punishments goals, as 
punishments can also be guided by power-protecting considerations, instead of more other-
oriented concerns such as the desire to restore justice (Darley, 2009), the desire to make 
offenders suffer (Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008), or the desire to help victims (Gromet et al., 
2012). This dissertation therefore makes an important contribution to the psychology of 
punishment goals by providing a specific psychological understanding of leaders’ punishment 
goals.   
 
Consequences of punishment goals  
 Another important contribution of the current dissertation is that it couples the 
determinants of punishment goals to its consequences for rule compliance. More specifically, I 
investigated how and why leaders’ reliance on punishment goals previously emphasized by 
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1651/1988) and Immanuel Kant (1780/1961), affects the 
effectiveness of the punishment in terms of promoting rule compliance. As shown in Chapter 4, 
leaders that justified their punishments as an attempt to deter people from rule breaking (cf. 
Thomas Hobbes) were less effective at promoting rule compliance than leaders that justified their 
punishments as an attempt to give people their just deserts (cf. Immanuel Kant). These findings 
show that understanding the psychology of punishment goals is not only important for 
understanding determinants of punishments; it also fosters a specific understanding of how 
punishment goals affect punishment effectiveness. More specifically, Chapter 4 demonstrated 
that people felt more distrusted by leaders that justified their punishments as an attempt to deter 
them from rule breaking compared to provide them with their just deserts, and that this 
perceived distrust mediated the effect of punishment-goal justifications on rule compliance. This 
finding is consistent with the findings from Chapter 2 that distrust underlies leaders’ reliance on 
deterrence—but not just deserts—as a punishment goal, and the more general notion that leaders 
can signal such underlying considerations to others through their behavior. For instance, in a 
series of experiments, McKenzie, Liersch, and Finkelstein (2009) demonstrated that people 
perceive the fact that they are by default “not an organ donor” as revealing the implicit 
recommendation of society’s policy makers. Moreover, in three experiments conducted by 
Tannenbaum, Valasek, Knowles, and Ditto (2013), participants accurately inferred policy makers’ 
negative attitudes towards the overweight from policy makers’ decisions to increase (or decrease) 
health care premiums for overweight employees. The findings presented in this dissertation thus 
demonstrate that people can similarly, and accurately, infer leaders’ distrust from their 
punishment-goal justifications.   
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Furthermore, the observed rule-undermining effect of feeling distrusted by a leader is 
consistent with the literature on interpersonal justice. This literature states that the perceived 
interpersonal treatment of people by their leaders is an important determinant of people’s 
willingness to comply with leaders’ rules (e.g., relational model of authority and the group-value 
model of procedural justice; Tyler & Lind, 1992). The assumption in this literature is that people 
comply with leaders’ rules in part because of the “social contract” between people and their 
leaders; people are willing to comply with leaders’ rules as long as leaders ensure that justice is 
done (i.e., people who cooperate are rewarded and people who break rules are punished; see 
Plato 380 BC/1992). The findings described in Chapter 4 are consistent with this notion. A 
perceived lack of trust from leaders may seem unwarranted when no prior breach of rules was 
displayed, and may thus seem unjust, thereby undermining rule compliance. Interestingly, this 
notion of the social contract is also central to deterrence theory and just-deserts theory (Hobbes, 
1651/1988; Kant, 1780/1961). Both theories differ, however, in how leaders should uphold the 
social contract—by deterring rule breaking with punishments or by giving rule breakers their just 
deserts with punishments? The current findings strongly suggest that, compared to deterrence, 
leaders using just-deserts as a justification for their punishments best uphold the social contract, 
as demonstrated in people’s increased willingness to comply with rules. This dissertation 
therefore makes an important contribution to understanding the consequences of punishment 
goals by providing a specific psychological understanding to how and why using punishment 
goals as a justification affects punishment effectiveness.   
 
Integrating determinants and consequences of punishment goals 
 By integrating both determinants and consequences of punishment goals, this dissertation 
also addresses an important limitation of previous research on punishment goals. Previous 
research has largely neglected to investigate the consequences of punishment goals and was 
therefore unable to connect the determinants of punishment goals to their consequences. Indeed, 
are leaders’ punishment goals beneficial or detrimental for how effective they are at promoting 
rule compliance? In the current dissertation, I demonstrated that leaders’ power increases reliance 
on deterrence as a punishment goal through increasing distrust towards others and that relying on 
deterrence as a punishment justification is relatively ineffective at promoting rule compliance 
because it signals leaders’ distrust towards others. Distrust is thus shown to directly connect 
leaders’ reliance on deterrence as a punishment goal to the subsequent ineffectiveness of the 
punishment. Moreover, I demonstrated in Chapter 3 that this distrust is in part explained by 
leaders’ concern to maintain power, thereby demonstrating that leaders’ reliance on deterrence as 
a (relatively ineffective) punishment goal is part of leaders’ concern for maintaining power. Thus, 
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although power increases leaders’ reliance on punishments to deter rule-breaking behavior, this 
can paradoxically stimulate instead of prevent rule-breaking behavior.  
This demonstrates that it is fruitful to theorize both on how and why leaders punish, and 
how and why such punishments affect rule compliance. An integrative understanding of leaders’ 
punishment behavior and subsequent effectiveness, for instance, sheds light unto why informing 
leaders about how they should punish does not always directly translate into behavioral change. 
Even if leaders are explicitly told that they should justify their punishments as an attempt to 
achieve just deserts, and not as an attempt to deter rule breaking, their power still edges them 
towards reliance on deterrence as a punishment goal. Especially in the long run, when leaders’ 
strategies are subject to unexpected problems and crises, leaders may fall back on their 
psychological tendency to deter rule breaking with punishments, thereby promoting rule 
compliance with punishments relatively ineffectively. This strongly suggests that it is leaders’ 
power and subsequent distrust towards others, that is a potential problem for their ability to 
promote rule compliance effectively. This dissertation therefore makes an important contribution 
to an integrated understanding of leaders’ punishment behavior and peoples’ reaction to such 
punishment behavior. That is, by providing a specific psychological understanding of how and 
why leaders’ inclination to rely on specific punishment goals affects people’s willingness to 
comply with the leader’s rules.  
 
Practical Implications and Contributions 
 Powerful leaders frequently punish others for their rule-breaking behavior. Leaders 
therefore need to understand how their power affects their punishment goals, and how reliance 
on such punishment goals affects people’s willingness to comply with rules. The current 
dissertation demonstrates that the power hierarchy of an organization can increase (or decrease) 
leaders’ reliance on the deterrence goal for punishment. Especially in organizations where rule 
compliance is of great importance (e.g., financial institutions), leaders are often given a great deal 
of power over others. After the recent financial crisis in 2008, for instance, many financial 
institutions hired rule-compliance officers who were given the power to oversee bank manager’s 
decisions, create rules, and guidelines, and enforce rules with punishments (Trevino, den 
Nieuwenboer, Kreiner, & Bischop, 2014; Trevino, den Nieuwenboer, & Kisch-Gephart, 2014). 
Ironically, the power that such individuals have can thus impede the extent to which they are 
effective at promoting compliance with such rules. This strongly suggests that organizations that 
afford a great deal of power to leaders make these individuals relatively ineffective at promoting 
rule compliance. That is, leaders’ power and reliance on deterrence as a relatively ineffective 
punishment goal are positively related—decreasing leaders’ power thus decreases reliance on 
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deterrence as a punishment goal. Moreover, the findings described in Chapter 3 hint at the 
notion that decreasing the extent to which leaders feel threatened (e.g., feel stable and certain 
about their power position) may also decrease their reliance on deterrence as a punishment goal. 
An interesting implication may thus be to hire temporary leaders to enforce rules through 
punishments (Andreoni & Gee, 2012). These “guns for hire” know that they will have to leave 
their job after a certain amount of time, thereby reducing their feelings of power instability and 
possibly reducing their reliance on deterrence as a punishment goal.  
 These implications are important because leaders are frequently told to achieve behavioral 
change through creating a shared vision and providing inspiration to others (i.e., transformational 
leadership; Bass, 1985). However, leaders still have to enforce rules with punishments, as 
inspirational leadership is not always sufficient for promoting rule compliance (Wyld, 2013). 
Although creating “flatter” organizations (with smaller power differences between people) may 
seem like a possible solution to counteract the negative effects of power on punishment 
effectiveness, power differences within organizations are unlikely to disappear any time soon. 
Part of the reason is that the existence of a power hierarchy can be functional in terms of creating 
clarity with regard to “who has to do what”, thereby increasing the extent to which people are 
effective at their respective jobs (Anderson & Brown, 2010). Leaders should thus at least be 
aware of the negative effects of using deterrence as a punishment goal and should also be 
motivated to create explicit strategies towards communicating about punishments in terms of 
justice. Leaders should in particular be aware of how their own distrust towards others affects 
their punishment goals, and others’ willingness to comply with rules.  
Even though leaders’ own distrust towards others may at times be hard to attenuate, 
leaders should also realize that the consequences of such distrust might be contrary to their own 
interest. Although leaders’ distrust may at times protect them from losing power to others in the 
short term, the rule-undermining effect of their distrust is unlikely to be an optimal long-term 
strategy. Leaders’ power positions arex often dependent on their ability to successfully promote 
rule compliance in the long run (e.g., politicians can fail to get reelected if crime rates increase). 
Consistent with the notion that changes are easiest implemented when such changes appeal to 
people’s self-interest (Parks et al., 2013), leaders should be aware of the fact that their own power 
position might be best maintained by using punishments aimed at giving rule breakers their just 
deserts and thereby achieve justice.    
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 Although the studies that I have presented in this dissertation are consistent with my 
hypotheses and deploy a variation of different methodologies, there are still some methodological 
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limitations that should be addressed. For instance, one of these limitations is the experimental 
nature of many of the empirical data reported in this dissertation. With one exception (i.e., data 
from the European Value Survey in Chapter 2; Study 2.3a), all data were derived from carefully 
constructed laboratory experiments. Such experiments provided advantages. First, it provided the  
the advantage of  being able to manipulate specific variables of interest (e.g., power; punishment 
justifications) while excluding alternative explanations (e.g., income differences between power 
positions; pre-existing animosity between people and their leaders). Secondly, it allowed me to 
draw causal inferences between variables, thereby moving beyond reporting simple correlations. 
Although the advantages of such an experimental approach are profound, it still begs the 
question to what extent the observed effects of power on deterrence, and deterrence on rule 
compliance are reflected in more dynamic and real-life settings. For instance, future research 
could investigate how the justifications that rule-compliance officers in financial instructions 
provide for their actions affects their effectiveness in promoting rule compliance. Future research 
could also investigate how tax-compliance officers’ justifications for monitoring (and possibly 
punishing) taxpayers affect the relationship between the tax-compliance officer and taxpayer, and 
consequently taxpayers’ willingness to comply with tax rules. Although these studies may be 
challenging, the current dissertation provides a specific theoretical framework for exploring these 
interesting dynamics.   
 Consistent with the above, future research should also apply a more dynamic and 
interactive approach to understanding the relationships between leadership, punishment, and rule 
compliance. Future research could, for instance, investigate the role of status, its effects on 
punishment goals and subsequent punishment effectiveness. More specifically, leaders’ 
perceptions of status may increase a desire for positive group functioning and cohesion (in part 
because leaders’ status is dependent on others’ positive evaluations; see Blader & Chen, 2012), 
which may increase reliance on just deserts as a punishment goal. But how do people react to 
such status-induced punishment? And do leaders, in turn, adjust their own punishment behavior 
when they receive feedback about people’s reactions to their punishments? And do such 
adjustments lead to more (or less) effective punishments? Without an understanding of both 
leaders’ behavior and followers’ reactions to leaders’ behavior, answering such questions is 
difficult. Future research should therefore apply a more interactive research approach to 
understanding leaders’ punishment (effectiveness).  
 Lastly, future research could also benefit from a more functionalist-approach to the study 
of power (i.e., whether power holders act in ways that is functional for maintaining their power). 
In recent years, we have seen an increase in the number of studies on the social-cognitive effects 
of power (e.g., effects of the experience of power on perspective taking; Galinsky et al., 2006), 
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but few studies have been conducted on how power holders behave to maintain their own power 
(but see Case & Maner, 2014; Maner & Mead, 2010). Indeed, do some effects of power result 
from strategic considerations to maintain power? The current dissertation strongly suggests that 
power can affect relevant behavioral outcomes as part of a strategy to maintain power, thereby 
implying that strategic considerations play a role for power holders. Since individuals occupying 
real-life power positions are often reluctant to let go of such positions (Fehr et al., 2013), a 
further understanding of the psychology of power from a functional perspective seems 
worthwhile.   
 
Conclusion 
 Based on the findings in this dissertation, it seems safe to conclude that understanding 
the determinants and consequences of leaders’ punishment goals is important. Together, the 
findings reported in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 on the role of power, distrust, punishment goals, and 
punishment effectiveness provide new insights into safeguarding leaders against relying on 
suboptimal punishment goals. These findings also provide new evidence as to what punishment 


















































Aharoni, E., & Fridlund, A. J. (2011). Punishment without reason: Isolating retribution in  
lay punishment of criminal offenders. Psychology, Public Policy, and the Law, 18, 599–625. 
Akintoye, I. R., & Tashie, G. A. (2013). The effect of tax compliance on economic growth and  
development in Nigeria. British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, 11, 222–231.  
Anderson, C., & Brion, S. (2014). Perspectives on power in organizations. Annual review of  
Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 1, 67–97.  
Anderson, C., & Brown, C. (2010). The functions and dysfunctions of hierarchy. Research in  
Organizational Behavior, 30, 55–89. 
Anderson, C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2006). Power, optimism, and the proclivity for risk. European  
Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 511–536. 
Anderson, C., & John, O. P., & Keltner, D. (2011). The personal sense of power. Journal of 
Personality, 80, 313–344.  
Anderson, C., Willer, R., Kilduff, G., & Brown, C. L. (2012). The drive to defer: Why some 
individuals prefer lower status. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102, 1077–1088. 
Andreoni, A., & Gee, L. K. (2012). Guns for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment 
in public goods provision. Journal of Public Economics, 96, 1036–1046.  
Arvey, R. D., & Ivancevich, J. M. (1980). Punishment in organizations: A review,  
propositions, and research suggestions. Academy of Management Review, 5, 123–132. 
Ball, G. A., Treviño, L. K., & Sims, H. P. (1994). Just and unjust punishment: Influences on 
subordinate performance. Academy of Management Journal, 37, 299–323.  
Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2012). Trust, conflict, and cooperation: A meta-analysis.  
Psychological Bulletin, 139, 1090–1112. 
Bass, B. M. (1985). Leadership and performance beyond expectations. New York: Free Press. 
Bentham, J. (1789/1988). An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, New York, NY:  
Prometheus Books. 
Berg, J., Dickaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games 
and Economic Behavior, 10, 122–142. 
Bilotkach, V. (2006). A tax evasion-bribery game: Experimental evidence from Ukraine. The  
European Journal of Comparative Economics, 3, 31–49. 
Blader, S., & Chen, Y. (2012). Differentiating the effects of status and power: A justice  
perspective. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102, 994–1014. 
Blader, S. L. & Tyler, T. R. (2003). A four component model of procedural justice: Defining the  
meaning of a "fair" process. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 747-758. 
 
Brown, J. D. (2012). Understanding the "Better than Average" effect: Motives (still) matter.  
502982-L-bw-Mooijman
 95 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 209–219.  
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s mechanical turk a new  
source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 3–5. 
Butterfield, K. D., Treviño, L. K., & Ball, G. A. (1996). Punishment from the manager’s  
perspective: A grounded investigation and inductive model. Academy of Management Journal, 
39, 1479–1512.  
Butterfield, K. D., Treviño, L. K., Wade, K. J., & Ball, G. A. (2005). Organizational punishment 
from the manager’s perspective: An exploratory study. Journal of Managerial Issues, 17, 363–
382. 
Carlsmith, K. M. (2006). The roles of retribution and utility in determining punishment.  
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 437–451. 
Carlsmith, K. M. (2008). On justifying punishment: The discrepancy between words and  
actions. Social Justice Research, 21, 119–137. 
Carlsmith, K. M., Darley, J. M., & Robinson, P. H. (2002). Why do we punish? Deterrence and 
just deserts as motives for punishment. Journal of Social and Personality Psychology, 83, 284–
299. 
Carlsmith, K. M., Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T (2008). The paradoxical consequences of 
revenge. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1316–1324. 
Case, C. R., & Maner, J. K. (2014). Divide and conquer: When and why leaders undermine the 
cohesive fabric of their group. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 107, 1033–1050. 
Chemerinsky, E. (2004). Life in prison for shoplifting: Cruel and unusual punishment. Human  
Rights, 31, 11–13.  
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). New York, NY:  
Academic Press. 
Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., & LePine, J. A. (2007). Trust, trustworthiness, and trust  
propensity: A meta-analytic test of their unique relationships with risk taking and job 
performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 909–927. 
Crockett, M. J., Özdemir, Y., & Fehr, E. (2014). The value of vengeance and the demand for  
deterrence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 2279–2286.  
Cropanzano, R., Bowen, D. E., & Gilliand, S. W. (2007). The management of organizational  
justice. Academy of Management Perspective, 4, 34–48.  
Darley, J. M. (2009). Morality in the law: The psychological foundations of citizens’  
desires to punish transgressions. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 5, 1–23.  
Darley, J. M., Carlsmith, K. M., & Robinson, P. H. (2000). Incapacitation and just deserts as 
motives for punishment. Law and Human Behavior, 24, 659–684. 
502982-L-bw-Mooijman
 96 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B. (2004). The risk-based view of trust: A conceptual framework. Journal  
of Business and Psychology, 19, 85–116. 
De Cremer, D., & Van Knippenberg, D. (2002). How do leaders promote cooperation? The  
effects of charisma and procedural fairness. Journal of Applied Psychology, 5, 858–866. 
De Keijser, J. W., Van Der Leeden, R., & Jackson, J. L. (2002). From moral theory to penal  
attitudes and back: A theoretically integrated modeling approach. Behavioral Sciences and the 
Law, 20, 317–335. 
de Quervain, D. J. F., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U., Buck, A., &  
Fehr, E. (2004). The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science, 305, 1254–1258. 
Downes, D., & Hansen, K. (2006). Welfare and punishment: The relationship between  
welfare spending and imprisonment. London: Crime and Society Foundation.  
Eisinga, R., Te Grotenhuis, M., & Pelzer, B. (2013). The reliability of a two-item scale:  
Pearson, Cronbach, or Spearman-Brown? International Journal of Public Health, 58, 637–642.  
Ellemers, N. (2012). The Group Self. Science, 336, 848–852. 
Ellemers, N., De Gilder, D., & Haslam, S. A. (2004). Motivating individuals and groups at work:  
A social identity perspective on leadership and group performance. Academy of Management 
Review, 29, 459–478.  
Ellemers, N., Doosje, B., & Spears, R. (2004). Sources of respect: Effects of being liked by  
ingroups and outgroups. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 1551–172. 
Ellemers, N., Wilke, H., & Van Knippenberg, A. (1993). Effects of the legitimacy of low group  
or individual status on individual and collective identity enhancement strategies. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 766–778. 
EVS (2011). European Values Study 1981: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2011). GESIS Data  
Archive, Cologne. ZA4438 Data file version 3.0.0. 
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. Evolution and  
 Human Behavior, 25, 63–87.  
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137–140.  
Fehr, E., Herz, H., & Wilkening, T. (2013). The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive  
effects of power. American Economic Review, 103, 1325–1359.  
Festinger, L. (1962). A theory of cognitive dissonance (Vol. 2). Stanford University Press. 
Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. American  
Psychologist, 48, 621–628.  
Gabor, T., & Crutcher, N. (2002). Mandatory Minimum Penalties: Their Effects on Crime,  
Sentencing Disparities, and Justice System Expenditures. Ottawa: Justice Canada. 
Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2000). Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup-  
502982-L-bw-Mooijman
 97 
identity model. Philadelphia, PA: The Psychology Press. 
Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Magee, J. C. (2003). From power to action. Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 453–466. 
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2006). Power and perspectives  
not taken. Psychological Science, 17, 1068–1074.  
Gerber, M. M., & Jackson, J. (2013). Retribution as revenge and retribution as just deserts.  
Social Justice Research, 26, 61–80. 
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000). A fine is a price. Journal of Legal Studies, 29, 1–17. 
Goodwin, S. A., Gubin, A., Fiske, S. T., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2000). Power can bias impression  
processes: Stereotyping subordinates by default and by design. Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations, 3, 227–256. 
Gromet, D. M., Okimoto, T. G., Wenzel, M., & Darley, J. (2012). A victim-centered approach to  
justice? Victim satisfaction effects on third-party punishments. Law and Human 
 Behavior, 36, 375–389. 
Guinote, A. (2007a). Behavioral variability and the situated focus theory of power. European  
Review of Social Psychology, 18, 256–295.  
Guinote, A. (2007b). Power and goal pursuit. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33,  
1076–1087.  
Hayes, A. F., Preacher, K. J., & Myers, T. A. (2011). Mediation and the estimation of indirect  
effects in political communication research.  In E. P. Bucy & R. Lance Holbert 
(Eds.), Sourcebook for political communication research: Methods, measures, and analytical techniques. 
(pp. 434–465). New York: Routledge.  
Hobbes, T. (1651/1996). Leviathan. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Inesi, E. M. (2010). Power and loss aversion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision  
Processes, 112, 58–69.  
Inesi, E. M., Gruenfeld D. H., & Galinsky, A. D. (2012). How power corrupts relationships:  
Cynical attributions for others’ generous acts. Journal of Experimental Social  
Psychology, 48, 795–803. 
Jabour, B. (2013, September 27). Queensland plan to 'name and shame' young offenders  
under fire. The Guardian. Retrieved January 20, 2014, from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/crime-australia-queensland. 
Josephs, R. A., Sellers, J. G., Newman, M. L., & Mehta, P. H. (2006). The mismatch effect:  
When testosterone and status are at odds. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 999 
–1013.  
Kant, I. (1952). The science of right. (W. Hastie, Trans.). In R. Hutchins (Ed.), Great books of  
502982-L-bw-Mooijman
 98 
the western world (pp. 397–446). Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. (Original work published 1790). 
Keller, L. B., Oswald, M. E., Stucki, I., & Gollwitzer, M. (2010). A closer look at an eye for an  
eye: Layperson’s punishment decisions are primarily driven by retributive motives. Social  
Justice Research, 23, 99–116.  
Keltner, D., Anderson, C., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2003). Power, approach and inhibition.  
Psychological Review, 23, 265–284.  
Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. Academy of Management  
Journal, 18, 769–783.  
Kipnis, D., Castel, P. J., Gergen, M., & Mauch, D. (1976). Metamorphic effects of power.  
Journal of Applied Psychology, 61, 127–135. 
Kirchler, E., Kogler, C., & Muelbacher, S. (2014). Cooperative tax compliance: From deterrence  
to deference. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23, 87–92.  
Kramer, R. M. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, 
enduring questions. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 984–993. 
Kramer, R. M., & Schaffer, J. (2014). Misconnecting the dots: Origins and dynamics of  
intergroup paranoia.  In J-W. van Prooijen & P. A. M. Van Lange (Eds.), Power,  
politics and paranoia: Why people are suspicious of their leaders. New York:  
Cambridge University Press.  
Lammers, J., & Stapel, D. A. (2009). How power influences moral thinking. Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 279–289. 
Lammers, J., Galinsky, A. D., Gordijn, E. H., & Otten, S. (2012). Power increases social distance.  
Social and Personality Science, 3, 282–290. 
Lammers, J., Stoker, J. I., Jordan, J., Pollmann, M. M. H., & Stapel, D. A. (2011). Power  
increases infidelity among men and women. Psychological Science, 22, 1191–1197. 
Langlois, J. (2012). India to name and shame rapists. Global Post. Retrieved January 20, 2014  
From http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asiapacific/india/ 
121227/india-name-and-shame-rapists. 
Lee, F., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2001). Is it lonely at the top? Independence and interdependence of  
power-holders. In B. M. Staw & R. I. Sutton (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (pp. 
43–91). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Lewicki, R. J., Tomlinson, E. C., & Gillespie, N. (2006). Models of interpersonal trust  
development: Theoretical approaches, empirical evidence, and future directions. Journal of 
Management, 32, 991–1022. 
Lount, R. B. Jr., & Petitt, N. C. (2012). The social context of trust: The role of status.  
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 117, 15–23. 
502982-L-bw-Mooijman
 99 
Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of  
power and status. Academy of Management Annals, 2, 351–398. 
Magee, J. C., & Smith, P. K. (2013). The social distance theory of power. Personality and Social  
Psychology Review, 17, 158–186. 
Magee, J. C., Kilduff, G. J., & Heath, C. (2011). On the folly of principal’s power:  
Managerial psychology as a cause of bad incentives. Research in Organizational Behavior, 31, 
25–41. 
Mandatory Minimum Terms Result In Harsh Sentencing (2007). Retrieved January 20, 2014,  
from http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/07-06 26/Mandatory_Minimum_ 
Terms_Result_In_Harsh_Sentencing.aspx. 
Maner, J. K., Gailliot, J. K., Butz, D., & Peruche, B. M. (2007). Power, risk and the status- 
quo: Does power promote riskier or more conservative decision-making? Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 451–462.  
Maner, J. K., & Mead, N. (2010). The essential tension between leadership and power: When 
leaders sacrifice group goals for the sake of self-interest. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 99, 482–497. 
Martinez, M. (2015, January 24). Colorado woman gets 4 years for wanting to join ISIS. CNN.  
Retrieved, January 28 from http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/23/us/colorado-woman-
isis- sentencing.  
Martínez-Moyano, I. D., McCafrey, P. D., & Oliva, R. (2013). Drift and adjustment in  
organizational rule compliance: Explaining the ‘regulatory pendulum’ in financial markets. 
Organization Science, 25, 321–338. 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational  
trust. Academy of Management Review, 20, 709–734. 
Mayer, D. M., Kuenzi, M., Greenbaum, R., Bardes, M., & Salvador, R. (2009). How low does  
ethical leadership flow? Test of a trickle-down model. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 108, 1–13. 
McKenzie, C. R. M., Liersch, M. J., & Finkelstein, S. R. (2006). Recommendations implicit  
in policy defaults. Psychological Science, 17, 414–420.  
Mead, N. L., & Maner, J. K. (2012). On keeping your enemies close: Powerful leaders seek  
proximity to in-group power-threats. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102, 576–
591. 
Molenmaker, W. E., De Kwaadsteniet, E. W., & Van Dijk, E. (2014). On the willingness to costly  
reward cooperation and punish non-cooperation: The moderating role of type of social 
dilemma. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 125, 175–183. 
502982-L-bw-Mooijman
 100 
Mooijman, M., & Stern, C. (2016, in press). When perspective taking creates a motivational  
threat: The case of conservatism, same-sexual behavior, and anti-gay attitudes. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin. 
Mooijman, M., & Van Dijk, W. W. (2015). The self in moral judgment: How self-affirmation  
affects the moral condemnation of harmless sexual taboo violations. Cognition and Emotion,  
7, 1334–1342.  
Mooijman, M., Van Dijk, W. W., Ellemers, N., & Van Dijk, E. (2015). Why leaders punish: A  
power perspective. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109, 75–89.  
Mooijman, M., Van Dijk, W. W., Van Dijk, E., & Ellemers, N. (under revision, 2015). On  
sanction effectiveness: How and why sanction-goal justifications affect rule compliance. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.  
Mooijman, M., Van Dijk, W. W., Van Dijk, E., & Ellemers, N. (under review). Power, distrust,  
and the motivation to maintain power.  
Mulder, L. B., Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., & Wilke, H. A. M. (2006). Undermining trust  
and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 147–162.  
Mulder, L., & Nelissen, R. (2010). When rules really make a difference: The effect of cooperation  
rules and self-sacrificing leadership on moral norms in social dilemmas. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 95, 57-72. 
Nagin, D. (1998). Criminal deterrence research at the outset of the twenty-first century. In M.  
Tonry (Ed.), Crime and justice: A review of research (Vol. 23, pp. 1–42). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Nelissen, M. A., & Zeelenberg, M. (2009). Moral emotions as determinants of third-party  
punishment: Anger, guilt, and the functions of altruistic sanctions. Judgment and  
Decision Making, 4, 543–553.  
Okimoto, T., & Wenzel., M. (2011). Third-party punishment and symbolic intragroup status.  
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 709–718. 
O’Reilly, C. A., & Chatman, J. A. (1986). Organizational commitment and psychological  
attachment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 71, 492–499.  
Parks, C. D., Joireman, J., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2013). Cooperation, trust and antagonism:  
How public goods are promoted. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 14,  
119–165. 
Philips, M. (2011, May 02). Osama Bin Laden Dead. Retrieved, April 22nd from  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead. 
Plato (380 BC/1992). Republic. (Trans. G. M. A. Grube, Revised by C. D. C. Reeve) Indianapolis,  
502982-L-bw-Mooijman
 101 
IN: Hackett Publishing Company. 
Preacher, K. J., & Kelley, K. (2011). Effect size measures for mediation models: Quantitative  
strategies for communicating indirect effects. Psychological Methods, 16, 93–115. 
Raul, A. C. (2002, October 11). In era of broken rules, society breaks. Los Angeles Times.  
Retrieved, October 7th from http://articles.latimes.com/2002/oct/11/opinion/oe-
raul11. 
Robinson, P. H. (2005). Law without justice: Why criminal law doesn’t give people what they  
deserve. Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
Rucker, D. D., Galinsky, A. D., & DuBois, D. (2012). Power and consumer behaviour: How 
power shapes who and what consumers value. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 22, 352–368. 
Rucker, D., Polifroni, M. D., Tetlock, P., & Scott, A. (2004). On the assignment of punishment:  
The impact of general-societal threat and the moderating role of severity. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 673–684. 
Schneider, F. (2008). Size and development of the shadow economy in Germany, Austria and  
other OECD countries: Some preliminary findings. La Revie Economique, 15.  
Sedikides, C., Meek, R., Alicke, M. D., & Taylor, S. (2014) Behind bars but above the bar:  
Prisoners consider themselves more prosocial than non-prisoners. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 53, 396–403.  
Seip, E. C., Van Dijk, W. W., & Rotteveel, M. (2014). Anger motivates costly punishment of  
unfair behavior. Motivation and Emotion, 38, 578–588. 
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology:  
Undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as  
significant. Psychological Science, 22, 1359–1366.  
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2013). Life after p-hacking. Paper presented  
at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Society for Personality and Social  
Psychology, New Orleans, LA, USA.  
Smith, P. K., & Trope, Y. (2006). You focus on the forest when you're in charge of the trees:  
Power priming and abstract information processing. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 90, 578–596.  
Smith, P. K., Jostmann, N. B., Galinsky, A. D., & van Dijk, W. (2008). Lacking power impairs  
executive functions. Psychological Science, 19, 441–447. 
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self.  
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 261–302.  
Stouten, J., De Cremer, D., & Van Dijk, E. (2005). I'm doing the best I can (for myself):  
502982-L-bw-Mooijman
 102 
Leadership and variance of harvesting in resource dilemmas. Group Dynamics: Theory, 
Research, and Practice, 9, 205–211. 
Strobel, A., Zimmermann, J., Schmitz, A., Reuter, M., Lis, S., Windmann, S., & Kirsch, P. (2011).  
Beyond revenge: neural and genetic bases of altruistic punishment. NeuroImage, 54, 671–
80. 
Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Kenworthy, J., & Cairns, E. (2009). Intergroup trust in Northern Ireland.  
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 45–59. 
Tannenbaum, D., Valasek, C. J., Knowles, E. D., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Incentivizing  
wellness in the workplace: Sticks (not carrots) send stigmatizing signals. Psychological Science, 
24, 1512–1522.  
Tax Justice Network (2011). The costs of tax abuse 2011. Retrieved from  
http://www.taxjustice.net/2014/04/01/cost-tax-abuse-2011. 
Texas judge orders convicted drunk driver to public humiliation (2012). Fox News. Retrieved  
from http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/04/21/texas-judge-orders-convicted-drunk-
driver-to-public-humiliation. 
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge. Yale University Press: New Haven.  
Treviño, L. K., Den Nieuwenboer, N. A., & Kish-Gephart, J. J. (2014). (Un)ethical behavior in  
organizations. Annual Review of Psychology, 65, 635–660. 
Treviño, L. K., Den Nieuwenboer, N. A., Kreiner, G. E., & Bishop, D. (2014). Legitimating the  
legitimate: The challenges of ethics and compliance work in organizations. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 123, 186–205. 
Tyler, T. R. (2006). Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimization. Annual Review of  
Psychology, 57, 375-400.  
Tyler, T.R. (2012). Justice theories. In P. Van Lange, A. Kruglanski, and T. Higgins (Eds.).  
Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Tyler, T. R., & Boeckmann, R. (1997). Three strikes and your out, but why? The psychology of  
public support for punishing rule breakers. Law & Society Review, 31, 237–265. 
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2000). Cooperation in groups: Procedural justice, social identity,  
and behavioral engagement. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.  
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2001). Identity and prosocial behavior in groups. Group Processes  
and Intergroup Relations, 4, 207–226.  
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2003). The group engagement model: Procedural justice, social  
identity, and cooperative behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, 349– 
361. 
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2005). Can businesses effectively regulate employee conduct? The 
502982-L-bw-Mooijman
 103 
antecedents of rule following in work settings. Academy of Management Journal, 48,  
1143–1158. 
Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. In J. M. Olson &  
M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 115–191). New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Van der Toorn, J., Feinberg, M., Jost, J. T., Kay, A. C., Tyler, T. R., Willer, R., & Wilmuth, C.  
(2015). A sense of powerlessness fosters system justification: Implications for the 
legitimation of authority, hierarchy, and government. Political Psychology, 36, 93–110. 
Van Dijk, E., Mulder, L. B., De Kwaadsteniet, E. W. (2014). For the common good? The use  
of sanctions in social dilemmas. In P. A. M., Van Lange., B. Rockenbach., &  
T, Yamagishi. (Eds.), Reward and punishment in social dilemmas (pp. 70–85). New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
Van Kleef, G. A., Oveis, C., Van der Löwe, L., Luogokan, A., Goetz, J., & Keltner, D.  
(2008). Power, distress and compassion: Turning a blind eye to the suffering of others. 
Psychological Science, 19, 1315–1322.  
Van Lange, P. A. M., Joireman, J. A., Parks, C. D., & Van Dijk, E. (2013). The psychology  
of social dilemmas: A review. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120, 
125–141. 
Van Prooijen, J-W., Coffeng, J., & Vermeer, M. (2014). Power and retributive justice: How  
trait information influences the fairness of punishment among power holders. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 50, 190–201. 
Vidmar, N., & Miller, D. T. (1980). Social psychological processes underlying attitudes  
toward legal punishment. Law & Society Review, 14, 565–602. 
Wenzel, M., Okimoto, T. G., Feather, N. T., & Platow, M. J. (2008). Retributive and restorative 
justice. Law and Human Behavior, 32, 375–389. 
Wilkinson, R. G., & Pickett, K. E. (2007). The problems of relative deprivation: Why some  
societies do better than others. Social Science and Medicine, 65, 1965–1978.  
Wilkinson, R. G., & Pickett, K. E. (2009). The spirit level: Why equality is better for  
everyone. London: Penguin Books.  
Williams, M. J. (2014). Serving the self from the seat of power: Goals and threats predict  
leaders’ self-interested behavior. Journal of Management, 40, 1365–1395. 
Willis, G. B., & Guinote, A. (2012). The effects of social power on goal content and goal  
striving: A situated perspective. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 5, 706–719.  
Wiltermuth, S., & Flynn, F. (2013). Power, moral clarity and punishment in the workplace.  
Academy of Management Journal, 4, 1002–1023. 
502982-L-bw-Mooijman
 104 
Wojciszke, B., & Kujalowicz–Struzynska, A. (2007). Power influences self-esteem. Social  
Cognition, 25, 472–494.  
Wyld, D. C. (2013). Transformational leadership: When is it redundant? Academy of  
Management Journal, 27, 2011–2013.  
Xiao, E., & Houser, D. (2011). Punish in public. Journal of Public Economics, 95, 1006–1017. 
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 110–116.  
Yamagishi, T., & Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan.  
 Motivation and Emotion, 18, 129–166. 




























Dutch Summary (Samenvatting) 
 Het handhaven van regels is een primaire taak van leiders in de politiek of het 
bedrijfsleven. De mate waarin mensen zich aan de regels houden correleert namelijk sterk met 
het financiële succes van een land of organisatie. Dit komt doordat regels normaal gesproken 
collectieve (belasting betalen, op tijd op het werk komen) in plaats van individuele belangen 
(belasting ontwijken, te laat op het werk komen) benadrukken (Akintoye & Tashie, 2013; Parks et 
al., 2013). Hoewel regel handhaving dus van belang is, is het voor leiders niet altijd even 
makkelijk om mensen zich aan de regels te laten houden. Het Amerikaanse bedrijf Enron ging 
bijvoorbeeld failliet omdat werknemers zich niet aan ethische regels hielden (Raul, 2002). Ook 
verschillen landen in grote mate van elkaar in hoe succesvol ze zijn in het ophalen van voldoende 
belastinggeld (e.g., belastingontwijking wordt voor Griekenland geschat op 25% van het BNP, 
terwijl dit voor de Verenigde Staten 8.6% is; Tax Justice Research, 2011). Maar wat maakt een 
leider dan (in)effectief in het handhaven van regels? Dit proefschrift probeert een antwoord op 
deze vraag te geven door de determinanten en gevolgen van strafdoelen te onderzoeken. Dat wil 
zeggen, wat voor specifiek doel hebben leiders voor ogen wanneer ze anderen straffen, en hoe 
effectief zijn leiders in het stimuleren van regel-navelend gedrag wanneer ze dit strafdoel 
nastreven? Het antwoord op deze vragen geeft een essentieel inzicht in de manier waarop leiders 
geneigd zijn (in)effectief te straffen.  
Ik heb in Hoofdstuk 2 onderzocht hoe het hebben van macht van invloed is op het doel 
dat leiders proberen te bereiken met een straf (i.e., macht als determinant van strafdoelen). Macht 
wordt over het algemeen gedefinieerd als het hebben van controle over waardevolle bronnen (i.e., 
zoals managers controle hebben over het salaris van werknemers; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008). Ik heb de invloed van macht op het gebruik van strafdoelen onderzocht door in 
een veld studie en 8 laboratorium experimenten aan mensen te vragen wat het doel van een straf 
volgens hen zou moeten zijn. Zou een straf vooral regel-overtredend gedrag van mensen moeten 
voorkomen, of zou een straf vooral mensen die de regels overtreden hun verdiende loon moeten 
geven? De straf ging of over studenten die uitgesloten zouden worden van een vak voor het 
plegen van plagiaat, burgers die een boete zouden krijgen voor belastingontwijking, of team leden 
die uit een groep gezet zouden worden voor het oneerlijk verdelen van (collectief beheerd) geld.  
Voordat ik deze vragen stelde manipuleerde ik in vier van de negen studies ook of 
mensen wel of geen machtspositie bekleedden, vroeg ik in vier van de negen studies in hoeverre 
mensen zich machtig of niet machtig voelden, en vroeg ik in een veldstudie of mensen wel of 
geen positie bekleedden als manager. Ook vroeg ik aan mensen in hoeverre ze anderen 
wantrouwden. Dachten ze dat studenten geneigd waren om plagiaat te plegen, burgers geneigd 
waren om belasting te ontduiken, en team leden geneigd waren om geld oneerlijk te verdelen? 
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Resultaten lieten zien dat mensen met veel (versus weinig) macht eerder aangaven dat een straf 
bedoeld zou moeten zijn om te voorkomen dat mensen zich niet aan de regels houden, in plaats 
van mensen hun verdiende loon te geven. Dit werd verklaard doordat hoe machtiger mensen 
zich voelden, hoe meer ze anderen wantrouwden. Doordat leiders over het algemeen meer macht 
hebben dan hun volgers, suggereert dit dus sterk dat leiders de neiging hebben te straffen om 
regel-overtredend gedrag te voorkomen. Ook suggereren de bevindingen uit Hoofdstuk 2 dat dit 
komt doordat het hebben van macht het wantrouwen in anderen vergroot.  
Leiders zijn dus door hun macht geneigd een straf te gebruiken om regel-overtredend 
gedrag te voorkomen. Maar hoe beïnvloedt dit de effectiviteit van de straf? In Hoofdstuk 4 heb 
ik onderzocht hoe en waarom het gebruik van strafdoelen als rechtvaardiging van een straf (i.e., 
een rechter die aangeeft dat een celstraf bedoeld is om te voorkomen dat de dader nog een keer 
in de fout gaat, of om deze dader een verdiende straf te geven), de effectiviteit van de straf 
beïnvloedt. Ik heb dit onderzocht door in vier experimenten te manipuleren of een straf door een 
universiteit, team leider of manager gerechtvaardigd werd als een poging om regel-overtredend 
gedrag van mensen te voorkomen of om mensen die regels breken hun verdiende loon te geven. 
Dit ging respectievelijk om een straf voor, (a) het plegen van plagiaat door studenten, (b) het 
stelen van kantoorgoederen door werknemers, en (c) het oneerlijk verdelen van collectief beheerd 
geld door groepsleden. Ook vroeg ik aan mensen in hoeverre ze zich gewantrouwd voelden door 
de leider die een straf rechtvaardigde als een poging om regel-overtredend gedrag te voorkomen 
of om mensen hun verdiende loon te geven. Resultaten lieten zien dat mensen minder geneigd 
waren zich aan de regels te houden als ze een leider hadden die een straf rechtvaardigde als een 
poging om te voorkomen dat ze regels zouden breken vergeleken met het geven van een 
verdiende straf aan regelovertreders. Dit suggereert dus sterk dat leiders door hun macht 
strafdoelen gebruiken die relatief ineffectief zijn. Hoe kunnen we dit voorkomen? De 
bevindingen uit Hoofdstukken 2 en 4  suggereren dat het wantrouwen van leiders in anderen een 
belangrijk onderdeel van dit ineffectieve straffen is. Dit wantrouwen vergroot de neiging van 
leiders om straffen te gebruiken om regel-overtredend gedrag te voorkomen en verminderd de 
effectiviteit van de straf (doordat mensen zich gewantrouwd voelen).  
In Hoofdstuk 3 heb ik onderzocht hoe het wantrouwen van leiders in anderen verkleind 
kan worden. In drie experimenten manipuleerde ik of mensen wel of geen machtspositie hadden, 
vroeg ik in hoeverre ze anderen wantrouwden en in hoeverre ze hun positie wilden behouden. 
Ook manipuleerde ik in een experiment in hoeverre de positie van mensen kon veranderen 
tijdens het experiment. Ik manipuleerde, met andere woorden, ook de (in)stabiliteit van 
machtsposities. Resultaten lieten zien dat mensen anderen meer wantrouwden wanneer ze een 
machtspositie hadden (versus geen machtspositie), en dat dit verklaard werd doordat 
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machthebbers graag hun eigen machtspositie wilden behouden (en vertrouwen dus als een 
manier zagen om macht te verliezen). Resultaten lieten verder zien dat het effect van macht op 
wantrouwen werd verkleind wanneer mensen met macht het gevoel hadden dat ze hun macht 
niet konden verliezen aan anderen (doordat ze een stabiele machtspositie hadden). Dit is dus 
consistent met het idee dat macht wantrouwen vergroot omdat machthebbers hun eigen macht 
willen behouden. 
De bevindingen uit dit proefschrift laten zien dat leiders door hun macht geneigd zijn te 
straffen om regel-overtredend gedrag te voorkomen, en dat het gebruik van dit strafdoel niet 
optimaal is voor de effectiviteit van de straf. De neiging van leiders om dit ineffectieve strafdoel 
te gebruiken kan verminderd worden door leiders zich niet bedreigd te laten voelen in hun 
machtspositie. De macht die leiders hebben zorgt er dus soms voor dat leiders minder effectief 
zijn in het handhaven van regels met straffen. Hoewel macht vaak aan leiders wordt gegeven 
zodat ze de regels kunnen handhaven met straffen, is dit dus niet altijd de meest effectieve 




















































 Een proefschrift is meer dan alleen wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Een proefschrift is ook 
een optelsom van jarenlang balans zoeken tussen werk en privé. Dat is bij dit proefschrift niet 
anders. De steun van familie, vrienden, en promotoren heeft het vinden van de juiste balans 
tussen werk, familie, vrienden, en de lang afstandsrelatie met Hayley een stuk gemakkelijker 
gemaakt. Eric, Wilco, en Naomi, bedankt voor het vertrouwen dat jullie in mij hebben gehad, de 
ruimte die jullie mij hebben gegeven, en het advies dat ik van jullie heb gekregen. Drie 
hoogleraren als promotoren was een uitdaging maar jullie vulden elkaar goed aan. Ik heb de 
samenwerking met jullie altijd als zeer plezierig ervaren. Ik ben dan ook trots om onderdeel te 
mogen uitmaken van de Leiden familie. Mijn collega’s, bedankt voor de leuke ASPO congressen. 
Jojanneke, bedankt voor je hulp, immer goede advies en openstaande kantoordeur (waar ik je 
regelmatig kwam lastigvallen). Dylan, mijn kleine grote broer, zonder jou had ik überhaupt niet 
eens nagedacht over een carrière in de wetenschap. Bedankt voor het inspireren van mijn leven 
en ik voel me bevoorrecht dat ik je enige vriend mag zijn. Mijn lieve ouders, jullie hebben altijd 
alles gedaan om het leven voor me gemakkelijk te maken. Bedankt voor het geven van het goede 
voorbeeld. Hard werken loont. Hayley Marie, 4 jaar een lange afstandsrelatie volhouden met mij 
mag een wereldprestatie heten. We hebben 1, 6, en 8 uur tijdverschil overleefd en we hebben 
elkaar soms 6 maanden niet kunnen zien. Die lange afstandsrelatie komt nu tot een einde. 
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